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ABSTRACT 
There is a growing importance for both biosecurity and biosafety globally and locally. In this context, 
this study examined and compared the biosecurity and biosafety systems of the Philippines and New 
Zealand. This study also considered the central issue of whether the international idea that biosecurity 
should be the strategic and integrated approach covering and encompassing biosafety and other related 
instruments, is present or being practised in the national context. This study utilised a qualitative 
research framework. It followed a case study approach as a process and a product of analysis, and 
employed triangulation technique of in-depth interviews, observation and used of pertinent/documents 
in gathering the relevant data and information. This study found that there are complexity of systems, 
policies, legislation, regulations, and cross-cutting issues that surround biosecurity and biosafety in the 
Philippines and New Zealand. In terms ofbiosecurity encompassing biosafety in the local context, this 
study revealed that such a concept is not yet present in the Philippines, whilst, to some extent it is 
happening in New Zealand. This study concluded that unless steps are taken to make national policies 
better informed, enhance understanding of the nature and relevance ofbiosecurity, and set strategic and 
operational priorities, then there will be a continuing overlap between biosecurity and biosafety at the 
national or local level. 
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CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
Today's reality meant that the agriculture and health and food safety institutions needed 
an expanded international vision and a broader mandate,' and needed to be restructured 
to include stronger alliances between, and integration of the activities of various sectors 
(FA 0 2003). 
The extent of international trade and travel has made an unprecedented leap in the 21 st century. 
Globalisation and changes in transport technologies have resulted in greater and more rapid trade as 
well as the development of new trade routes (Sutton 2003). These phenomena have huge economic, 
social, cultural and environmental implications. 
Pests, diseases and potentially harmful organisms can threaten the biodiversity, ecosystems, public 
health and economy of developed and developing nations. The potential pathways for spreading such 
pests and diseases are: accelerating movement of people by air from continent to continent; 
trans boundary movement of cargos and containers; and large increases in the volume of food and 
agricultural products being traded internationally. Improved biosecurity is being sought among 
national bodies responsible for enforcing sanitary, phytosanitary and zoosanitary measures to better 
protect human, animal and plant life and health without creating unnecessary technical barriers to trade 
(FAO 2003). In recent years, there has been greater recognition of the importance of biosecurity in 
relation to the protection of the economy, human health and the environment. Biosecurity policies 
have been gradually evolving from a narrow focus on production pests to a broader awareness of 
multiple economic, social and ecological objectives (Jay et al. 2003). 
Just as rapid as the increase in the globalisation of trade and travel is the pace of technological change 
in biotechnology. Modern biotechnology, through genetic engineering in particular, has revolutionised 
the agricultural and health sectors. These sectors have witnessed an exponential growth in the use of 
biotechnology over the last three decades, especially in advanced industrialised countries (Gupta 2001). 
A growing array of products derived from the use of modern biotechnology is being transferred across 
the globe giving rise to the issue and concept of biosafety. Biosafety as defined by the Secretariat of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (2000) refers to the need to protect the environment and human 
health from possible adverse effects of the products of modern biotechnology. At the same time, 
modem biotechnology is recognised as having a great potential for the promotion of human well-being, 
particularly in meeting critical needs for food, agriculture and health care (SCBD 2000). 
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These recent developments highlight the growing importance of both biosecurity and biosafety. 
Biosecurity is a relatively new concept and a term that is evolving as usage varies among countries 
with different specialist groups using it in different ways. The issues encompassed in biosecurity have 
traditionally been dealt with in a sectoral manner by means of food safety laws, animal and plant 
quarantine and pesticide regulations (FAO 2003). Emerging issues of biosafety and the necessity to 
control the introduction and management of invasive alien species into the environment mean that a 
growing numberof concerns need to be addressed. 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (2003) defines biosecurity as a strategic 
and integrated approach that encompasses the policy and regulatory frameworks (including instruments 
and activities) that analyse and manage risks in the sectors of food safety, animal life and health, and 
plant life and health, including associated environmental risks. Biosecurity covers the introduction of 
plant pests, animal pests and diseases, and zoonoses; the introduction and release of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) and their products; and the introduction and management of invasive 
alien species and genotypes. The F AO regards biosecurity as "a holistic concept of direct relevance to 
the sustainability of agriculture, food safety, and the protection of the environment, including 
biodiversity" (F AO 2003: 1). 
As the F AO tends to encompass the issues of GMOs within the context of biosecurity, another relevant 
instrument, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (the Protocol) to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), came into force on 11 September 2003. Its purpose is to regulate the safe use, 
handling, transit, and trans boundary movement of living modified organisms (LMOs)l. The Protocol 
in effect reflects a sectoral approach to regulation in this area. 
The current situation indicates that there could be potential overlaps and perhaps areas of potential 
conflict between the two systems. The need for a coordinated and/or unified approach to handling the 
issues of biosecurity and biosafety cannot be underestimated. Furthermore, the coming into force of 
the Cartagena Protocol as a binding international legal instrument has direct relevance to biosecurity 
from the point of view of potential impacts and implications of LMOs on biological diversity and the 
environment. This calls for the strengthening of the national and regional governments and institutions 
in their systems in the light of international and regional harmonisation. In view of this, it is imperative 
to look into the systems and frameworks both in "developed" and "developing" countries, which 
encompass policy, regulation, capacity and implementation. 
It is in this context, that this thesis examines and compares the biosecurity and biosafety systems of the 
Philippines and New Zealand. This study builds up from the experiences and lessons leamed from 
1 The tenninology used for such organisms is a subject of debate. 
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both countries to make a cross-systems/cross-case analysis. Whilst New Zealand leads the Philippines 
in terms of the implementation and management of an advanced biosecurity system, it is notable that 
the Philippines has been grappling with the issue of effective management of genetically modified 
organisms (biosafety) particularly in agriculture and social development, for a greater period than New 
Zealand. This contrast, in part, reflects the differing philosophies of the two countries and regions in 
terms of agriculture, development, and conservation. It is also an important distinction in terms of 
policy approach and policy outcomes. 
Moreover, this thesis considers the central issue of whether the international idea that "biosecurity 
should be the strategic and integrated approach covering and encompassing biosafety and other related 
instruments" (F AO 2003: I); is present or being practised in the national context. During the 
commencement of this study, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety came into force in September 2003; 
New Zealand released its first Biosecurity Strategy in August 2003; and the Philippines was developing 
its National Biosafety Framework. Hence, this thesis shows the timeliness of this research and the 
opportunities that arise in view of effecting change in these areas. 
1.1 Research Questions 
The study focuses on addressing the following questions: 
1. What are the contrasting biosecurity and biosafety policy approaches in the Philippines and New 
Zealand? 
2. Why and how effective are the differing frameworks and strategies being used in both countries for 
biosecurity and biosafety? 
3. What are the gaps andlor potential overlaps within and between the biosecurity and biosafety 
systems? 
4. What are the challenges and cross-cutting issues in view ofbiosecurity and biosafety governance? 
5. What are the shared norms in biosecurity and biosafety in both countries? 
6. How does the idea of biosecurity encompassing biosafety operate in the national or local context, 
i.e. in the case of the Philippines and New Zealand? 
1.2 Significance of the Stndy 
This thesis contributes to a better understanding of the way biosecurity and biosafety systems work in 
the case of a developed country like New Zealand and a developing country such as the Philippines. 
For the Philippines, it leads to a greater understanding of how the country may successfully integrate a 
biosecurity system alongside their current biosafety system. Also, there is a value from this study for 
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New Zealand. The Ph~lippines and New Zealand have similar strategic interests in terms of their 
, . 
presence and interest in the Pacific and South-East Asia; as an example both countries contributed to 
peacekeeping efforts in East Timor. This study could lead to increased dialogue and understanding of 
both countries' approaches to biosecurity and biosafety; and learn from their unique 'lessons~learned' 
and experiences. 
This thesis also contributes to knowledge of the way in which the global idea of biosecurity 
encompassing biosafety works within the national or local context. The findings and discussion in this 
thesis will interest: policy advisors; academics and researchers working in the areas of biosecurity and 
or biosafety; government officials and planners; and social and environmental scientists, among others. 
This study also opens up areas for further and potential research in the relatively new field of 
biosecurity and biosafety. 
1.3 Structure of the Study 
The structure of this study is ordered in such a way that while the chapters can stand alone its 
chronological order facilitates a better understanding of the whole thesis. 
Chapter 2 reviews past research undertaken on the topic in the Philippines and New Zealand, as well as 
overseas studies, noting the gaps in the body of research. 
Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology used in the study. In particular, it describes the research 
locale, the research paradigm the research design/approach, data gathering techniques, data analysis 
and the researcher's bias. The primary methodology used was the integrated element of the qualitative 
research approach to case-studies on the way biosecurity and biosafety is practised in two countries. 
The researcher employed the triangulation technique of in-depth interviews, secondary/archived 
documents, and observation in informing the case-study analysis. 
Chapter 4 profiles and outlines the enabling policies, laws, regulations and regulatory regime for 
biosecurity and biosafety in the Philippines. 
Chapter 5 profiles and outlines the enabling policies, laws, regulations and regulatory regime for 
biosecurity and biosafety in New Zealand 
Chapter 6 presents and discusses the intertwining issues, concerns and challenges to biosecurity and 
biosafety in the Philippines. 
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Chapter 7 presents and discusses the crosscutting issues, concerns and challenges to biosecurity and 
biosafety in New Zealand. 
Chapter 8 provides a cross-case analysis from the two case studies of the experiences of the Philippines 
and New Zealand, in view of their biosecurity and biosafety systems. 
Chapter 9 presents a summary of the study by outlining in bullet points the synthesized 
concepts/lessons from the field as an outcome ofthe study. It also presents the conclusion of the study, 
the implications of the findings, the recommendations for future research and the limitations of the 
study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
An understanding of any research topic requires one to go back to previous research as sources for 
learning. This study of biosecurity and biosafety systems in the Philippines and New Zealand is no 
exception. This Chapter reviews the previous researches and documents relevant to the fields of study. 
2.1 Biosecurity in the International Context 
"Biosecurity is of growing interest as a result of major international developments, including 
globalisation of the world economy, the rapid increase in communications, transport and trade, 
technological progress, and increased awareness of biological diversity and environmental issues" 
(FAO 2001: 2). During the Sixteenth Session of the Committee on Agriculture (COAG) of the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation of the United N~tions (FAO) in March 2001, the Committee agreed to 
endorse a common integrated approach to biosecurity. The COAG identified that biosecurity is a key 
requirement for achieving the goals set out in the F AO Strategic Framework by promoting, developing, 
and re-enforcing policy and regulatory frameworks for food, agriculture, fisheries and forestry. It was 
noted that biosecurity has direct relevance to food safety, the conservation of the environment 
(including biodiversity), and sustainability of agriculture. This led to a an Inter-agency Meeting and an 
International Expert Consultation in September 2002 to improve understanding of the nature and 
relevance of biosecurity in food and agriculture in view of advancing its practical implementation 
particularly in developing countries (FAO 2002). In 2003, a technical consultation on biological risk 
management in food and agriculture was conducted in Thailand. The consultation recommended that 
"countries should determine the potential for synergies and harmonisation within their national and 
sub-regional regulatory frameworks that would result from a holistic and coordinated approach to 
biosecurity. Policy makers should recognise the importance of biosecurity as a key element of 
sustainable development, and the benefits, including in trade that can be gained from comprehensive 
approaches to biosecurity" (F AO 2003: 8). 
In the United States for instance, Meyerson & Reaser (2002) illustrated and emphasized the need for 
the United States and other governments to adopt a comprehensive approach to biosecurity, so as to 
minimise the risk or harm caused by (non-native) organisms to the economy, environment and human 
health. They have identified that although there were numerous reports and papers recommending 
actions to prevent the movement and establishment of hannful organisms in the United States, these 
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materials focused only on individual sectors (i.e. health, agriculture, and environment) but without a 
vision for building a comprehensive, integrated biosecurity system. 
The need for strengthening biosecurity for food security and agricultural trade was also identified in the 
Asia-Pacific Region. In an F AO (2004) report on 'Regional Strategic Framework for Asia and the 
Pacific towards a Food-Secure Asia and Pacific', strengthening biosecurity in the region was one of the 
six priority programme areas. The report highlighted the fact that production systems in Asia and the 
Pacific are rapidly evolving in response to increasing demand for food and agricultural products as well 
as to globalisation pressures. Furthermore, the report underscored that "biosecurity is now one of the 
urgent issues that confronts both the region and the international community" (F AO 2004: 19). The 
report also identified that more coordinated efforts are required to take into account overlapping global 
and regional issues encompassing sustainable agriculture, food security, environmental protection, loss 
of biodiversity and trade. The need for the development of national policies and regulatory frameworks 
relating to biosecurity and biosafety was identified as a major step on this front. However, the 
interrelated biosecurity issues in Asia and the Pacific remain inadequately understood or addressed 
(FAO 2004), and the studies related to such issues are scarce ifnot nil. 
2.1.1 Biosecurity and Biosafety: peCUliarities ill usage alld defillition 
Biosecurity and biosafety are relatively new concepts. These are terms that are evolving as usage 
varies among countries with different specialist groups using them in different ways (FAO 2003). 
FAO uses the tenn biosecurity in relation to sanitary, phytosanitary and zocisanitary measures applied 
to food and agricultural systems. They also use the term synonymously with "Biosecurity in food and 
agriculture". In a series of consultations conducted by the FAO from 2001 to 2003, the need for 
translation and harmonisation of terminology has been emphasized. They found that the usage of the 
term biosecurity varies among countries. For instance they noted the variation in translation 
particularly for Spanish and French. The terms "Bioseguridad" (Spanish) and "Biosecurite" (French) 
have been used in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety for the translation of the word biosafety. As a 
result, the F AO COAG recommended standardising the use of the English term "Biosecurity" (i.e. 
capitalised, italicised and not translated at all) in all languages for the purpose of their consultations 
and reporting. Tucker (2003) noted filliher that although the terms biosecurity and biosafety were 
often used interchangeably, they refer to different issues. 
There are notable differences (within and between terms) in the definitions of biosecurity and 
biosafety. For instance, according to Meyerson & Reaser (2002) the term biosecurity was previously 
used in the United States primarily to describe an approach designed to prevent or decrease the 
transmission of infectious diseases in crops and livestock. They observed however, that the tenn has 
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been applied more broadly in recent times to encompass efforts to prevent harm from both intentional 
and unintentional introductions of organisms to human health, infrastructure, agriculture and the 
environment. Tucker (2003) however, provided a contrasting definition of biosecurity as a term to 
denote policies and procedures designed to prevent the deliberate theft, diversion, or malicious use of 
high-consequence pathogens and toxins. In New Zealand, the defmition of biosecurity also evolved 
through time. The New Zealand Biosecurity Act 1993 does not specifically define the term 
'biosecurity' however, the title of the Act does contain the following purpose " ... the exclusion, 
eradication, and effective management of pests and unwanted organisms." Subsequently, in 2003 the 
New Zealand Biosecurity Strategy provided an expanded definition of biosecurity to mean the 
exclusion, eradication or effective management of risks posed by pests and diseases to the economy, 
environment and human health. 
Finally, the F AO COAO in 2003 provided a holistic definition of biosecurity. It states that "biosecurity 
is a strategic and integrated approach that encompasses the policy and regulatory frameworks 
(including instruments and activities) that analyse and manage risks in the sectors of food safety, 
animal life and health, and plant life and ~ealth, including associated environmental risk." It 
emphasises that biosecurity should "cover( s) the introduction of plant pests, animal pests and diseases, 
and zoonoses, the introduction and release of genetically modified organisms (OMOs) and their 
products, and the introduction and management of invasive alien species and genotypes." The F AO 
looks at biosecurity as a holistic concept of direct relevance to the sustainability of agriculture, food 
safety, and the protection ofthe environment, including biodiversity. 
2.2 Biosecurity in the Philippines 
In the Philippines biosecurity is a relatively new term. There is no specific document or official 
publication that has particularly studied biosecurity systems in the country, according to the F AO or 
New Zealand's definition of biosecurity. However, Padolina2 (2004) directly linked the issue of 
biosecurity and its relevance to food security and highlighted the imperatives for a biosecurity system 
in the country. Responsibilities for biosecurity issues in the country is dispersed among different 
sectors involving agriculture, health, the environment, forestry, fisheries, trade and industry (FAO 
2004). 
2 Dr. William Padolina, Deputy Director General for Partnership of the International Rice Research Institute CIRRI), presented 
a topic on: Biosecurity and Food Security at SEARCA on 29 January 2004. A PowerPoint presentation for the said topic was 
obtained by the researcher. 
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In view of the limited study on the topic of biosecurity in the country, this section focuses on reviewing 
the literature that revealed the extent of a problem directly related to biosecurity in the Philippines. It 
centres on the growing problem of invasive alien species in the country and highlights the pressing 
need for a system that will address and manage the risks associated with them. 
2.2.1 Tlte Case of Invasive Alien Species 
In the Philippines, the numbers of introduced alien species are growing. Most of these species, 
especially the tree species, are introduced for economic reasons and for forest rehabilitation purposes. 
Almost all ecosystems are affected. The more invasive alien species are the tilapia (Tilapia 
mossambica), Thai catfish (Clarias batrachus), golden apple snail (Pomacea canaliculata), water 
hyacinth (Eichhornia crassipes), Chromolaena odorata, Lantana camara and the insect pests 
associated with introduced tree species (Uriarte 2005). 
Halos (2003) reported there are already known instances of new introductions that have not resulted in 
economic benefit but rather have had adverse environmental and economic consequences in the 
Philippines. One particular species, the water hyacinth (Eichornia crassipes Mart Solms), originally 
from tropical America and introduced as ornamental in 19123 has become a noxious weed, clogging 
waterways, covering swampy areas, and crowding out other species in the area. A look out of the 
airplane window as one approaches Manila Airport will show the number of water inlets following to 
the Pasig River which are clogged and rendered impassable by water hyacinth. 
hl the report of Halos (2003), the introduction of some aquatic species resulted in biodiversity and 
economic losses. For instance, the Thai catfish (Clarias batrachus) introduced in 1972 displaced the 
native catfish (Clarias macrocephalus) in its native habitat. More recently, an aquarium catfish 
species, the janitor fish (Plecostomus hyposfomus), introduced in the 1990s is becoming a problem for 
fishermen in Laguna Lake. They claimed that this fish can destroy fish nets and compete for food with 
the more valuable commercial fish species4• 
One of the worst introductions is the golden kuho!. This snail, a native of South America, was 
introduced through Taiwan between 1982 and 1984 by a private individual, but the government soon 
picked it up as a livelihood project. Raising golden kuhol was primarily intended for food 
consumption in view of its nutritional benefits and as alternative source of income for small-scale 
fanners (Halos 2003). By 1986, this pest was reported to have damaged 300 hectares of rice fields in 
Cagayan Valley (Guerrero 2001). Golden kuhol continues to infest 11 % of the irrigated rice fields and 
3 PROSEA, Plant Resources of Southeast Asia Vol. 11 
4 Philippine Daily Inquirer, Aug 8, 2003 
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appears to have displaced the native snail, Pila luzonica. Farmers spent an estimated US$23 million 
between 1980 and 1998 in an effort to control this pest (Halos 2003, Uriarte 2005). 
Of the introduced tree species, ipil-ipil (Leucena leucocephala) and kakawate (Gliricidia septum) can 
be seen to have spread around the country. These species behave like pioneer species and their impacts 
into the ecosystem have not been recorded yet. However, the introduction of the giant ipil-ipil has 
facilitated the infestation of a new insect pest, (Psyllid sp) and this has checked the rapid spread of the 
giant ipil-ipiL Early in its introduction, ecologists warned that this type of ipil-ipil could develop into a 
weed because it was claimed to be more pest resistant than the existing dwarf types. (Halos 2003, 
Uriarte 2005). The list of alien species in the country and their effects on the ecosystems is presented 
in the table below. 
Table 1. Effects on the Ecosystems of some Alien Species Introduced in the Philippines5• 
Alien Species 
I. Wetland Ecosystems 
A. Fish 
1. Thai catfish (Clarias batrachus) 
Effects to the Ecosystem 
The introduction in Luzon led to the displacement of native 
catfish (Clarias macrocephalus), which became widespread in 
many parts of the country 
It was thought they would boost the aquaculture industry, 
however they were not commercialized because of their tough 
flesh 
2. African catfish (Clarias gariepinus) Not yet considered invasive but on the "watched list" 
3. Tilapia (Tilapia mossambica) Has invaded most lakes and river and now even inhabits saline 
estuaries 
4. Janitor fish (Hyposto111uS 
plecostomus) 
B. Snails 
1. African giant snail (Achatina fulica) 
and 
2. Golden apple snail (Pomacea 
canaliculata) 
C. Aquatic Plants 
1. Water fern (Salvinia molesta) 
S This table is adapted from Uriarte 2005. 
For aquariums; invaded Laguna Lake; Not yet considered 
invasive but on the tlwatched list" 
Purposely imported to avert malnutrition as source of protein 
and as an aquarium novelty; dominated many ecosystems thus 
causing huge losses; led to the displacement of the native snail 
(Pila luzonica); major pest to the newly planted rice seedlings 
Rapidly invading other bodies of water; a problem weed in 
Iloilo especially in irrigated rice field; clogs waterways 
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Table 1. .. . cont'd. 
Alien Species 
2. Water hyacinth (Eichhorni 
crassipes) 
D. Amphibians 
1. Marine toad (Bufo marin us) 
2. American bullfrog (Rana 
catesbeina) 
II. Forest Ecosystems 
A. Tree Species and Insect Pests 
1. Gmelina arborea 
2. Acacia mangiul11 
3. Eucalyptus camaldulensis 
4. Swietenia macrophylla 
5. Leucaena leucocephala 
B. Invertebrates 
1. Big headed ant (Pheidole 
megacephalus) 
2. Fire ant (Solenopsis geminate) 
3. Jumping plant lice (Heterophylla 
cubana) 
4. Leaf miner (Liriomyza sp.) 
5. Spiralling whitefly (Aleurodicus 
dispeures) 
Effects to the Ecosystem 
Rapidly invading Marikina and Laguna rivers; reduces growth 
of plankton that provides food for fish; clogs waterways 
A very prolific toad species; caused the decrease in the 
popUlation of native frogs in Negros 
Displaced native frogs 
Host of Ozola minor, Attacus and Xyleutis species; infested 
several.Gmelina arborea stand in the country and could be a 
widespread problem in the future 
Host of Anoplophora luciphor; infested Acacia mangium and 
could potentially infest other commercially introduced Acacia 
sp. in the country. 
Host of unidentified termite species; termite is a big problem 
in the Philippines both in living trees and in structural wood. 
Host of Zeuzera coffeae; affected stands of mahogany 
(Swietenia macrophylla) and could affect species from the 
same family (Meleaceae) 
Host of Heteropsylla cubana; considerably damaged all ipil-
ipil stand in the country and could potentially invade other 
native plants 
Displaced most inve11ebrate faunas; pest to agriculture as it 
harbours phytophagous insects that reduce crop productivity 
Invaded native communities and affected many, or all of the 
animals and plants in the community; has fiery and painful 
stings; nests in the soil 
Introduced by the typhoon in 1980. It has affected almost all 
standing Leucena leucocephala plantations 
Accidentally introduced with the importation of 
chrysanthemums: Major pest of potato crops and omamentals 
Affects vegetables and ornamentals. Accidentally introduced 
with the imp011ation of ornamental kalanchoe in 1970s 
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Table 1 ... . cont'd. 
Alien Species 
6. Mealy bug (Pseudococcus sp.) 
7. Riceblack bug (Scontiniphora 
coarctata) 
8. Potato cyst nematode 
(Globodera rastochlensis) 
C. Animal 
1. Wild pig (Sus scro/a) 
III. Grassland Ecosystems 
1. Hagonoy (Chromolaena odorata) 
2. Lantana (Lantana camara) 
3. Chinese creeper (Mikania micranth) 
4. South American shrub 
(Pachysachys coccinea) 
5. Mimosa pigra 
Source: Uriarte 2005 
2.3 Biosecurity in New Zealand 
Effects to the Ecosystem 
Affects the coconut in Northern Palawan. Accidentally 
introduced in 1990 with the importation of hybrid coconut 
planting materials 
Major problem of rice in Mindanao and Leyte. This bug was 
introduced through vessels plying the route between the 
province ofPalawan and countries south of the Philippines 
Accidentally introduced in the importation of potato planting 
materials. Heavily infesting potato fanns in Benguet in the 
Northern Philippines 
Causes damage to agricultural crops; outcompeted the 
indigenous bearded pig (Barbatus celebensis) 
Considered to be a hannful plant in grasslands because it 
outgrows or prevents establishment of other species like 
lmperata cylindrica 
Weed in pasturelands 
Kills other plants by smothering them 
Introduced as an ornamental; dominates nature reserves and 
parks in Luzon 
Invades lowland/upland, agricultural land 
New Zealand is the first country in the world that enacted a biosecurity law the Biosecurity Act of 
1993. The Act in essence, restated and refonned the law relating to the exclusion, eradication, and 
effective management of pest and unwanted organisms. Historically, New Zealand's biosecurity effort 
was directed at protecting land-based primary production which includes agriculture, forestry and 
h0l1iculture industries; and facilitating intel11ational trade in primary products (Sutton, 2003). Jay et al. 
(2003) reported that in the past, biosecurity activities in New Zealand has been successful in protecting 
the country from economically important organisms however, it was less successful in relation to the 
protection of the natural environment. A report published by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment (2000) provided a comprehensive analysis of New Zealand's biosecurity system prior to 
the new system that is currently being implemented in the country. The report was highly critical of 
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the operational weight placed on economic biosecurity objectives, and the almost total exclusion of 
marine biosecurity issues. It stated that New Zealand's biosecurity system needs a set of clearly 
articulated directions, "particularly in relation to native flora and fauna, biodiversity, and ecosystem 
and public health" (2000: 7). Arguably, a recent study of Jay et aT. (2003: 121) concluded that "New 
Zealand's biosecurity policies have been gradually evolving from a narrow focus on production pests 
to a broader awareness of multiple economic, social, and ecological objectives." 
In 2003, the New Zealand Biosecurity Council released its biosecurity strategy. The Council redefined 
the meaning of biosecurity for New Zealand and it stated that "biosecurity is the exclusion, eradication 
or effective management of risks posed by pests and diseases to the economy, environment and human 
health" (Biosecurity Council 2003). The new definition shows that biosecurity in New Zealand has 
evolved from a narrow focus to a broader awareness of multiple economic, social and environmental 
objectives (Jay et aT. 2003). Overall, the Strategy concludes that New Zealand's biosecurity system is 
well developed however, it also identifies weaknesses in a range of areas. Sutton (2003) highlighted 
some of these in the government's response to the Strategy. The Strategy seeks continual, incremental 
improvement in as systematic manner across the biosecurity system. It has not identified any area 
where activity is totally lacking or performance is drastically inadequate but rather, it has highlighted a 
series of areas where steady ongoing improvement is needed. The strategy also notes that, at its heart, 
improving the biosecurity system's performance requires excellence in implementation and 
management and recognises that this will require substantial efforts and resources. Ultimately, how 
much can be achieved will be determined by the extent to which society values each of the outcomes to 
which biosecurity contributes (Sutton 2003). 
At present, the current biosecurity system in New Zealand has shifted from a sectoral approach to a 
broader but integrated whole-of-system approach to biosecurity (MOU 2005). It is also geared towards 
addressing and managing risks at points of intervention, i.e. at pre-clearance6 and post-clearance7• This 
system will be discussed further in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
2.4 Biosafety in the International Context 
The origin of biosafety has its roots in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Adopted in 
1992 under the auspices ofthe United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Convention is the 
first global treaty to provide a comprehensive framework that addresses all aspects of biodiversity -
ecosystems, species and genetic diversity. It also introduces a new strategy for the biodiversity crisis 
known as the "ecosystem approach", which aims to reconcile the need for environmental conservation 
6 Management of biosecurity risks before it enters the border or at the border. 
7 Management of 'residual' biosecurity risks, i.e. risks that cannot be managed by pre-clearance activities or that remain after 
pre-clearance conditions have been met, or where risk is already present within New Zealand. 
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with concern for economic development (SCBD & UNEP 2003). Today, the Convention is the main 
international instrument for addressing biodiversity issues. With almost 190 governments signatories 
as Parties, the convention aims to provide a comprehensive and holistic approach to the conservation of 
biological diversity, the sustainable use of natural resources, and the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits derived from the use of genetic resources. Biosafety is one of the issues addressed by the 
Convention. This concept refers to the need to protect human health and the environment from the 
possible adverse effects of the products of modern biotechnology. At the same time, modem 
biotechnology is recognised as having a great potential for the promotion of human well-being, 
particularly in meeting critical needs for food, agriculture and health care. 
At its second meeting, held in Jakarta on November 1995, the Conference of the Parties (COP2) to the 
Convention established an open-ended ad hoc Working Group on Biosafety to develop a draft protocol 
on biosafety. The focus of the draft protocol was specifically on transboundary movement of any 
LMO resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity. After several years of negotiations, the Protocol, known as the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, was finalised and adopted 
in Montreal on 29 January 2000 at an extraordinary meeting of the Conference of the Parties (SCBD 
2000). On 11 September 2003 the formal entry into force of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety took 
place and marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of the Protocol (SCBD 2003). 
2.4.1 The Cartagena Protocol Oil Biosafety 
The Cartagena Protocol promotes biosafety by establishing practical rules and procedures for the safe 
transfer, handling and use of GMOs, with a specific focus on regulating movements of these organisms 
across borders, from one country to another (SCBD 2003). This system features two separate sets of 
procedures, one for GMOs that are to be intentionally introduced into the environment, and one for 
GMOs that are to be used directly as food, or feed, or for processing. Both sets of procedures are 
designed to ensure that recipient countries are provided with the information they need for making 
informed decisions about whether or not to accept GMO imports. Governments exchange this 
information through a Biosafety Clearing House and base their decision on scientifically sound risk 
assessments and on the "precautionary approach" (SCBD & UNEP 2003). 
The entry into force of the Biosafety Protocol presents a new challenge. Like other international 
agreements, implementation of the requirements of the Protocol will be an on-going and iterative 
process. Zedan (2003) stated that the primary step is the translation of those requirements into 
appropriate domestic laws and other practical implementation measures. Countries need to establish a 
well thought-through biosafety framework that is workable, transparent, and consistent with the 
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Protocol and other international agreements and eventually start 'working with the Protocol' once they 
have become Parties (van der Meer 2003, cited in SCBD 2003). However, it is complicated by the lack 
of shared norms in the governance of biosafety. In India for instance, Gupta (2001) reported that 
shared norms in biosafety governance were missing. In implementing the Cartagena Protocol, Falkuer 
and Gupta (2004) reported that although the Cartagena Protocol is becoming a global source of rules 
and norms for GMO trade, there are important elements which need to be negotiated by the Parties in 
order to make it a comprehensive regulatory system. 
There are differences as well in how some countries approach their national policies on biosafety. For 
example, UNEP-GEF (2004) reported that Myanmar, as well as a number of Pacific Island countries, 
see biosafety within the context of their national policies on biosecurity i.e. together with their plant 
and animal quarantine, as well as management of invasive species. In the case of Bhutan, Lebanon, 
Moldova and Romania, they include biosafety within the context of their national policies or plans on 
biodiversity conservation and environmental protection. The current scenario indicates a need for a 
better understanding of the whole concept of biosafety in relation to biosecurity and other fields. 
2.5 Biosafety in the Philippines 
The Philippines was the first country in the ASEAN region to develop a biosafety system (NCBP 
1990). In 1987, scientists from the University of the Philippines at Los Banos (UPLB), International 
Rice Research Institute (IRRI), and Department of Agriculture (DA) constituted themselves into an ad 
hoc Committee on Biosafety. The ad hoc Committee lobbied before the national government for the 
formulation of a national policy on biosafety and the creation of a technical body to draft guidelines 
that would ensure experiments where genetic manipulation is involved do not pose unacceptable risks 
to human health and the environment (NCBP 1990). 
These effOlts and policy initiatives of the scientific community subsequently led to the creation of the 
National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP). In October 1990, former President 
Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) No. 430 constituting the NCBP, a mUlti-disciplinary, 
inter-agency, scientific and technical advisory committee tasked with "undertaking the study and 
evaluation of existing laws, policies and guidelines on biotechnology; and recommending measures for 
its effective utilisation and prevention of possible harmful effects on the environment" (Ochave & 
Estacio 2001). 
In the international arena, the Philippines is a member-party to several international agreements which 
impact on the implementation of biosafety practices in the country. It is a member-party to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) having signed it in 1992 and subsequently ratified it in 
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October 1993. In May 2000, the Philippines signed the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the CBD; 
the country however, has not ratified the Protocol and therefore is not a Party to it yet, since its entry 
into force on 11 September 2003. According to Halos et al. (2004) it may still take time for 
Presidential ratification of, and Senate concurrence of the Cartagena Protocol. In the last two meetings 
of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meetings of the Parties (COP/MOP - 1 & 2) held in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and Montreal, Canada, respectively, the Philippines remained as an observer. 
In October 2002, the Philippines became a beneficiary of the UNEP/GEF Global Project on 
Development of National Biosafety Frameworks (NBF). The NBF Project aims to prepare countries 
for the entry into force of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. A major output of the Project in the 
Philippines is the development of its NBF. 
In terms of specific research conducted in line with biosafety in the Philippines, Aerni (2002) 
conducted a study comparing stakeholders' attitudes toward the risks and benefits of agricultural 
biotechnology in the Philippines and Mexico. In particular, Aerni found that stakeholders in the 
Philippines and Mexico were concerned about the potential impact of transgenic crops on both 
countries' rich biological diversity. It was also noted in the Aerni study that the stakeholders are not 
convinced that the national biosafety guidelines will be implemented properly in the two countries. 
2.6 Biosafety in New Zealand 
Prior to 1996, there was no law in New Zealand specifically dealing with the release of GMOs into the 
environment. In 1988, the Minister for the Environment set up a body called the Interim Assessment 
Group (lAG), which reviewed proposals to field test or release GMOs but had no statutory basis. 
Review was mandatory for government-funded research and voluntary for privately-funded research 
((Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 2001). 
The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act of 1996 (HSNO) established a regulatory regime 
for new organisms, including GMOs, to be administered by a new agency, the Environmental Risk 
Management Authority (ERMA). HSNO's rules on new organisms came into effect in 1998. Under 
HSNO, applications to develop or test a new organism in containment, or to release it into the 
environment, are reviewed by ERMA staff and decided upon by the Authority, a six- to eight-member 
quasi-judicial board whose members are appointed by the Minister for the Environment. 
When the HNSO Act was enacted in 1996, it established a regulatory regime for new organisms, 
including GMOs, to be administered by a new agency which is the ERMA. The HSNO rules on new 
organisms came into effect in 1998 and currently, all GMO applications are considered new organisms 
and so are under ERMA's jurisdiction. Although ERMA has jurisdiction over applications to 
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intentionally release a GMO, it lacks the operational capacity to enforce its decisions under HSNO, so 
enforcement is handled by MAF under the provisions ofHSNO Amendment Act of2003. 
ill the years 2000 to 2001, the New Zealand government appointed an independent Royal Commission 
on Genetic Modification to preside over one of the most ambitious, wide-ranging public debates on the 
question of genetic modification ever attempted anywhere (Pollak 2003). The Royal Commission heard 
testimonies from hundreds of interested groups and experts, as well as the views of thousands of 
members of the general public. 
Pollak (2003) provides a brief summary of the process that the Royal Commission went through which 
included: scoping meetings, formal hearings, public meetings, public submissions, Maori consultation 
programmes, youth forums and public opinion surveys. The outcomes of these public consultations 
were succinctly summarized by Pollak (2003: i): "The Royal Commission's work supports a number of 
observations and conclusions about public participation. Among other things, it demonstrated the 
usefulness of having several mutually enforcing streams of public consultation, and of making efforts 
to overcome cultural, temporal and geographic barriers to foster wide participation. The Royal 
Commission's conclusions departed significantly from the anti-GM views held by the majority of the 
general public. What, then, was accomplished by consulting the public? The Royal Commission 
process helped to stimulate a debate that likely enhanced public understanding. Although many 
disagree with the current direction of policy, the Royal Commission's report clearly helped the 
Government to shape policies that acknowledge and reflect many areas of public concern." 
In October 2003, Parliament enacted legislation amending the HSNO Act. The amendments enacted 
into law many of the recommendations of the Royal Commission. Key amendments to the HNSO Act 
will be presented in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research questions of this thesis required a methodological approach that could accommodate a 
focus on in-country systems, policies, regulations, issues and influences on process and outcome. The 
primary methodology used was the integrated element of qualitative research approach to two country 
case-studies on the way biosecurity and biosafety is practised. The researcher employed the 
triangulation technique of in-depth interviews, secondary/archived documents, and observation in 
informing the case-study analysis. 
3.1 The Research Locale 
This study drew on the experiences of the Philippines and New Zealand in terms of the biosecurity and 
biosafety systems in place in both countries and how they operate. This study was inspired by the 
intrinsic parallelism between the countries with respect to a number of areas presented in the following 
sections below. 
3.1.1 Country Profile 
The Philippines 
The Philippines is an archipelago comprising 7,107 islands (depending on whether it is high tide or low 
tide) lying about 805 km off the southeast coast of Asia. It is located on the Asia-Pacific "Ring of 
Fire" and has a total land area of approximately 300,000 square kilometres (circa 30 million hectares) 
two thirds of which are mountainous with narrow coastal lowlands. The islands are grouped into three 
large groups: Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. The capital Manila is located in Luzon which is the 
major northern island8• 
The country's encounter with the Western world started after Fernando Magallanes, the Portuguese 
navigator serving the King of Spain, landed on its shore on 16 March 1521. Before that, however, the 
Filipinos had a civilisation of their own and had been trading partners of the Chinese, the Arabs, and 
g United States Department of State Bureau of East A~ian and Pacific Affairs' Background Note: Philippines. 
www.slatc.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.ntm. Date retrieved: 30 September 2005. 
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the people of neighbouring countries for centuries. The Philippines was under Spanish control from 
1565-1898, the United States from 1898-1942, and Japan from 1942-19456, 
As of July 2005, the projected population of the Philippines was estimated to be around 85.2 million 
people9. There are 87 native languages and dialects spoken, with Filipino as the national language, and 
English as the second language spoken by nearly half of the population including nearly all 
professionals, academics, government and non-government workerslO, 
The Philippines is a republic and follows a presidential form of government. The President is elected 
for a period of six years, is the Head of State, and Head of the Executive Branch of the Government. 
The Legislature is headed by the Senate President in the Upper House and by the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives in the Lower House. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court heads the Judiciary. 
The country is composed of 15 administrative regions, which include 78 provinces, and 61 chartered 
cities6, 
The Philippines has a Gross Domestic Product of US $84.2 billion in 2004 with an annual growth rate 
of 6.1 %. Its per capita income in 2004 was US $976. Agriculture accounts for a quarter of 
Philippines' Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The main agricultural products include rice, coconut 
products, sugar, corn, pork, bananas, pineapple products, aquaculture, mangoes, and eggs, among 
others, The natural resources of the country include copper, nickel, chromium, iron, cobalt, silver, gold 
and natural gas6• 
The Philippines is considered as one of the 17 mega diverse countries in the world. These countries 
hold about 70 percent of the world's total diversity in flora and fauna. In the Philippines alone, there 
are over 52,000 species. Of these, 13,500 are plants comprising 5 percent of the world's total flora. 
About 68 percent of the country's reptiles, 78 percent of amphibians, 64 percent of the mammals and 
44 percent of birds are considered unique in the Philippines. In tenus of uniqueness or endemism, 
many of the country's species rank in the top ten in the world. Considering land density and density of 
flora and fauna, the Philippines may even be considered to be the most mega diverse countryll. 
New Zealand 
New Zealand is located in the southwest Pacific Ocean midway between the Equator and the South 
Pole, approximately 1,600 kilometres southeast of Australia. It has a total land area of approximately 
270,500 square kilometres (circa 27.05 million hectares), about the size of Japan, Britain and Italy, 
9 National Statistics Office (NSO) 2005. Date retrieved: 03 October 2005. 
10 The Philippine Government's Department of Tourism. ww\!'Jourism.gov.ph. Date retrieved: 26 September 2005. 
11 Source: National Economic and Development Authority 2004. Medium Term Philippine Development Plan 2004 - 2010. 
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The country is made up of two big islands - the North Island and South Island, and a number of smaller 
islands. It has a highly varied landscape from snow-capped mountain ranges and hill country to 
lowland and coastal plains; and archaeological evidence indicates that New Zealand was populated by 
fishing and hunting people of East Polynesian ancestry perhaps 1,000 years before Europeans arrived12• 
In 2004, an estimated 4 million people live in this temperate to sUbtropical country with an annual 
population growth of 1.3 %. Seventy five percent of the total population is of European descent, 15% 
Maori, and 6% other Polynesians and 4% Asians. English is spoken by the majority and Maori is 
spoken by less than 15% of the population. New Zealand has a 99% literacy rate with 100% of 
children and adolescents from 6 years old to 16 years old attending school. It is a largely secular state, 
although the majority are considered Protestants and 15% are Roman Catholics13 • 
New Zealand has a parliamentary system of government closely patterned on that of the United 
Kingdom and is a fully independent member of the Commonwealth. Executive authority is vested in a 
Cabinet led by the Prime Minister, who is the leader of the political party, or coalition of parties 
holding the majority of seats in Parliament All cabinet ministers must be members of Parliament and 
are collectively responsible to it9. 
The unicameral Parliament (House of Representatives) has 120 seats, six of which are currently 
reserved for Maori elected on a separate Maori roll; however, Maori may also run for, and have been 
elected to, non-reserved seats. Members of Parliament are elected for a maximum term of three years, 
although elections can be called sooner9. 
The Judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, the High Courts, and the District Courts. 
New Zealand law has three principal sources: English common law, certain statutes of the United 
Kingdom Parliament enacted before 1947, and statutes of the New Zealand Parliament In interpreting 
common law, the courts have been concerned with preserving uniformity with common law as 
interpreted in the United Kingdom9. 
New Zealand has a Gross Domestic Product of US $99.69 billion in March 2005 with an annual growth 
rate of 4.8%. Its per capita income in 2004 was US $23,900. The country is rich in timber, natural gas, 
iron sand, and coal. Its chief products are wool, meat, dairy, and forestrl. 
New Zealand's biodiversity is unique and is considered internationally important High percentages of 
New Zealand's indigenous species are endemic (they are found nowhere else on eaIih) a result of 
12 United States Department of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs' Background Note: New Zealand. 
ww_\V.statc.gov/r/pafcifbgn/35852.htm. Date retrieved: 30 September 2005. 
13 Statistics New Zealand Quick Facts. www.statMovt.nz. Date retrieved: 26 September 2005. 
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isolated evolution and the diversity of New Zealand's land and seascapes. This level of endemism is 
remarkable internationally. New Zealand's is home to the world's only flightless parrot (kakapo); a 
bird with nostrils at the end of its beak (kiwi); a primitive frog that lays eggs that hatch adult frogs 
(Leiopelma species); and many other exceptional species. The ecosystems in which these species live 
are also highly distinctive such as the kauri forests of the northern North Island, and the braided river 
systems of the eastern South Islandl4 • 
3.2 Research Frameworli: 
This study followed a qualitative research framework. Figure 1 shows the flow of methods and 
techniques employed in this study. 
Research Paradigm 
II Qualitative research 
Research Design/ Ap'proach 
• Case Study Approach 
);> Documents 
);> Interviews 
);> Archival records 
);> Direct observation 
);> Participant observation 
Data Collection and Fieldwork Strategies 
., Sampling Strategy: Pwposefitl sampling 
• Data Gathering Technique: Triangulation 
);> In-depth interviews 
);> Observations 
);> Pertinent/archived documents 
Data Analysis 
• Case study approach to analysis 
• Content Analysis 
Figure 1. Research Frameworli: of the Study 
14 Source: The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy, February 2000. 
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3.2.1 Research Paradigm 
This study followed the qualitative research paradigm primarily because the nature and context of this 
study dealt more with the two countries' experiences of policy, regulatory regimes and framework in 
view of the cross cutting topics of biosecurity and biosafety. Qualitative research aims to provide an 
in-depth understanding of people's experiences, perspectives and histories in the context of their 
personal circumstances or settings (Strauss & Corbin 1990; Taylor & Bogdan 1998, Patton 2002, 
Spencer et al. 2003). "Among many distinctive features, it is characterised by a concern with 
exploring phenomena from the perspective of those being studied; with use of unstructured methods 
which are sensitive to the social context of the study; the capture of data which are detailed, rich and 
complex; a mainly inductive rather than deductive analytic process; developing explanations at the 
level of meaning or micro-social processes rather context-free laws; and answering 'what is', 'how' 
and 'why' questions" (Spencer et al. 2003: 3). 
3.2.2 Research Design/Approach 
This study utilised the case study approach in conducting the research. "A case study reports on a 
'phenomenon' within, but separate from, its larger context. The phenomenon studied may be a culture, 
society, community, subculture, organisation, group or institution, beliefs, practices, or interactions or 
almost any other aspect of human existence (Jorgensen 1989: 19)." In particular, this study looked at 
the national-level context of the current approaches, practices, frameworks, institutions involved, and 
norms within the biosecurity and biosafety spectrum. The researcher explored in depth the national 
policies, programmes, and processes bound by time and activity; and collected rich-text information 
using a variety of data collection procedures over a period of time. This case study was further 
informed by a good case study strategy provided by Yin (1994, 2003) and Patton (2002), which 
comprises encompassing methods and specific approaches to data collection and organisation, and data 
analysis. The case study in this sense was not merely a design feature alone nor just a data collection 
tactic (Stoecker 1991) but a comprehensive research strategy (Yin 1994). It follows a systematic 
process to gather information about each case of interest; and each case can be treated as a process and 
a product of analysis (Patton 2002). 
There are six important methods and sources of evidence used in a case study. These are: 
documentation, interviews, archival records (such as service records, organisational records, maps, 
charts and survey data), direct observation, participant observation, and physical or cultural artefacts 
(such as tools, instruments or works of ali) (Yin 1994). This case study utilised almost all the methods 
provided by Yin except physical or cultural artefacts. Throughout the process of employing these 
methods, the researcher endeavoured to develop a range of personal skills, most of which are 
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emphasized by Yin (1994), including being able to set the tone of the initial conversation preceding the 
actual/formal interview; being able to ask the relevant questions in the manner that goes with the flow 
and context of the interview; being a good listener; being adaptive and flexible; being able to access 
pertinent information and archival documents; having firm grasp of the issues under study; and being 
unbiased by preconceived notions. 
3.2.3 Data Collection and Fieldwork strategies 
Sampling Strategy 
Purposeful sampling was used as the sampling technique in this research. This was used because in 
purposeful sampling "cases for study (e.g. people, organisations, communities, cultures, events, critical 
incidences) are selected because they are 'information rich' and illuminative, that is, they offer useful 
manifestations of the phenomenon of interest. Sampling, then is aimed at insight into the phenomenon, 
not empirical generalisation from a sample to a population" (Patton 1990, 2002, 2003). Among 
purposeful sampling strategies the researcher, )nost of the time, employed opportunistic or emergent 
sampling. This means following new leads during field work, taking advantage of the unexpected, and 
focusing more on flexibility. Fieldwork often involves on-the-spot decisions about sampling to take 
advantage of new opportunities during actual data collection. ill particular, the use of the sampling 
technique for this study was informed by Patton (1990, 2002) who emphasized that "unlike 
experimental designs, emergent qualitative designs can include the option of adding to a sample to take 
advantage of unforeseen opportunities after fieldwork has begun." Being open to following wherever 
the data lead is a primary strength of qualitative fieldwork strategies. This permits the sample to 
emerge during fieldwork. Opportunistic, emergent sampling takes advantage of whatever unfolds as it 
unfolds (Patton 1990, 2002). 
Data Gathering Technique 
The triangUlation method was employed in gathering the data needed for this study. Triangulation is 
the use of multiple methods to generate more valid results (Denzin & Lincoln 1994, Silverman 2000, 
2005). The researcher used the triangulation of three kinds of qualitative data, including in-depth 
interviews, observations and pertinent documents. Pertinent documents are those documents which are 
considered important, relevant and supplementary in view of the topic(s) under study (Patton 2002). 
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In-depth Interviews 
Open-ended questions and probes yield in-depth responses about people's experiences, perceptions, 
opinions, feelings, and knowledge (Patton 2003). The researcher conducted in-depth face-to-face 
interviews, telephone interviews and email interviews in the Philippines and New Zealand. Most of the 
interviews carried out by the researcher were face-to-interviews some of which were considered to be 
"elite interviewing" (Hertz and Imber 2005, cited in Gupta 2001). They were referred to as elite 
interviews in the sense that the interviewees were in the higher echelon in terms of their positions 
and/or held sensitive posts in the government, private sector or in any organisation or institution they 
represented. One important element of the interviews that was employed by the researcher was 
assuring the interviewees of the 'strict confidentiality' of the data and infOlmation gathered. Fieldwork 
and interviews in the Philippines (mostly in Manila) were conducted in October and November of 
2004, and in the months of July and August 2005 in New Zealand (mainly in Wellington and 
Christchurch). There were two telephone interviews as well carried out by the researcher in the month 
of September 2005; one in the Philippines and one in Wellington New Zealand. At least four email 
interviews were sent to interviewees located in Wellington and Manila, two of which were follow-up 
questions from the earlier face-to-face interviews that were conducted. During the interviews, most of 
the interviewees were forthcoming and responsive. 
Observation 
Observation is described by Patton (2002) as fieldwork descriptions of activities, behaviours, actions, 
conversations, interpersonal interactions, organisational or community processes, or any other aspect of 
observable human experience. The data consists of field notes and rich, detailed descriptions, 
including the context within which the observations were made. The researcher employed 'direct 
observation' during interactions and conversations with the interviewees. Also, in New Zealand, the 
researcher attended three major conferences: the first was an International Conference of mostly 
entomologists and ecologists in August 2003 in Hanmer, the second was an APEC Science Ministerial 
Meeting held in Christchurch in March 2004, and the third was the Second National Biosecurity 
Summit held in Auckland in November 2004. In the course of these meetings the researcher observed, 
especially during workshops and panel discussions. Whilst conducting fieldwork in the Philippines, 
the researcher took the opportunity to participate in one symposium and a technical briefing. The first 
was a symposium on 'Biodiversity and Food Security' held in Quezon City in Metro Manila in October 
2004; whilst the second was a 'Technical Briefing of the Chief of Staffs of the Congress and Senate 
Committees on the Environment' regarding the proposed National Biosafety Framework and the 
potential ratification of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. These events proved to be an engaging 
24 
experience for the researcher and enabled direct observation of the activities in these meetings to be 
made. 
Pertinent! Archived Documents 
Documents according to Patton (2002) can be written documents and other documents from 
organisational, clinical, or program records; memoranda and correspondence; official publications and 
reports; personal diaries, letters, artistic works, photographs, and memorabilia; and written responses to 
open-ended surveys. Data consists of excerpts from documents captured in a way that records and 
preserves context. In addition to in-depth interviews and direct observations, the researcher also relied 
on archived documents and supplementary evidence gathered during fieldwork in the Philippines and 
New Zealand. These documents included, among others: Statements of Intents (SOI), government 
reports, draft frameworks, progress reports, workshops proceedings, conference proceedings, 
government published documents, position papers, technical magazines, cabinet papers, technical 
pamphlets, unpublished manuscripts and media reports. They were either sourced from the internet or 
directly obtained from the individuals or organisations concerned. There were two occasions in New 
Zealand where the researcher requested the information through the 'Official Information Act'. The 
archived documents obtained in the process of conducting this research proved to be a key source of 
important data and information used in this study. 
The researcher has also drawn upon secondary literature in order to explore the larger context within 
which biosecurity and biosafety unde11akings occur. 
3.2.4 Data Analysis 
Throughout the duration of this study a large amount of data was gathered and obtained. The data 
consisted of transcripts of tape-recorded interviews, handwritten field notes, organisational repOlts, 
publications, pamphlets, booklets, electronic journals, and a collection of associated documentation. 
Seeking 'meaning' from the data collected is the core of data analysis. In qualitative research, data 
analysis is an "ongoing process involving continual reflection about the data" (Creswell 2003: 190). 
The management of the large volumes of qualitative data had the potential to cause problems for the 
eventual analysis. To avoid an overwhelming amount of information at the end of the research process, 
data were progressively analysed. This occurred as the data were collected from original sources, 
reviewed, organised and managed, which included the transcribing of all interviews, and scanning and 
selecting relevant information throughout the write-up process. The themes of the research emerged 
during this analytical process whilst the process itself was equally shaped by the respective questions 
and descriptive details pulled together in each case study for the two countries. 
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Transcription of the interviews was carried out by the researcher personally for tvvo vital reasons: (1) 
So that the transcription process can be an initial fonn of analysis seeking meaning and context along 
the way (2) So that the confidentiality of the transcribed infonnation is assured. Likewise, in the 
presentation of the responses/quotes made by the interviewees, names were not identified as the 
researcher and each interviewee agreed on a 'strict confidentiality' accord. The researcher 
endeavoured to translate all responses spoken in Filipino/Tagalog (during interviews in the Philippines) 
into English. 
The particular method used in the analysis was a combination of case study approach and content 
analysis which are further discussed in the following sections below. 
Case Study Approach to Analysis 
The case study approach was one of the methods used in the analysis of data. This approach to 
qualitative analysis constitutes a specific way' of collecting, organising, and analysing data; in that 
sense it represents an analysis process. The purpoSe is to gather comprehensive, systematic, and in-
depth information about each case of interest. The analysis process results in a product - a case study. 
Thus the tenn case study can refer to either the process of analysis or the product of analysis, or both 
(Patton 1990, 2002, 2003). In the case studies conducted by the researcher, each case study was treated 
as the process and product of analysis. 
Content Analysis 
Content analysis usually refers to analysing text (interview transcripts, diaries, or documents) rather 
than observation-based field notes. More generally, however, content analysis is used to refer to any 
qualitative data reduction and sense-making efforts that take a volume of qualitative materials and 
attempt to identifY core consistencies and meanings. Of particular relevance, case studies can be 
content analyzed (Patton 2002). Content analysis involves identifYing, categorising, classifYing and 
labelling the primary patterns in the data. This essentially means analyzing the core content of 
interviews and observations to detennine what is significant (Patton 1990, 2002, 2003). In such a 
process, the researcher is mindful of the recommendations made by Hammersley & Atkinson (1983, 
1995) and Bryman & Burgess (1994), that in doing the analysis one should immerse oneself in the data 
and seek out patterns, identifYing possibly surprising phenomena, and being sensitive to 
inconsistencies, such as divergent views offered by different groups or individuals. The analysis 
process was further infonned by Tomlinson (2003: 48-49), that "each stage of analysis required 
elements of 'data reduction', which is where less infonnation was transferred from each stage of data 
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reorganising." The researcher focused analysis through continued mutual interaction between the 
reduction of data, and the continued display and redisplay of data. In conjunction with filtering and 
reduction techniques, the researcher was heedful of the research objectives as the eventual thesis 
findings unfolded. 
3.3 Research Evaluation 
Validity refers to the extent to which "an empirical measure adequately reflects real meaning of the 
concept under consideration" (Babbie 1995: 127). According to Creswell (2003) validity should be 
seen as the "strength of qualitative research"; it should be used in establishing whether the findings are 
accurate from the viewpoint of the researcher, participant or the readers of an account. Hence Creswell 
(2003: 196) enumerated eight primary strategies to check the accuracy of the findings which included 
triangulation; member checking; use of rich, thick description; clarification of bias; presentation of 
negative or discrepant information; spending a prolonged time in the field; use of peer debriefing; and 
the use of an external auditor. In seeking to achieve validity in this study, the triangulation method, 
consultation with the supervisor, peer consultation and a thorough consideration of the data gathered 
were adopted. Moreover, the researcher endeavoured to present a rich, thick description of the findings 
and has clarified the bias that may impinge on analysis of the data. 
3.4 Researcher's RolelBias 
In qualitative research, Creswell (2003) indicated that the role of the researcher as the main data 
collection instrument requires the identification of the personal values, biases and assumptions. The 
researcher before starting this study was working on tropical tree breeding research for a period of six 
years in a private company in the Philippines. It must be further emphasized that the researcher had no 
involvement in government nor in any institutions or organisations either in the Philippines or New 
Zealand from the time that this study commenced up to the time it culminated (i.e. the third quarter of 
2003 and the third quarter of 2005, respectively). However, as Miles and Huberman (1994) pointed 
out, it is impossible to achieve a clean theoretical slate and to enter the research field with no 
preconceived notions. The researcher brought to this study a notion that New Zealand is definitely 
advanced in its biosecurity, but not too advanced in dealing with biosafety; on the other hand, the 
Philippines may not have a biosecurity system to speak of, but is advanced when it comes to biosafety 
matters. Whilst the researcher may have brought certain biases to this study, every effort was made to 
ensure objectivity in the presentation of the results and its analysis. 
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3.5 Ethics 
The researcher made a considerable effort to ensure that the ethical dimension of the research process 
was observed and practised to its highest degree. The researcher before conducting each interview 
sought the interviewee's permission to record the interview on a digital recorder and on tape; assured 
confidentiality of their responses; and respected and appreciated the length of time each interviewee 
was able to lend for such interview. In the discussion of the findings, quotes were not attributed to 
individuals by name. 
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CHAPTER 4 
BIOSECURIY AND BIOSAFETY SYSTEMS, POLICIES AND 
REGULATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES 
This chapter profiles and outlines the existing biosecurity and biosafety policies, laws and regulations 
in the Philippines. It also elucidates the existing mechanisms, and the governance and regulatory 
frameworks in place in the country. 
4.1 Biosecurity Systems, Polices and Regulations 
4.1.1 Existing Policies/Laws 
This section profiles and outlines the existing policies and legislation relevant to biosecurity15 in the 
Philippines. 
The Philippine Agenda 21 is the country's National Agenda for Sustainable Development. It serves 
as the country's policy framework and strategy for sustainable development. Of particular relevance to 
this study, the Philippine Agenda 21 states that "the benefits of modem biotechnology in producing 
revolutionized products that increase productivity and value must not compromise the ability of the 
future generations to meet their own needs." The significant features of the Philippine Agenda 21 
include: 
(a) the realization ofthe continuing deterioration of the natural and social environment; 
(b) a vision of "appropriate (not maximum) productivity" within the limits of the natural 
environment's carrying capacity; 
(c) adoption of a policy mix of market-based instruments and command-and-control measures 
as techniques to induce changes in production and consumption patterns; and 
(d) adoption of social marketing approaches in the effort to inform, educate and communicate 
the imperative of sustainable development to the public at large to effect a reorientation of 
fundamental societal values. 
15 Sincc the term biosceurity is not yet adopted in the Philippines, the terms used (to determine relevant policies and laws) 
include, among others: quarantine, pests, diseases, plants, animals, exotic species, invasive alien species, and pest 
management. 
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In fisheries, the Fisheries Code!6 declares that the policy of the State, is among others, "to ensure the 
rational and sustainable development, management and conservation of the fishery and aquatic 
resources consistent with the primordial objective of maintaining a sound ecological balance, 
" 
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." The introduction of foreign finfish, 
mollusks, crustaceans or aquatic plants in Philippine waters without a sound ecological, biological and 
environmental justification based on scientific studies shall not be allowed subject to the biosafety 
standard as provided for by existing laws.!7 However, the Department of Agriculture (DA) may 
approve the introduction of foreign aquatic species for scientificlresearch purposes. The law also 
provides for conservation and rehabilitation measures for rare, threatened and endangered species, and 
banning of the fishing and/or taking of rare, threatened and/or endangered species, including their 
eggs/offspring as identified by existing laws. The fisheries policy puts a premium on aquaculture as a 
major source of fishery products in the future. Biotechnology offers huge potential benefits in 
increasing the yield of aquaculture, as well as contributing to the conservation of threatened species. 
The Republic Act 9147, otherwise known as the Wildlife Resource and Conservation Act enacted in 
the year 2001, regulates the collection, possession, and/or local transport of wildlife, their by-products 
and derivatives including the introduction of exotic wildlife into the country (which are subject to 
trade, are cultured, maintained, andlor bred in captivity or propagated in the country) by requiring an 
authorisation or clearance from the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources 
(DENR) or the authorised representative. Further, it provides that the collection of wildlife by 
indigenous people may be allowed for traditional use but not for trade, on condition that collection and 
utilisation for the saidJpurpose shall not cover threatened species. In the case of exotic species, the Act 
states that in no case shall exotic species be introduced into critical areas and designated critical 
habitats (Section 25) and into protected areas covered by Republic Act No. 7586 (NIPAS Act). In 
cases where introduction is allowed, it shall be subject to an environmental impact study which shall 
focus on the bioecology, socioeconomic and related aspects of the area where the species will be 
introduced. The Proponent shall also be required to secure prior informed consent from local 
stakeholders. 
The Presidential Decree No. 936 (PD 936) of 1976 established the National Crop Protection Centre 
(NCPC) within the College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines in Los Banos, and seven other 
Regional Crop Protection Centres within the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI). The law created the 
NCPC in response to the need of the country to have a unified approach to research, training and 
16 Republic Act No. 8550 (1998). 
17 Fisheries Code, sec. 10. 
30 
extension programmes in crop production. Section 1 of PD 936 mandates the NCPC and the other 
regional centres to perform specific functions such as: 
(a) undertaking problem analyses, development research and planning required to develop crop 
protection systems against pests of major economic crops; 
(b) developing and implementing manpower training programs designed to upgrade the pool of 
manpower required to meet the complex pest control needs of the country; 
(c) undertaking information exchange and extension to provide farmers and the public with 
coordinated information about the varied facets of pest control and to emphasize the urgent 
need for safe and effective pest control practices; 
(d) establishing adequate linkages between research and operational phases at the farm level in 
order to ensure that the changing research needs for operational activities are based on the 
most recent and applicable research findings; and 
(e) providing scientific advice to government planners for the formulation of policies and 
regulatory programs necessary for dealing with the complex pest control technologies 
essential for the protection of crops. 
Under the Seed Industry Development Act,18 the State declares it a policy to promote and accelerate 
the development of the seed industry and, for this purpose, conserve, preserve and develop the plant 
genetic resources of the nation. It creates the National Seed Industry Council, composed of 
representatives from the government and private sectors, whose main function is to formulate policies 
that will stimulate plant breeding activities for the development of the genetic resources of the country. 
It also institutes a National Seed Quality Control Service, to formulate and develop plans and programs 
on seed quality control services and activities on seed testing, plant/seed material confirmation and 
other quality control schemes. The law is complemented by the High-Valued Crops Development 
Actl9 which mandates the state to develop high-value crops as export crops that will significantly 
augment the foreign exchange earnings of the country, through an all-out promotion of the production, 
processing, marketing and distribution of high-value crops in suitable areas of the country. It tasks the 
Department of Agriculture with establishing experimental stations and seed farms for the development 
of varieties suitable for the agro-climactic conditions of the area, and markets that will provide greatest 
value added to high-value crops. Both laws do not exclude modem biotechnology techniques as a 
means for crop development or for improving seed quality. 
18 Republic Act No. 7308 (1992). 
19 Republic Act No. 7900 (1995). 
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The Revised Forestry Code2o reorganized certain related offices into the Bureau of Forest 
Development, with the following mandate: to be responsible for the protection, development, 
management, regeneration, and reforestation of forest lands; the implementation or multiple use and 
sustained yield management in forest lands; the protection, development and preservation of national 
parks, marine parks, game refuges and wildlife; the implementation of measures and programs to 
prevent kaingin and managed occupancy of forest and grazing lands; and the enforcement of forestry, 
reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations, among others. It provides 
incentives to qualified persons engaged in industrial tree plantation, tree farming and/or agro-forest 
farming. However, it reserves the regulation of mining operations in forest lands to mining laws, rules 
and regulations, with the only caveat that the protection, development and utilization of other surface 
resources be given due regard. The law is relevant in that GM trees may be used for higher timber 
yields or greater carbon sequestration abilities, the introduction of which may pose risks to natural 
stands. 
The NIP AS Acf1 establishes a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIP AS), which shall 
encompass outstanding remarkable areas and bio'logically important public lands that are habitats of 
rare and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, 
whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be designated as protected areas. It provides 
for categories of protected areas (PAs): 
(a) strict nature reserve; 
(b) natural park; 
(c) natural monument; 
(d) wildlife sanctuary; 
(e) protected landscapes and seascapes; 
(f) resource reserve; 
(g) natural biotic areas; and 
20 Presidential Decree No. 705 (1975, as amended in 1978, 1980, 1981, 1987 and 1991). 
21 Republic Act No. 7586 (1992). 
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(h) other categories established by law, conventions or international agreements to which the 
Philippine Government is a signatory. 
Activities within protected areas are highly regulated especially in strict nature reserves and Natural 
Parks. Thus, the release of GM products is most likely prohibited within the area. 
The Executive Order No. 24722 prescribes guidelines and establishes a regulatory framework (the 
Inter-Agency Committee on Biological and Genetic Resources) for the prospecting, for scientific and 
commercial purposes, of biological and genetic resources, their by-products and derivatives. The 
Committee is tasked, among others, with ensuring that no biological and genetic materials are taken 
from the Philippines and exported abroad except under a valid Research Agreement; and to study and 
recommend appropriate laws on the utilization of biological and genetic resources including new laws 
on intellectual property rights. 
The Animal Welfare Act23 regulates the establishment and operations of all facilities utilized for 
breeding, maintaining, keeping, treating, or training of animals either as objects of trade or as 
household pets. It provides that only adequate, clean and sanitary establishments of animals that will 
not be used for, nor cause pain and/or suffering to the animals shall be issued certificates of registration 
and allowed to operate. It prohibits the killing of any animal other than cattle, pigs, goats, sheep, 
poultry, rabbits, carabaos, horses, deer and crocodile, except when, among others, the animal is killed 
after it has been used in authorized research or experiments. It declares that every person has the duty 
to protect the natural habitat of wildlife. The destruction of said habitat is considered a form of cruelty 
to animals and its preservation is a way of protecting the animals. The application of modern 
technology to modify animals must take into account the provisions of this Act. 
The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA)24 recognises, protects, and promotes the rights of 
ownership and possession of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples (ICCslIPs) to 
their ancestral lands and domains, including the right to manage and conserve natural resources within 
the territories, and the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of these natural 
resources for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental protection and conservation 
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws. It affords the ICCs/IPs the right to control, 
develop and protect their sciences, technologies and cultural manifestations, including human and other 
genetic resources, seeds, and derivatives of these resources, traditional medicines and health practices, 
vital medicinal plants, animals and minerals, indigenous knowledge systems and practices, as well as 
knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora. The law also affords the ICCs/IPs priority rights in the 
22 Executive Order No. 247 was issued by the President of the Philippines on 18 May 1995. 
23 Republic Act No. 8485 (1998). 
24 Republic Act No. 8371 (1997). 
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harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral 
domains. 
The revised Philippine Biosafety Guideline (pBG) issued by the National Committee on Biosafety of 
the Philippines (NCBP) in 1998 prescribed guidelines on the planned release of Genetical1y Modified 
Organisms (GMOs) and potentially harmful exotic species (PRES). With regard to PRES, the PBG 
defines it as any exotic species which may constitute significant negative risks to human health and the 
environment. The guideline mandates that no person or institution shall release into the environment 
any GMOs or PRES without the prior approval ofthe NCBP. 
Import and Export Laws 
The Presidential Decree No. 1433 (PD 1433) otherwise known as the Plant Quarantine Law of 1978 
authorises the Depmtment of Agriculture (DA) through the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) to exercise 
inspection and certification and/or treatment activities on impOlted and exportable plant products such 
as fruits and vegetables. PD 1433 also mandates the BPI to prevent the introduction of exotic pests 
into the country, to prevent further spread of existing plant pests and enforce phytosanitary measures 
for the export of plants, plant products and regulated articles. 
The Republic Act 3639 (RA 3639) established the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI) and empowered 
it to prescribe standards for quality in the manufacture, importation, labelling, advertising, distribution 
and sale of livestock, poultry, meat products, dairy products and animal feeds and veterinary supplies 
in the country. The Act tasked the BAI with preventing, controlling, containing and eradicating 
communicable animal disease by regulating the flow of animals and animal products in the country. 
The Presidential Decree No.7 (PD 7) authorises the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) 
to implement policies and procedures governing post production flow of livestock, meat and meat 
products both locally produced and imported through the various stages of marketing. The Law 
instructs the NMIC to supervise the operations of abattoirs and meat establishments and conducts ante-
and post-mortem inspections of meat. The meat Import/Export Services of the NMTC ensures that 
imported or expOltable meat and meat products are produced under acceptable conditions and systems. 
The Republic Act No. 123 (RA 123) prescribed the reorganisation and operation of the Bureau of 
Quarantine. The Act also positioned the Bureau of Quarantine within the category of first-class bureau 
under the Department of Health (DOH). Section 2 of RA 123 set the jurisdiction and function of the 
Bureau of Quarantine. It states that the examination at ports of entry and airports of entry into the 
Philippines of incoming and outgoing vessels and aircraft should be vested in and be conducted by the 
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Bureau of Quarantine. Operational mandates of the Bureau include surveillance over sanitary 
conditions within the aircraft and vessels, as well as over their cargoes, passengers, crews, and all 
personal effects; and the issuance of quarantine certificates, bills of health, or other equivalent 
documents. The law empowers the Bureau to have the authority over incoming vessels, including 
those of the army and navy, both domestic and foreign, their wharfage and anchorage, and over aircraft 
and airports, insofar as is necessary for the proper enforcement of the provisions of the Act. 
4.1.2 Governance and Regulatory Frameworks 
It was discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis that biosecurity is a relatively new term in the Philippines. 
Hence, in the case of the country's governance and regulatory frameworks, this section will focus on 
the existing food safety, and plant and animal quarantine systems. 
Food Safety Framework 
The two main agencies tasked with developing' and enforcing food safety standards in the Philippines 
are the Bureau of Food and Drug (BF AD) under the Department of Health (DOH) and the Bureau of 
Agriculture and Fisheries Product Standards (BAFPS) of the Department of Agriculture (DA). Under 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1963, BFAD was made responsible for the safety of processed 
food products while the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997 (AFMA) made BAFPS 
accountable for fresh and primary agricultural and fisheries products (USDA-F AS 2004). 
The BFAD's primary function is to ensure the safety, proper handling, efficacy, purity and quality of 
processed foods, drugs, diagnostic reagents, medical devices, cosmetics and hazardous household 
substances. The BF AD oversees the control of the manufacture and sale of processed foods, where the 
major concerns are adulteration and mislabelling of food products. It is responsible for the surveillance 
of imported food products at legal ports of entry. 
The major duties of the BAFPS include formulating and enforcing standards of quality in the 
proces~ing, preservation, packaging, labelling, importation, exportation, distribution and advertising of 
fresh and primary agricultural and fisheries products. The BAFPS provides assistance in establishing 
the scientific basis for food safety, trade standards and codes of practice and harmonizes them with 
internationally accepted standards and practices. It serves as the National Enquiry Point for Codex 
Alimentarius and other food safety and standards regulatory bodies. It is in charge of monitoring and 
disseminating information on international developments in food safety. 
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Plant and Animal Quarantine Framework 
Different regulatory bodies exist in the Philippines in terms of regulating the flow of plants and animals 
coming in and out of the country. These are often supported by specialist commissions which focus on 
specific technical matters such as meat inspection, biosafety, etc. The main regulatory bodies 
monitoring the safety aspects of imported agriculture and food products are the Bureau of Plant 
Industry (BPI), Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), and the Bureau of Fisheries & Aquatic Resources 
(BFAR). All these bureaus are under the jurisdiction of the DA. 
The BPI exercises inspection and certification and/or treatment activities on imported and exportable 
plant products such as fruits and vegetables. It is also mandated by law to prevent the introduction of 
exotic pests into the country, to prevent further spread of existing plant pests and to enforce 
phytosanitary measures for the export of plants, plant products and regulated articles (USDA~F AS 
2004). 
On the other hand, the BAI prescribes standards for quality in the manufacture, importation, labelling, 
advertising, distribution and sale of livestock, poultry, meat products, dairy products and animal feeds 
and veterinary supplies in the country. The BAI is also charged with preventing, controlling, containing 
and eradicating communicable animal diseases by regulating the flow of animals and animal products 
in the country (USDA F AS 2004). 
The BF AR has the administrative responsibility to control fish and other marine products. The 
Fisheries Post-Harvest Technology Division (FPHTD) of BFAR issues commodity clearances (i.e. 
import permits) and other requirements for the import of fish and fishery products. 
All imported food and agricultural products are required to comply with the Philippines' food health 
and phytosanitary laws. In general, none of these products is allowed to enter the Philippines if it is 
deemed to be a danger to human life or well-being, either directly or indirectly. 
All food and agricultural products, including plant products that enter the Philippines, are required to 
pass through procedures designed to check that they are not contaminated with any pest and that they 
are fit for their intended use. 
At present, national microbiological standards for food have not yet been established. Philippine food 
regulations are thus patterned after CODEX Alimentarius Commission guidelines as well as 
regulations established by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of the United States and similar 
regulatOlY bodies in other countries. 
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4.2 Biosafety Systems, Polices and Regulations 
4.2.1 Existing Policies and Laws 
Policy on Modem Biotechnology 
The Republic Act 8435 otherwise known as the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act 
(AFMA) of 1997 prescribes measures to modernise the agriculture and fisheries sectors of the country 
with a view to enhancing profitability and preparing the sectors for the challenges of globalisation. It 
aims to transform them 'from a resource-based to a technology-based industry, by ensuring equitable 
access to assets, resources and services, and promoting higher-value crops, value-added processing, 
agribusiness activities, and agro-industrialisation. The Act emphasizes that any development in the 
agriculture and fisheries sectors should be in accordance with the principles of poverty alleviation and 
social equity; food security; rational use of resources; global competitiveness; sustainable 
development; people empowerment; and protection from unfair competition, Accordingly, it mandates 
the DA, in consultation with the farmers a~d fisherfolk, the private sector, NGOs, people's 
organizations and appropriate government agencies and offices, to formulate and implement a medium-
and long-term comprehensive Agriculture and Fisheries Modernisation Plan focusing on the above-
stated principles. In view of product standardisation and consumer safety, the AFMA establishes the 
Bureau of Agriculture and Fisheries Product Standards (BAFPS) to set and implement standards for 
fresh, primary- and secondary- processed agricultural and fishery products. More specifically, the 
coverage of the BAFPS includes standards related to consumer health and safety and efficient trade of 
raw, fresh, primary and secondary processed agricultural and fisheries products, both food and non-
food. The law does not have a specific provision dealing directly with biotechnology or modem 
biotechnology, but it supports research, development, and use of technology in agricultural production. 
Policy Statement on Modem Biotechnology issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo 
In July 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued a Policy Statement on Modern 
Biotechnology emphasizing the government policy of promoting the safe and responsible use of 
modem biotechnology and its products as one of the several means to achieve and sustain food 
security, equitable access to health services, a sustainable and safe environment, and industry 
development. It underscores the need for all technologies (including modern biotechnology) to provide 
farmers with the oppOltunity to increase their over-all productivity and income, enhance the welfare of 
consumers, and promote efficiency, competitiveness, and improved quality standards of local 
industries; all within the paramount objective of attaining safety and sustainable development, 
including its human, social and environmental aspects. 
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The Policy Statement also provides directives to respective government departments such as the 
Departments of Agriculture, Environment and Natural Resources, Science and Technology, Health, 
Trade and Industry, and other concerned agencies to address the current issues associated with the local 
and global dimensions and trends of modern biotechnology, including its potential health, 
environmental and social impacts. Towards this end, they are mandated to: 
(1) conduct public consultations with representatives from civil society, government and 
business; 
(2) formulate departmental directives and regulations on the access to, and use of the products 
of modern biotechnology; 
(3) coordinate activities and programs on research, development and application; and 
(4) allocate appropriate resources for th,e upgrading of capacities and capabilities to effectively 
regulate technology and its products including, but not limited to product testing and 
labelling, 
In response to Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) issues, Republic Act 9168 otherwise known as the 
Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) signed into law in June of 2002, protects and secures the 
exclusive rights of breeders with respect to their new plant varieties by granting them a Certificate of 
Plant Variety Protection. A certificate is granted if a variety is deemed new, distinct, uniform, and 
stable. 
The Republic Act 9147 otherwise known as the Wildlife Resource and Conservation Act enacted in 
the year 2001 has a specific provision relevant to biosafety and Section 16 in particular, provides 
provision for biosafety. The law states that all activities relating to genetic engineering and pathogenic 
organisms in the Philippines, as well as activities requiring the importation, introduction, field release 
and breeding of organisms that are potentially harmful to man and the environment shall be reviewed 
in accordance with the biosafety guidelines ensuring public welfare and the protection and 
conservation of wildlife and their habitats. No specific instrument for biosafety has been referred to, or 
defined in the Act. 
The Executive Order No. 430 (1990) established the NCBP and declared a national biosafety policy 
for the Philippines, The EO mandates the NCBP to perform functions such as, among others: 
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(1) identifying and evaluating potential hazards involved in genetic engineering experiments, 
or the introduction of new species and genetically modified organism and recommending 
measures to minimize risks; 
(2) formulating, reviewing, or amending national policies and guidelines on biosafety, such as 
the safe conduct of work on genetic engineering, pests, and their genetic materials, for the 
protection of public health, the environment, and personnel; and supervising the 
implementation thereof; 
(3) formulating, reviewing, or amending national policies and guidelines in risk assessment of 
work in biotechnology, and supervising the implementation thereof; 
(4) developing working arrangements with the government quarantine services and institutions 
in the evaluation, monitoring, and review of project vis-a.-vis adherence to national policies 
and guidelines on biosafety; 
(5) assisting in the development of technical expertise, facilities, and other resources for 
quarantine services and risks assessments; and 
(6) recommending the development and promotion of research programs to establish risks 
assessment protocols and assessment of long-term environmental effects of biological 
research covered by the guidelines. 
National Policies on Biosafety under EO 430 
The Executive Order 430 recognises that it is in the best interests of the Philippines to have national 
policies regulating work on biological measures that are potentially hazardous to crops, livestock, 
poultry and humans, including aquatic flora and fauna. It further promulgates that: 
(1) the Philippines, as a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention (WC), shall not 
engage in any activity related to chemical and biological warfare; 
(2) the Biosafety Guidelines should apply to all research, production and manufacturing work 
andlor institutions in the country, whether public or private, national or international 
engaged in genetic engineering work; and Guideline coverage also includes importation, 
introduction and/or breeding of plant pests and potentially halmful microorganisms; 
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(3) any work covered by the Guidelines must be reviewed and approved by the NCBP before 
its implementation; and for a more efficient and effective system of reviewing work 
proposals and/or import and introduction of regulated materials, each institution engaged 
in research, production, manufacturing and/or introduction involving potentially hazardous 
biological work is required to create its Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC); 
(4) the primary responsibility of enforcing the rules and regulations on biosafety rests on the 
institution involved and its scientists; and 
(5) the monitoring of the work is a responsibility of the institution, however, the monitoring of 
work dealing with imported or introduced pests should be the responsibility of the 
quarantine services of the government. 
The revised Philippine Biosafety Guideline (pBG) issued by the National Committee on Biosafety of 
the Philippines (NCBP) in 1998 prescribed guidelines on planned release of GMOs and PRES. It 
covers the intentional release of GMOs and PRES into the Philippine environment and established the 
criteria for evaluating the planned release into the environment, or field testing, of GMOs and PHES. 
It specifically excludes from its coverage work performed under contained conditions; accidental 
release from contained facilities; use of phatmaceuticals, processed food, animal feed, industrial, and 
other products that are already being regulated by other departments, agencies or instrumentalities of 
the Philippine government; work involving organisms which result from natural reproduction or the 
use of traditional breeding practices; and such other activities as the NCBP may in the future declare to 
be excluded. 
The Department of Agriculture's Administrative Order No.8 Series of 2002 (AO 8) prescribes rules 
and regulations for the importation and release into the environment of plants and plant products 
derived from the use of modern biotechnology. The AO 8 was issued primarily to supplement the 
existing guidelines on the importation and release into the environment of the products of modern 
biotechnology and by institutionalising existing operational arrangements between the Bureau of Plant 
Industry (BPI) and the NCBP, It also provides regulations that control the release of such products for 
propagation or for direct use as food or feed, or for processing. 
Before any importation or release into the environment of regulated articles, the AO mandates 
mandatory risk assessment to detennine whether a regulated article poses significant risks to human 
health and the environment. The AO states as its principles (1) that risk assessment needs to be carried 
out in a scientifically sound and transparent manner based on available scientific and technical 
information; (2) the concept of substantial equivalence in identifYing risks should be adopted; (3) risk 
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assessment should be carried out on a case-by-case manner and on the basis of transformation event; 
and (4) according to the principles provided for by the CPB. The AO stipulates however, that the 
conduct of risk assessment should be in accordance with the policies and guidelines on risks 
assessment issued by NCBP. 
Administrative Order No.8 specifically outlines the approval process and sets the corresponding policy 
and requirements for importation for contained use, field testing and release for propagation of 
regulated articles; and for importation of regulated articles for direct use as food or feed, or for 
processing. The main regulatory agency in-charge to implement AO 8 is the DA-BPI. 
4.2.2 Governance and Regulatory Frameworks 
There are four government departments that are involved with the governance and regulatory activities 
related to biosafety in the Philippines. The Department of Science and Technology (DOST) is the 
department to which the NCBP is attached as it is the prime research and development institution in the 
country. The DA on the other hand, is responsible for administering and regulating GMO applications 
related to crops and animals, although at present they are focused on crops which are handled by the 
DA-BPI under AO 8 in particular. The DENR has governance and regulatory functions as well in 
terms of dealing with the potential impact of GMOs and PRES on the environment and biodiversity, 
and the potential development of GMOs for bioremediation and as biological control agents. However, 
the DENR has no particular rules and regulations on GMOs yet, and any application that concerns 
DENR will be handled under the NCBP guidelines. In view of the potential adverse effects of GMOs 
on human health and for potential application for GMO medicines, the Department of Health (DOH) is 
the primary body in-charge of handling it, although like the DENR, the DOH has no rules and 
regulations set in p lace yet. 
The NCBP 
The NCBP is the highest regulatory body in the Philippines with respect to the introduction, use and 
transfer of GMOs and PRES. It is responsible for ensuring that no person or institution, whether public 
or private, releases any GMOs or PRES into the environment without its prior approval subject to 
compliance with any rules, regulations, or requirements of other government regulatory agencies. 
While the NCBP has broad responsibilities, its decisions are considered recommendatory and relies on 
its member Departments U. e. the DA, DENR and DOH) to approve the recommendations of the 
committee. Hence, the regulatory functions actually rely on its member regulatory agencies. 
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The NCBP is a mUlti-disciplinary, inter-agency, scientific and technical advisory committee tasked 
with undertaking the study and evaluation of existing laws, policies and guidelines on biotechnology; 
and recommending measures for its effective utilisation and prevention of possible pernicious effect on 
the environment. It acts as a technical evaluation body that reviews proposals for biotechnology 
specifically those applications on the use of GMOs; however it also has jurisdiction on applications 
concerning potentially harmful exotic species (PRES). The inclusion of PRES broadened the scope of 
NCBP and as a result more than 95% of the applications filed with the NCBP have nothing to do with 
GMOs but rather with PRES (Ochave & Estacio 2001). 
A recent action of the NCBP was to clarify its understanding of its own mandate. The NCBP viewed 
that its 'approval' or 'disapproval' of biotechnology applications is restricted to: research and 
development (i.e. laboratory and field tests); technical aspects (whether or not on the basis of existing 
science safety risks are considered acceptable; and scientific advice (i.e. directed to pertinent line 
agencies to provide them with a basis for acting on proposed applications). The Committee deemed 
that it reviews proposals for biotechnology applications for the benefit of final approving bodies (e.g. 
the DA in the case of crop biotechnology); and it communicates directly with proponents for the 
purpose only of ensuring that it has the best information for a rigorous review of the technical aspects 
of the safety of biotechnology applications. 
The NCBP Structure 
The NCBP is composed of ten (10) members including the Department of Science and Technology 
(DOST) Undersecretary for Research and Development who acts as its Chair. The other members of 
the Committee include four (4) practising scientists representing a biological scientist, an 
environmental scientist, a physical scientist, and a social scientist; two (2) respected members of the 
community; and one (1) representative each from the DA, DENR, and DOH. The NCBP is aided in its 
functions by these regulatory agencies. 
At the core of the structure is the NCBP aided in its functions by the regulatory agencies, the 
Institutional Biosafety Committees (IDCs) and the Ad Hoc Technical Subcommittees (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. A framework of the way the NCBP coordinates with existing regulatory agencies, 
mcs and Ad /toe Technical Subcommittees (Source: NCBP 1998). 
The term of office of the Chairman of the NCBP is coterminous with hislher appointment as 
Undersecretary for Research and Development. All members excluding the Chairman serve for a term 
of three years renewable for another term or more under exceptional circumstances. The four scientist 
members must have a minimum of seven years of academic and post academic training (degree ami/or 
non-degree) in their respective field. Representatives of the regulatory agencies are designated by the 
heads of their respective agencies while the rest of the members are appointed by the President of the 
Philippines. 
The Institutional Biosafety Committee (lBC) 
Any institution intending to engage in genetic engineering and/or potentially hazardous biological 
work; or to undertake aJlY planned release of GMOs or PHES into the environment must first set up an 
lBC. The!BC is responsible for evaluating project proposals involving organisms covered within the 
Biosafety Guidelines and for recommending such proposals for appropriate action by the NCBP. After 
a project has been approved, the !BC is responsible for supervising, monitoring and reporting its 
progress to the NCBP. It is also the !BC's task to ensure that environment and human health are 
safeguarded in the conduct of any potentially bio-hazardous activities by the institution or by any of its 
employees or researchers; and that the surrounding communities are well-informed of plans for any 
planned-release and its concomitant risks. 
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An me is composed of at least five members, three of whom are designated as 'scientist members'; 
while the other two should be designated as 'community representatives' and must not be affiliated 
with the institution apart from their affiliation with the me. The community representatives must be in 
the position to represent the interest of the surrounding communities which may be affected by the 
planned release of GMOs or PHES into the environment. 
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CHAPTERS 
BIOSECURIY AND BIOSAFETY SYSTEMS, POLICIES AND 
REGULATIONS IN NEW ZEALAND 
This chapter profiles and outlines the existing biosecurity and biosafety policies, laws and regulations 
in New Zealand. It elucidates the existing mechanisms, and the governance and regulatory frameworks 
in place in the country noting the interface between the biosecurity and biosafety systems in place. 
5.1 Biosecurity Systems, Polices and Regulations 
5.1.1 Existing Policies/Laws 
This section focuses on the main Acts that have direct relevance to biosecurity. It also looks at the 
interface of the existing legislations. 
The New Zealand Biosecurity Act of 1993 was the world's first; a law relating to the exclusion, 
eradication and effective management of pests and unwanted organisms. The Act covers all organisms 
(including new organisms) and provides among others, regulation for: importation of risk goods, 
surveillance and prevention from pest and unwanted organisms, pest management (strategies for both 
national and regional) and the enforcement and penalties for offences committed against the law. The 
Act also stipulates the responsibilities, powers and functions of the Minister for Biosecurity and local 
authorities (i. e. regional councils). 
Under the Act, no biosecurity clearance is given for any goods unless the inspecting officer is satisfied 
that the goods are not risk goods, or that they comply with the requirements specified in an import 
health standards in force for the goods. Risk goods on the other hand, are defined in the Act to mean 
any organism, organic material, or other thing, or substance, that (by reason of its nature, origin, or 
other relevant factors) may: cause unwanted harm to natural and physical resources or human health in 
New Zealand, or interfere with the diagnosis, management, or treatment, in New Zealand of pests or 
unwanted organisms. The Biosecurity Act is administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 
The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms (HSNO) Act enacted in 1996 is relevant to 
biosecurity in the sense that it regulates the importing, developing or manufacturing of hazardous 
substances and new organisms. In particular, Section 97 A of the HSNO Amendment Act 2003 gave 
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MAF the responsibility as the enforcement agency to ensure that the provisions of the Act are enforced 
in respect of new organisms. 
The Strategy 
The New Zealand Biosecurity Strategy, published in August 2003, outlines a comprehensive set of 
expectations for the future performance of the biosecurity system25 • The Strategy provides the 
blueprint for the action and the direction of New Zealand biosecurity. It sets out a vision for all of the 
different activities in biosecurity. It encompasses all environments (land, freshwater and marine) and 
both indigenous and valued introduced plants and animals. The overall expectation in the Strategy is 
that the "biosecurity system is fully integrated, operating efficiently and transparently in an 
environment of continuous improvement." The strategy has set more than 50 expectations for the 
future state of the New Zealand biosecurity system. Most of the expectations have a longer term focus, 
and describe the sort of objectives that should be aimed for, rather than the specific actions that need to 
be undertaken to achieve those objectives. Three of the main expectations are that: . 
(1) the biosecurity system will be fully integrated, and operating efficiently and transparently 
in an environment of continuous improvement; 
(2) the system encourages all New Zealanders to participate and support biosecurity; and 
(3) there is an annual review with external stakeholders on the performance and development 
of biosecurity. 
The strategy also notes that the biosecurity system must respond to the needs of Maori, both as the 
Crown's treaty partner and as an emerging economic force. Some of the other key expectations relate 
to improving institutional arrangements, plugging capability gaps, adopting a consistent approach to 
funding sources, and improving systems and processes. 
5.1.2 Governance and Regulatory Framework 
Governance Framework26 
25 Overview ofBiosecurity. www.biosecurity.govt.nzlabout/overview.htm. Date retrieved: 03 October 2005. 
26 This section was informed by closely to the June 2005 Memorandum of Understanding between MAF, DOC, 
MFish and MOR. 
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The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) has been given accountability for the end·to·end 
management of the biosecurity system (Sutton 2003). This means that MAF is accountable for 
biosecurity system oversight encompassing both those that MAF controls and those over which MAF 
has no direct control. The Memorandum of Understanding (2005) specified the elements of system 
oversight which include: facilitating a shared sense of strategic direction; providing commentary and 
advice to the Minister for Biosecurity; facilitating cooperation and coordination; national leadership 
and coordination, including that of pest management; and gathering information and reporting. 
Cabinet noted that this would mean that once the new arrangements were fully implemented the chief 
executive of MAF would be accountable to the Minister for Biosecurity for strategic, regulatory and 
service delivery functions, from pre.border through to pest management, that contribute to health, 
environment, economic, and socio-cultural outcomes. 
The Minister for Biosecurity and Associate Minister for Biosecurity hold the overall accountability for 
New Zealand' biosecurity activities and decisions (MOU 2005). Of political significance, the 
incumbent27 Minister for Biosecurity is also the Minister for Agriculture, Minister for Trade 
Negotiations, and Associate Minister for Rural Affairs. The minister was also the former Chair of 
Primary Production and Rural Services Caucus Committee and of the Finance Select Committee. 
Currently, the Minister is also representing New Zealand on the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 
responsible for promoting New Zealand's Trade Policy. 
In performing its functions and making decisions, the Biosecurity Minister is informed through four 
goveming and advisory bodies, namely: 
(1) the Ministerial Committee for Biosecurity, 
(2) Biosecurity Ministerial Advisory Committee (BMAC), 
(3) Biosecurity Chief Executives Forum (CEs Forum), and 
(4) the Biosecurity CentrallRegional Govemment Forum (BCR Forum). 
The Ministerial Committee for Biosecurity comprises the Ministers of Biosecurity (as the lead 
Minister), Agriculture, Conservation, Fisheries, Health and the Associate Minister for Biosecurity. The 
Committee is primarily convened when there are biosecurity issues of major cross-sectoral importance. 
It is further tasked with overseeing plans and review systems performance, among others (MOU 2005). 
27 At the time of writing, New Zealand was having its MMP election. 
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The BMAC on the other hand is a multi-stakeholder advisory committee formed to provide 
independent advice on the performance of the overall system and monitor the implementation of the 
New Zealand Biosecurity Strategy. The BMAC replaced the disestablished Biosecurity Council. 
While MAP has overall responsibility for the performance of the overall biosecurity system, the Chief 
Executives Forum has been created to ensure clarity of roles, accountabilities and responsibilities 
among the agencies concerned. Currently, the Forum is composed of the Chief Executives of MAP, 
DOC, Mfish and MOR. In terms of providing an interface between central and regional government, 
the Biosecurity CentrallRegional Forum was created to improve coordination and collaboration across 
central and regional government biosecurity agencies. As providers of pest management services, 
regional councils are recognised as critical components of the end-to-end management ofbiosecurity28, 
Strategic level 
The Biosecurity Strategy Unit (BSU) acts as Secretariat for the four governance/advisory bodies. The 
BSU operates as an independent group reporting directly to the Director General of MAF and focuses 
on providing strategic advice on the biosecurity system as a whole26, It is responsible for developing 
longer-term strategic directions for the biosecurity function, and evaluation of performance in view of 
relevant biosecurity responsibilities and activities across the systems. 
Operational level 
Established in November 2004, Biosecurity New Zealand (BNZ) is the lead agency in New Zealand's 
biosecurity system and replaces the MAF's Biosecurity Authority. It is tasked with a 'whole of 
system' leadership role, encompassing economic, environmental, social and cultural outcomes29, The 
BNZ is the division of MAP that has the lead role in preventing the importation of unwanted pests and 
diseases, and for controlling, managing or eradicating them should they arrive, A new structure for 
BNZ was also created; it consists of six structural units reporting to the Assistant Director-General 
(ADG) for Biosecurity30 i.e, pre-clearance, post-clearance, policy and business, animal welfare, 
compliance and enforcement, and incursion investigation and reference laboratories. At the operational 
level, it follows a point of intervention approach at the pre-clearance and post-clearance units. At the 
pre-clearance directorate, it manages biosecurity risks before they enter the border or at the border. It 
consists of four groups i. e. risks analysis, biosecurity standards, monitoring, and exports. On the other 
hand, the post-clearance directorate manages 'residual' biosecurity risks, i.e. risks that cannot be 
managed by pre-clearance activities or that remain after pre-clearance conditions have been met, or 
28 Biosecurity Strategy Unit. w\Vw.mat:govt.nzlbiosecurity-strategic-unit/. Date retrieved: 03 August 2005. 
29 Overview of Biosecurity New Zealand. www.biosecurity.govt.nzlaboutloverview.htm. Date retrieved: 14 July 2005 
30 Source: Introducing Biosecurity New Zealand, a pamphlet provided during the 2nd Biosccurity Summit in November 2004 
held in Auckland. 
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where risk is already present within New Zealand. It is divided into surveillance and incursion 
response, and pest management groups. 
5.2 Biosafety Systems, Polices and Regulations 
5.2.1 Existing Policies/Laws 
The HNSO Act 1996 sets the environmental and health and safety law in New Zealand. The purpose 
of the Act is to protect the environment, health and safety of people and communities, by preventing or 
managing the adverse effects of hazardous substances and new organisms. The Act provides a process 
for assessing the risks posed by hazardous substances and new organisms and for setting national 
controls to manage their environmental effects and risks. The Act created the Environmental Risks 
Management Authority (ERMA) to be the prime body responsible for making decisions about 
importing, developing or manufacturing hazardous substances and new organisms. The Act established 
a consistent process for assessing the risks posed by hazardous substances and new organisms and for 
setting national controls to manage their effects. and risks. Enforcement of the Act for new organisms 
started on 29 July 1998 and for hazardous substances on 2 July 2001. New organisms under the HSNO 
Act can be any organism belonging to the following: 
(a) a species that was not present in New Zealand before 29 July 1998; 
(b) a species that has a containment approval under the HSNO Act; 
(c) a genetically modified organism (GMO); 
(d) a subspecies, infra-subspecies, variety, strain or cultivar that has been determined (by 
regulation) as a risk species and that was not present in New Zealand before 29 July 1998; 
or 
(e) a species, subspecies, infra-subspecies, variety, strain or cultivar that has been eradicated 
from New Zealand. 
The HSNO Amendments Act 
All genetically modified organisms are classified as "new organisms' under the HSNO Act. 
Consequently, ERMA has direct control over GMOs and serves as the regulatory body to cover 
biosafety issues concerning GMOs. The legal definition of a GMO in the HSNO Act states that "a 
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GMO means ... any organism in which any of the genes or genetic material- (a) have been modified by 
in vitro techniques; or (b) are inherited, or otherwise derived, through any number of replications, from 
any genes or other genetic material which has been modified by in vitro techniques." 
In 2002, HSNO Act was amended to tackle particularly the outstanding issues related to GMOs. The 
HNSO Amendment Act 2002 required the ERMA (the Authority) to take into consideration "additional 
matters when considering applications in relation to GMOs, and if it approves the applications, to 
include particular controls for field tests and certain developments31 ." The 2002 amendment also 
imposed a restricted period32 of two years which started on 29 October 2001 and ended on 29 October 
2003 for approving certain GMO related applications. During this period the Authority was mandated 
to cease consideration or approval of the following applications: 
(a) any application to import a new organism for release; and 
(b) any application to release a new organism from containment. 
Again, in October 2003, the Parliament made amendments to the HSNO Act. The HNSO Amendment 
Act 2003 officially lifted the moratorium and led to key changes in the legislation. Among others, 
changes include: 
(1) Streamlined low-risk approvals. Changes were made to ease the regulatory burden on 
scientific researchers working on GMOs in containment. For example, the law now allows 
a single approval of a variety of genetic modifications on a project basis, rather than 
requiring a separate process for each organism and transformation involved; 
(2) Streamlined procedures for assessment and approval of animal or human medicines that 
are or contain low risk new organisms, including approvals to deal with emergency 
situations; 
(3) Extended grounds on which the Minister may call in applications to include significant 
cultural, ethical, and spiritual effects; 
(4) Creation of the new category of "conditional release." The new category will allow 
ERMA to approve the release of new organisms with conditions imposed to protect the 
environment and crop co-existence; 
JJ Certain developments inelude a medicine or new medicine; veterinary medicine used for therapeutic or prophylactic 
purposes; and those that are subject of a e1inical trial approved by the Director General of Health. 
J2 Others referred to it as "moratorium" 
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(5) Specification of one agency (the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry) to be responsible for 
all enforcement of HSNO IS provisions regarding new organisms. 
(6) Changes to better incorporate Maori viewpoints. The amendments created a new advisory 
board to work with ERMA on Maori issues, and made provisions for allowing expertise in 
Maori issues to serve as a basis for appointment to the Authority; and 
(7) Liability. The amendments provided penalties and civil liability for breaches ofthe Act. 
5.2.2 Governance and Regulatory Framework 
The MinisterlMinistry for the Environment 
The Minister for the Environment appoints members of the Authority of ERMA. The Minister also 
issues policy direction in view of regulating hazardous substances and new organisms. Of a particular 
power given to the Minister is the term "Minister's Call-in". This means "the Minister can call in and 
decide on an application that the Minister considers to be of national or international significance 
(ERMA 200 I )." The Ministry for the Environment advises the government of policies, laws, 
regulations, and other means of improving environmental management in New Zealand. The Ministry 
carries out many of the statutory functions of the Minister for the Environment. It monitors the work 
of ERMA on behalf of the Minister; focuses on providing advice on the administration of hazardous 
substances and new organisms; and works towards development of relevant policies and regulations. 
The significant areas of policy for which the Ministry is responsible are: management of natural 
resources; sustainable land management; air and water quality; management of hazardous substances, 
waste and contaminated sites; protection of the ozone layer; and responding to the threat of climate 
change. Figure 3 outlines the structural framework of the ERMA in terms of regulating new 
orgamsms. 
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MINISTER FOR THE Ministry for the Environment 
ENVIRONMENT Development of policy and regulations 
~ 
Ngi'i Kaihautn Tikanga Taiao Environmental Risk Management ~ Advisory committee on Maori issues Authority Applicants and users 
~ Applicants for and users of hazardous 
Tlte Autltority substances and new organisms 
.. appointed body of six to eight people 
Institutional Biological Safety .. makes decisions on applications 
Committees ~ .. monitors compliance and enforcement Maori Delegated decision making on low ++ .. are consulted by applicants 
risk organisms The Agency .. make submissions on applications 
.. the Authority's support organisation 
.. technical and scientific advice 
The general public ! t .. II makes submissions on applications 
Enforcement of new organisms 
.. request information 
Enforcement of new orgallisms 
II Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
Enforcement at the border 
.. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
II Customs Department 
Figure 3. Structural framework of the Environmental Risk Management Authority in view 
of regulating new organisms (Source: ERMA 2005). 
The Authority 
ERMA New Zealand is a crown entity and acts as a quasi-judicial body. It is comprised of three 
formal elements ~ the Authority, the Agency, and Nga Kaihauru Tikanga Taiao.33 The Authority is 
composed of eight people appointed by the Minister for the Environment and is responsible for 
exercising statutory functions and acting as the governing body of ERMA New Zealand. They have 
two main roles, i.e. (1) they are the decision makers they are the people who make decisions about 
whether or not hazardous substances or new organisms can be imported, developed or manufactured in 
New Zealand; and (2) they also monitor compliance and enforcement in view of the HSNO Act. The 
Authority has a governance role over the Agency. They serve as boards of directors overseeing the 
operational, financial and organisational status of the Agency. In making decisions on approvals on 
hazardous substances and new organisms, the Authority "must take into account specific matters 
33 ERMA Statement ofIntent 2004/2005. 
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including the economic, social and cultural well-being of all people and communities in New Zealand 
and the relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, 
waahi tapu, valued flora and fauna, and other taonga (ERMA 2001)." This is being facilitated by close 
coordination between the Authority and Nga Kaihautii Tikanga Taiao. Nga Kaihautii is a statutory 
Maori Advisory Committee established under Part 4A of the HSNO Act, and is required to provide 
advice and assistance, as sought by the Authority, on matters relating to policy process and applications 
(ERMA 2004). The Authority also established an ethics and advisory panel to assist in its 
consideration of ethical and spiritual matters in decision-making (Figure 3). 
The Agency 
The Agency serves as the Authority's support organisation. It provides technical and scientific advice 
to the Authority in making its decisions. It is headed by a Chief Executive with six group managers 
and manned by around 100 staff with relevant technical expertise for evaluating and processing 
applications, administering the public consultation process and acting as the Authority's public 
interface (Ministry for the Environment2001). In simple terms, the Agency receives the application, 
evaluates it, ensures that all information relevant to the application are obtained, conducts risk 
assessment and eventually present the risk assessment to the Authority for appropriate actions 
(Harrison pers. comm.). Another key role of the Agency is to screen applications and provide advice 
and information to potential applicants. The Agency is also in-charge of coordinating with the 
Institutional Biological Safety Committees (IBSCs), enforcement agencies, members of the general 
public and Maori. 
ThemSCs 
Decisions on the development of low-risk GMOs and their importation to secure containment can be 
done through a rapid assessment process (ERMA 2003). The prerogative to make these decisions may 
be delegated by the Authority to mscs which are based in academic and research institutions (ERMA 
2003). mscs usually consist of members of the institution where the research would be undertaken 
and members of the community in which the institution is situated, including a Maori representative 
(Ministry for the Environment 2004). The mscs are expected to keep detailed records and report their 
actions to the Agency who oversee their work. They are regularly checked, audited and guided by staff 
from the Agency to ensure that rules and correct procedures are followed. In terms of compliance, 
MAF visits and checks the laboratories where low-risk research is carried out in containment. 
According to Harrison (pel's. COl11l11.) about 80% of decisions are made at the low-risk level. 
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CHAPTER 6 
BIOSECURITY AND BIOSAFETY ISSUES AND CONCERNS IN THE 
PHILIPPINES 
This chapter presents and discusses the intertwining issues, concerns and challenges to biosecurity and 
biosafety in the Philippines. This chapter has two sections. The first focuses on the biosecurity issues 
and concerns and the second delves into the biosafety issues and concerns. 
6.1 Biosecurity Issues and Concerns 
6.1.1 Understanding the Term Biosecurity 
One of the issues in biosecurity is that it is a relatively new term especially for developing countries 
(FAO 2004). ill the Philippines, this study confirmed that the term biosecurity is still unfamiliar and is 
not adopted widely. Evidence from interviews cDnducted by the researcher and documents retrieved for 
the purpose of this study reveal that its scope is not yet fully understood. The term biosecurity in the 
Philippines is also used interchangeably with biosafety. Officials interviewed by the researcher 
admitted that perhaps even the political leadership is unaware of the term biosecurity. There are only 
two or three scientists who understand the concept of biosecurity according to the F AO and New 
Zealand's definition, and one of them however, considers biosecurity to be directly relevant to food 
security34. There is clear confusion about the term for many and the following responses from top 
government officials and a scientist further confirm the unfamiliarity of the concept: 
The term biosecurity is not even yet adopted Widely; people probably do not 
understand yet what its scope is and biosafety is sometimes confused with biosecurity or 
used interchangeably with biosecurity but, well for those who are aware of the 
distinction between the two it's not good practice to mix them up. 
I'm not too familiar with it. Yeah, what is it? 
I'm not sure whether even the political leadership is ffivare of the concept ofbiosecurity. 
34 Dr. William Padolina, Deputy Director General for Partnership of the Intemational Rice Research Institute 
(IRRI), presented a topic on: Biosecllrity and Food Security at SEARCA on 29 January 2004. A PowerPoint 
presentation for the said topic was obtained by the Researcher. 
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Interestingly, others have their own personal understanding and definition of the concept. One 
scientist opined that: 
Biosecurity is more about preserving biodiversity against commercialisation by external 
entities and influences. 
An environmental scientist on the other hand, put forward the concept of environmental security: 
I haven't encountered the term biosecurity but what we have here as a matter of strategy 
is the term environmental security; which is ensuring that human life and property are 
within a controllable level and that are otherwise generated from the environment. The 
second aspect of that is that human activities do not harm the environment, or the harm 
to the environment is within controllable levels. 
The definition provided by the scientists may not be the mainstream definition of the term biosecurity, 
but it categorically shows that the concept of protection of biodiversity and the environment are being 
directly related to the term biosecurity. The next section embarks on discovering how biosecurity is 
perceived in view of the associated risks attached to it 
Biosecurity as a matter of terminology may be unfamiliar in the Philippines, however, if it is broken 
down into its associated risks (regarded as biosecurity risks) such as: invasive alien species, animal 
and plant pests, and zoonotic diseases, a better understanding of it emerges. Based on the interviews 
conducted by the researcher, and from the public documents and news articles collated for this 
research, the threats of Avian influenza, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), red tides, 
formalin contaminated vegetables, invasive alien species, high profile plant pests such as golden 
kuhol and water hyacinth, and animal diseases such as foot and mouth disease (FMD) and Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), among others were patticularly recognised as critical problems in 
the Philippines. The risks from these threats are therefore considered high and are perceived to have a 
great impact on food security, the health, environment and the economy in the country. A former top 
government official highlighted these concerns: 
Biosecurity has always been one of my concerns because even before there were 
already reports of Avian Flu in Hong Kong and of course we had occasional incidents 
here in the Philippines of formalin contaminated vegetables, but we also hm1e red tides 
here, that are seasonal in occurrence, plus of course other packaging problems of foods 
that are not hygienically prepared, so it's notjustfood or materials comingfrom outside 
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but also internally. The practice and standards of food safety are not complied with. I 
know there are regulations but the compliance is very poor. 
6.1.2 Invasive Alien Species 
Another issue related to biosecurity is the rising problem with invasive alien species (lAS). In the 
Philippines, there appears to be a growing awareness and recognition of the threat posed by lAS. One 
scientist interviewed by the researcher confirmed that there are already known instances of intentional 
introductions of new species that have not resulted in economic benefit (which is primarily the reason 
for such introduction), but have caused adverse environmental and economic consequences in the 
Philippines instead. The scientist recounted the dismay caused by the intentional introduction of the 
golden apple snail (Pomacea caniculata), locally known as golden kuhol; which was purposely 
imported as a source of protein to prevent malnutrition, and as an aquarium novelty but it 
unexpectedly became a major pest to newly planted rice seedlings and displaced the native Philippine 
snail (Pila luzonica). Concerns were expressed however that the issue of lAS is not given enough 
attention and that the government and the public are too focused on the issue of GMOs. One 
environmental lawyer and a scientist commented that lAS are a much bigger threat to the country: 
To me invasive alien species is a much bigger issue that the Philippines should be 
tackling compared with the issue ofGMOs. The problem is it is giveniess attention, less 
funding but it is definitely a much bigger problem. 
I would say exotics or invasive alien species are bigger threats than GMOs. Why? They 
are already here within the country before we react, as somebody has already 
introduced them into the environment; at least with GMOs we assess them first before 
we allow them to enter the countly. So at least we are able to reduce the risks in the 
case of GMOs. 
The researcher found out that the dilemma over the issue of lAS was evident even during the 
development of the NBF. Based on the transcripts of the actual proceedings of an expert consultation 
conducted for the development of the NBF in 2003, it was revealed that the participants were 
concemed about whether to place lAS within the scope of the proposed NBF or put it in a separate 
framework. There were those who argued that dealing with two different organisms (a GMO and an 
invasive species) in one framework would run the risk of confusing the public by suggesting some 
comparability between the two. During the discussion about the NCC, it was noted that the process 
provided for under the proposed NBF is primarily for addressing GMOs and that it might be 
potentially difficult to apply the same process to the issues of exotic species and lAS. However, while 
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most were not convinced that IAS should fall under the scope of the NBF there is no alternative 
framework yet where it can be covered. One government official voiced this uncertainty: 
Of course there's the issue of invasive species but we don't know whether it should fall 
under the proposed national biosafety framework or whether they should be covered by 
a different policy paper altogether. 
In the end however, the NCC decided to retain the inclusion of exotic species and invasive alien 
species with a caveat in paragraph 2 of Section 3.1 of the proposed NBF stating: 
The NCBP and concerned departments and agencies may apply, when allowed by law, 
the principles, mechanisms and processes developed and implemented under the NBF to 
similar problems such as addressing the issue of exotic species and invasive alien 
species. Where appropriate, they may adopt the administrative and decision-making 
systems established in this Framework. (Drqft Executive Order 2004) 
6.1.3 Pest Management 
In the Philippines, the cunent trend for pest management is a knowledge-driven, knowledge-based, 
location specific understanding of ecology and ecosystems; however, the country is lacking basic 
research on pest and disease ecology, and as a result fanners decided to respond according to their 
own best understanding of the situation and through Farmer Field School (FFS) also known as 
community Integrated Pest Management (IPM). The underlying concept behind FFS was really about 
reducing pesticide use since it is the most apparent problem, but when it comes to actual national pest 
control strategy there is no national effort at present. The researcher discovered that in some cases the 
approach was very "ad hoc" i.e. forming an ad hoc committee or an ad hoc task force to address 
problem of a particular pest (Velasco pers. comm.). In terms of pest eradication, the Philippines has 
no authentic experience or program to eradicate pests. The main attempt at eradication was with the 
mango pulp weevil in Palawan but this did not materialise due to logistical constraints and the 
difficulty of convincing farmers to cut down their trees, or not allowing them to bear fruit for three 
years. Moreover, at the time of this study, the researcher could not locate an economic study that 
estimated the impacts made by a pest on the countIy's economy or how it affected the farmers 
themselves. A professor and one government scientist interviewed by the researcher were uncertain 
of any study conducted on that matter: 
I am not sure if there has been a formal economic impact study (or one yet to be done) 
in the Philippines. Usually we do not do that because it is quite expensive,' the idea is to 
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use the money on other activities that would produce positive gains rather than on 
retrospective studies. 
There's no economic impact study that I can remember that measured the impact made 
by pests and diseases on the economy of the country and how they affected the farmers, 
for instance. 
Considering the above situation, it could be assumed that the lack of support for a more stable (instead 
of an ad hoc) pest management strategy for instance was due to the lack of realisation and recognition 
of the economic and environmental impacts that pests had on to the country. 
6.1.4 The need/or a Biosecurity System 
Based on the documents collated by the researcher, the need for a biosecurity framework first 
surfaced during an expert consultation workshop for the proposed NBF. However, since the focus 
was on biosafety, biosecurity did not gain prominence and it was suggested that it be looked at in 
another forum. There were strong views however, which invoked the need to have a biosecurity 
system in place in the country. As one former government scientist and administrator pointed out: 
I think we need biosecurity in the Philippines as part of our governance because of the 
liberalisation of trade when food materials and other materials that impact on human 
health and the environment come in. We need to have a biosecurity policy so that we can 
invoke that when we open our markets ... the SPS allows for countries to refuse entry to 
products that they deem harmful to their environment and to human health. But if we 
don't have a system in place, even if that were allowed, we will not be able to undertake 
regulatory activities. 
The link of biosecurity to a healthy nation and an efficient workforce was also cited. According to 
one scientist there is a direct connection between biosecurity and a strong populace: 
I hope they (the politicians) will pick it up (the issue of biosecurity) because in the long 
term it will affect the efficiency of the nation. Imagine if you are eating, and you are 
already malnourished, you'd be eating food that is contaminated, so you are already 
subjecting a good portion of your population to jeopardy. Now, will they be efficient? 
Probably not, because they will be affected by these contaminants. Maybe their thought 
processes will not work, they might be lethargic with no energy. So how can you push or 
expect them to work efficiently? On that score, I think the politicians, the Congress and 
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the Executives should really pay attention to this, and it is really because we are 
opening our markets. evenfrom our Asian neighbours. 
Another scientist further emphasized the need for a regulatory system and the necessary infrastructure 
that comes with it. It was underscored in the scientist's statement that biosecurity should be a national 
decision and that a regulatory system should be put in place: 
Now if you don't have a regulatory system to monitor them whatever Wtry, either at 
random or at a single gate I think you subject the population to a very high degree of 
peril. So, I hope that our politicians will realise it is necessary to put these systems in 
place. It's really putting in an infrastructure of laboratories and institutions that can 
perform the monitoring, and for our Port authorities to be educated also on how to 
visually detect possible contamination. 
Based on the above statements, the need for a biosecurity system in the Philippines is an issue that 
cannot be overlooked. The apparent consequence of not having a regulatory regime to address the 
matter will be further substantiated in the succeeding sections below. 
6.1.5 Border and Quarantine 
One of the issues related to biosecurity that appeared during the conducting of this study was the 
situation on the Philippine border. It was admitted that the system at the border is very porous. As 
one top government official explained: 
Our system at the border is very porous, it's very porous. We have a coast line the 
length of which is twice that of the United States because each island is to be measured, 
and surrounded by large bodies of water. We also have a navy that is ill-equipped and a 
coast guard that is also ill-equipped, therefore, we have very porous borders and 
products which are unmonitored or smuggled enter. This is a matter of great concern), 
There is also concern that the current quarantine system is very weak. According to one plant 
scientist, the Philippine quarantine system lacks technical expertise in terms of carrying out Pest Risk 
Analysis (PRA) as part of the International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM) 2 & 11, 
issued by FAO-IPPC in 1996 and 2004, respectively, The lack of sufficient funds to conduct a good 
PRA and to put up quarantine infrastructure and facilities were the other underlying reasons that 
contributed to a weak quarantine system in the country. To produce much needed funding, quite 
recently the Philippines Department of Agriculture and the Department of Trade and Industry sought 
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US support for a US$ 10 million grant for the procurement of irradiation equipment that would help 
facilitate the entry of Philippine mangoes to the US. The irradiation machine uses ionizing radiation 
to eliminate pests and bacteria from food intended for exports to meet the sanitary and phytosanitary 
requirements of importers (Campos 2005). These concerns can be viewed as significant if we look at 
the number of seaports, for instance in the whole Philippine archipelago which are used for handling 
almost 98% of the total imports and exports. Based on a public document retrieved by the researcher, 
there are 42 ports considered crucial to the Philippines economic development which are to be 
equipped with infrastructure and landslide equipment to enhance their competitive advantage. There 
are also over 1000 small, domestic ports within the whole archipelago. The situation of having a 
weak infrastructure and a lack of technological underpinning is stressed by one government scientist: 
A big portion of biosecurity is the technological underpinning; contamination can only 
be detected technically, we can not just say it is contaminated. For instance, a lot of the 
claims made to establish the presence or absence of hazardous substances have to be 
scientifically backed up and they must be backed up by methods that are universally 
acceptable, and that's where we are weak in this country. 
There was one notable case however where the quarantine system was quite stringent. In the small 
island of Guimaras (which was declared a Special Quarantine Zone), quarantine measures are quite 
high in order to keep the island free of high profile pests such as the mango pulp weevil and the 
mango seed weevil. The underlying reason was to satisfy strict requirements placed by the US on 
Philippine mango exports which currently only come from the Guimaras Island. Its direct relationship 
with trade will be presented and discussed in the succeeding section. 
6.1.6 Biosecurity and International Trade 
This study found that there are several trade related issues that can be connected with the broader 
issue of biosecurity35 in the Philippines. One government official commented that the weak science 
infrastructure in the Philippines, was used by importing countries to put trade restrictions on some 
Philippine exports: 
The products that we export, because of the weak science infrastructures here are 
always subject to the what we may call restrictions of the importing country, and the 
restrictions are based on their own analysis. And so we do not have the means to 
35 Since the term biosecurity is not being used in the Philippines (yet), the use of biosecurity in the Philippines in 
this thesis refers to the more traditional approach to pests and diseases and quarantine mechanisms in the country. 
60 
counter them because we have nothing to show that their analysis is not true; we have 
nothing to show that is our analysis. 
This predicament can be best described by providing a few examples such as the case of mango 
exports to the US. It took 14 years for the Philippines to persuade the US that the small central 
Philippine island of Guimaras was free of a winged brown pest called the mango pulp weevil and to 
permit mangoes from Guimaras to enter the US (Cohen 2004). Another example was the trade 
dispute over Philippine pineapple and banana exports to Australia. In 2002, the Philippines was 
protesting at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) against non-tariff barriers that Australia imposed 
on Philippine fresh pineapples. Biosecurity Australia has allowed the entry of Philippine pineapples 
and mangoes under strict pre-conditions, but banned the imports of Philippine bananas that year 
(Cabacungan 2002). These impacts on trade have been recognised even at the top level of 
government. A former Cabinet Secretary interviewed by the researcher for this study underscored the 
importance of having a good biosecurity system to be able to trade in an equal playing field: 
Biosecurity should be two-way the way 1 look at it. From a developing country's point 
of view it's two wcrys and maybe even from other countries' points of view, because a 
good biosecurity system can make sure your products comply with international 
standards. Also entering and outgoing products comply with international standards. 
And you have your own iriformation systems that would generate. And so, in effect you 
are able to conduct the trade on a level playingfield. 
6.1. 7 Biosecurity as strategically important as national security 
The Philippines arguably has not come to the point of discussing more deeply the holistic relationship 
between biosecurity and national security, although if a particular pest ravaged crops or livestock, or 
if a particular epidemic of a disease of animals, or from animals-to-bumans broke out as in the case of 
the Avian Influenza, it would be considered a national concern. For Avian Influenza for instance it 
would be a joint effort between the DOH and the DA and possibly the DENR. The National Disaster 
Coordinating Council (NDCC) would also be part of it should such a problem turn into a disaster for 
the country. On the other hand, a former government official opined that the Philippines do not 
consider biosecurity as national security matter at this stage but are more concerned with the bigger 
issue of environmental security. The DENR was invited to sit in Cabinet Cluster E which is the 
National Security Cluster for national security issues that concern the environment. One example of 
an environmental issue was the dispute between the Philippines and its Asian neighbours (including 
China) over control of the resource rich island of the Spratlys. It was stressed by the official that what 
appeared to be a military activity was prompted by deep environmental concerns: 
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Well it was considered like that for a long time by the Cabinet under President Fidel 
Ramos, that's why we in the Environment Department were sitting in Cabinet Cluster E, 
which is the national security cluster. We were not a regular member at that time, but 
from time to time we were invited to sit in that cluster precisely because many of our 
national security concerns involve interest in the environment such as the Spratlys. 
During that time we were very much involved in defining what would be the possible 
strategy for the Philippines campaign to contain the Spratlys problem ... What appears 
to be a military activity is actually prompted by very deep environmental issues. 
Consequently, based on the above statements, it can be argued that biosecurity is not seen or valued yet 
as a broader environmental concern that should be tackled within the context of bigger environmental 
security issues in the country. 
6.1.8 Biosecurity Encompassing Biosafety 
In the case of the Philippines, those who understand the broader concept of biosecurity conculTed that 
to a degree biosecurity should encompass biosafety matters. A government scientist used the example 
from another country to reinforce such a claim: 
Take for instance the Bt Corn in South America ... farmers have gone to the extent of 
stealing seeds, so there is an illegal trade of seeds now in South America. It's a 
question of monitoring and that's part of biosecurity. That's why I think biosecurity 
should encompass biosafety in some ways. 
One official however, stepped into the discourse and suggested that biosafety should be encompassed 
not by biosecurity but within the context of environmental security: 
To me biosafety should be encompassed by environmental security. The rationale for 
biosafety should be that one must pursue higher environmental security objectives. 
As noted in the earlier section of this Chapter, there is a tendency for cross-cutting issues like 
biosecurity and biosafety to be engulfed within the broader concept of environmental security. The 
researcher however, did not descend to a deeper level of research on the concept of environmental 
security due to limited and restricted access to information, but it would be worthwhile to explore this 
topic as a separate study. 
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6.2 Biosafety Issues and Concerns 
6.2.1 The Biosafety System in Place 
This study found that many believe that the biosafety system in the Philippines is working properly 
and is considered to be one of the strictest biosafety regimes, at least in the ASEAN region. Given 
that it is the scientists themselves who initiated the move to have biosafety regulations put in place, 
justifies the stringent measures that were formed. Hence, the regulations in place for biosafety are 
fundamentally scientific in orientation. As one environmental lawyer put it: 
Any person you ask will tell you we have the strictest biosafety regime, outside probably 
of developed countries. We can ask some of my NGO friends and etc ... we have the 
strictest in terms of the law and in terms of the regulations. 
Others agreed that the biosafety system is functional and run by a balanced group of competent 
people. They are of course referring to the NCBP as the main regulatory body in charge of biosafety. 
However, there was general acceptance that the NCBP is undermanned and with a very small 
Secretariat that does not cope with the number of biosafety related applications each year. Another 
issue is that most of the members of the NCBP have full time work obligations in various public, 
private and community institutions or organisations. The normal regular meeting of the members of 
the NCBP takes place only once a month; though in exceptional circumstances it may be twice a 
month, especially when there are issues that need immediate attention, and/or decisions. ill a more 
detailed picture on how the system works within the NCBP, a former top government official 
recounted: 
I think the biosafety system we now have in place is good and functional but it is under-
manned. It does not have a full Secretariat; they only have 1 or 2 people working as 
Secretariat while they receive 5 or 6, or even up to 10 applications a month. So, the 
processing is a little delayed, but it is composed of very competent people, I think, 
people who are good. It's a balanced group: there's a community representative there, a 
NGO representative and a social scientist as well,' and it's I think is functional. 
ill the case of DA-BPI which is now regulating all applications for field testing, commercial 
propagation and importation of plant and plant products derived from the process of modern 
biotechnology (hence a biosafety matter), there is an intensive capacity building programme that is 
being implemented within the Department and its Bureaus to make sure that the regulators can cope 
with the technical and administrative demand of the task. Holistically however, there is a consensus 
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that "the system must be strengthened, including the capabilities of the different regulatory and 
implementing agencies, the research institutions, and civil society organisations" (Halos et al. 2004: 
86). Likewise, many also recognised the complexity of the biosafety issue and others stressed the 
importance of an NBF for the Philippines. 
The Proposed National Biosafety Framework of the Philippines 
Based on the archives collated, and from a final workshop attended by the researcher (during fieldwork 
in the Philippines) on the development of the NBF, it is apparent that the proposed NBF was crafted 
through mutli-sectoral and multi-stakeholder processes. It went through a series of drafts, each draft 
being revised based on inputs from multi-stakeholder consultations conducted. One of the issues that 
was raised by the researcher to a member of the Nee was the potential conflict of the proposed NBF 
with the existing policies, guidelines and regUlations. The Nee member however, pointed out that 
there was no conflict because the NBF itself is a process-purpose framework rather than a 
specification-purpose framework. This means that the framework has not specified what to do, but 
rather focuses on the range of possibilities for action. The exact quote from the Nee member is 
presented below: 
I think the NBF will have no conflict with existing policies, guidelines and regulations. 
In fact it recognises process. There are so many things we don't know yet; and so many 
things that will still happen in the future. So it has not specified: this is what we do, this 
is what you do, these are the whole range of possibilities. For example the ethical 
assessment or, the socio-economic assessment we do not have standards for them yet. 
That's why, in the NBF standards can be developed ... So it's an evolving, it's a creative 
and a process - purpose framework ... rather than a ~'Pecification - purpose framework. 
There were non-technical issues and concerns however, that surfaced during the process of developing 
the NBI"'. One in particular looked at how the financial assistance for the development of the NBF 
from the UNEP-GEF was used. There was a notion that the funds could have been used in capacity 
building and an information and education campaign straight away, instead of the UNEP-GEF 
releasing them in a piecemeal basis, i.e. first phase-development of the NBF project; second phase-
capacity bUilding. One environmental lawyer and one social scientist commented: 
That funding from UNEP, to be quite blunt about it is basically a funding in search of a 
project. 
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If you ask me, that money from UNEP which was used to finance the development of that 
draft NBF could have been spent in a better way, like building the capacity, or 
information and education campaigns. You look at the draft NBF, you look what the 
results are and you would say that what they came up with is essentially what we have 
now. 
Interestingly, the researcher found out from one of the NCC members that the second phase offunding 
for capacity building will only be released by the UNEP-GEF if the Philippines government becomes a 
Party to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, i.e. when it finally ratifies the Protocol. However, in the 
technical briefing attended by the researcher where chiefs of staff of the Philippine Senate Committees 
on the Environment were briefed on the issue, it was evident that the there were polarity and 
contrasting views on the topic. Apparently, most of the teclmical staff of the Senators, as well as the 
Senators themselves (the staff are the ones keeping the Senators informed) were not fully aware of the 
issues pertaining to biosafety and the Cartagena Protocol. In hindsight, the policy makers and/or their 
duly authorised representatives could have been part of the consultation process during the 
development of the NBF so that they had a full grasp of the issue even before deliberations commenced 
for the ratification of the NBF. Based on the correspondence received by the researcher from one of 
the National Executing Agency officials of the NBF Project, the ratification of the Cartagena Protocol 
by the Philippine Senate may take a while, and the first hearing was scheduled for September 2005. 
Strengthening the functions of the NCBP became one of the major issues in contention during the 
development process of, and decision-making stage for the NBF. For instance, a government official 
stated: 
The issue in the NBF is they want to expand the functions of the NCBP; that's not a bad 
idea but the NCBP having a bigger function will mean higher expectations ... but your 
enabling resource support is not enough My wony is it might get worse instead 
The NCBP members themselves did not like the idea. They were opposed to the notion of creating a 
supra NCBP whilst having the nuance of no certainty in funding to support its operation: 
You know the problem with the initial draft that they made is they want to create a supra 
NCBP where you have so many members, you know, and without providing any funding. 
If you are going to create a supra agency that means additional budget, additional 
people, right now people are already coordinating with each other, people are working 
together through NCBP and not even through NCBP, even between Department to 
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Department like DENR and DA. So why do you need a supra agency for, what do you 
need itfor? 
In the draft NBF we get a bigger role and we are opposed to that. 
What do they mean by a supra NCBP? Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of the Draft EO provide the proposed 
new mandate and composition36 of the NCBP. In particular Section 4.1 states: 
The NCBP shall be the lead body to coordinate and harmonize inter-agency and multi-
sector efforts to develop biosafety policies in the country (where such are not already 
stipulated by law) and set scientific, technical and procedural standards on actions by 
agencies and other sectors to promote biosafety in the Philippines,' oversee the 
implementation of the NBF; act as a clearing house for biosafety matters,' and 
coordinate and harmonize the efforts of all concerned agencies and departments in this 
regard. (Draft Executive Order 2004) 
6.2.2 The Question offunding 
One of the outstanding issues in the Philippines is the limited funding given for biosafety regulation. 
This study discovered from one member of the NCBP that the funding allocation that should have 
come from the National government was not met except in the early inception of the NCBP in 1990. 
Whilst there is a provision clearly stated in Section 5 of EO 430 that "the DOST shall allocate from its 
present budget such amount as may be necessary for the initial operations of the NCBP and its 
Secretariat. .. and funding requirements shall be included in the general appropriations bill submitted 
to the Congress," it did not materialise. The National Government was not able to provide additional 
budget to cope with the growing demand for the NCBP to operate effectively. The Chairman of the 
NCBP had to outsource funds from other means. One avenue was to tap some of the funds from the 
Grants in Aid (GIA) Program under the DOST. The breakdown of funds to finance the operation of 
the NCBP was 50% from the national government and another 50% from the GIA Program. 
(panlasigue pers. comm.). This underpinning issue of inadequate funding was translated by others 
into the need for enabling mechanism for resource commitment: 
Well, I think they (those involved in the development of the NBF) really have to put more 
thinking and more flesh into the enabling mechanism primarily on the resource 
commitment. When I say commitment it means commitment of the Departments 
36 See Sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.5 of the Draft Executive Order (Appendix A) for a complete list of the proposed composition of 
the NCBP. 
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concerned and commitment of the National Government. I think that's where the focus 
should be. 
The above statement implies that the problem is not the lack of funding or resources, but the 
allocation, commitment and prioritisation of this funding. It is surprising however, that in spite of the 
hype of the issue on GMO in the Philippines, the enabling resource for a biosafety regulatory regime 
is still at this stage scant. 
6.2.3 Single Agency Regulating Biosafety 
The scenario of having many different government agencies addressing the concerns over 
biotechnology and biosafety brought to mind the likelihood of burdensome red tape associated with it. 
At some stage in the development of the NBF, the need for a single window or desk in the government 
that will address all concerns on biotechnology and biosafety related issues was suggested and 
supported by several stakeholders. From the proceedings of the regional workshops obtained for this 
study, various structures were suggested, namely.: 
(l) create a single independent, higher, oversight agency or council that will oversee all 
biotechnology efforts from research to release stages; 
(2) create a new body under the Office ofthe President; 
(3) create a coordinating body and leave implementation to different agencies; and 
(4) strengthen the NCBP by amending membership and functions, and ensuring funds for its 
operation (DENR-PAWBIUNEP-GEF 2003,2004). 
In the interviews conducted by the researcher, the polarity of views expressed during the regional 
workshops was confirmed. One government official commented that a single agency would be the 
ideal set-up provided that the agency can attract competent people. There are those who do not 
undermine the possibility of a single agency under the Office of the President. 
Well I would say that would be the ideal set up provided that the agency can draw on 
competent people and provided that the assessment will be science-based. 
That's a possibility but I think it should be under the Office of the President. I think so. 
Biotech is so important. 
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On the other hand, there are those who did not see the need for forming a separate institution outside 
the NCBP; they remarked that the NCBP is a functioning institution and thus it just needs to be 
improved and refined: 
I think it is a good way of reviewing what we have but it should not set up as a separate 
system. 
I hope that if the biosafety framework is to be useful it should just refine and finesse the 
systems that are in place already, but it should not set up a separate institution or 
agency. 
Others were not convinced that creating a single agency would be the answer; rather forming a 
coordinating body is the logical approach for them: 
I am not so sure if we need to create a single agency because the DA and DENR have 
the same position· on this. that we don't have to create another agency but we can create 
a 'Coordinating Body' composed of members from the different agencies to be able to 
evaluate applications and see which agency should appropriately handle the 
applications. 
The national draft of the NBF deviated from the regional draft and proposed the creation of a National 
Biosafety Board or NBB whose main task is policy making. Interestingly though, in the final draft of 
the NBF, the NCC pushed for the strengthening of the NCBP instead of creating another layer of 
bureaucracy. 
6.2.4 Capacity and Capability Building 
The issue of capacity and capability building in biosafety especially for developing countries is 
considered to be one of the most urgent issues that need to be addressed (McLean et al. 2002, SCBD 
2003). In the Philippines there appears to be a coordinated initiative for capacity building undertaken 
by the DA in collaboration with various institutions both international and locally; and with public and 
private organisations. For instance, the Biotechnology Coalition of the Philippines (BCP) with SUppolt 
from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has undertaken national 
capacity building activities in cooperation with the DA-Biotechnology Programme. However, it was 
noted by one interviewee that these capacity building efforts were limited and just starting. 
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The study also found that with regard to capacity and capability (in biosafety and modern 
biotechnology) when broke down into actual human resource, infrastructure and facility issues, more 
diverging views arose. One government scientist and adviser opined that the capacity for modern 
biotechnology and biosafety programs in the Philippines is modest compared with other countries. The 
scientist was basing such a claim on the reports of Halos et al. (2004) stating that there are about 955 
experts in various fields of sciences recognised by the National Research Council (NRCP) of the 
Philippines and National Academy of Science and Technology (NAST). However, these pools of 
experts do not consist entirely of the biotechnology and biosafety spectrum; they include combined 
expertise in agriculture and forestry, biological sciences, chemical sciences, earth sciences, engineering 
fields, medical sciences, pharmaceutical sciences, and physical sciences. A former Secretary of one of 
the Departments of the Philippine Government argued that: 
Notwithstanding our continuing propaganda that we have highly trained human 
resources, I would tell you that that is no longer true. Of the sciences, in the Philippines 
we are strongest in biology and biotechnology, there is no doubt about it, that is the 
Philippines standard; but if you compar~ our capacity with global standards, or even 
compared with our Asian neighbours such as Japan, South Korea, China, India and 
Singapore, we are not that strong ... anywcry what I am saying, when we touch on human 
resources is that in general we're not producing the quality of human resources we have 
produced before, because how can you say we are producing good human resources 
when our educational system is weakening. Our institutional infrastructure is also 
limited. 
One scientist involved in the capacity-building effort in the Philippines nonetheless, pointed out that it 
is not necessary to always equate biosafety capacity with molecular biology: 
In safety assessment of course you need molecular biologists to understand a particular 
molecular biology event, but in doing so you also need environmental scientists - we 
have a lot of environmental scientists; you need food scientists and we have a lot of 
food scientists too. I mean you don't need that many molecular biologists and looking at 
the number of applications coming in, it's not too many if you compare it with the 
number of applications other countries are receiving, for instance the US. 
The above statement can be construed as a short-term view of the growing biotechnology industry in 
the Philippines. Now that the Philippines has opened its doors to GMO propagation and importation 
(basically commercialisation), the Philippine officials may be underestimating the propensity of this 
industry to grow exponentially in the coming years. 
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In terms of the legal aspects, however, there is a dearth of legal expertise specifically in the field of 
biotechnology and biosafety. One environmental lawyer interviewed for this study reported that there 
are fewer than five legal experts in the field of biosafety, although there are quite a number of experts 
in environmental law, health and public safety, and trade law. 
Experiences of the NCBP and DA-BPI showed that capacity in biosafety in the Philippines is 
inadequate and needs to be strengthened. The need for capacity building was stressed in the proposed 
NBF; it was emphasised that "to ensure the proper implementation of the NBF, the capacities of 
various sectors: policy makers, regulatory agencies, local government units, research community and 
the general public involved in performing various tasks must be strengthened (Draft Executive Order 
2004)." As one member of the NCBP put it: 
We need to have a lot of capability building the way I look at it. So as we develop more 
expertise in the possible benefits that can be derived, capability building also for risk 
assessment and risk management I think, ~eeds to be developed. 
6.2.5 Socio-economic, Ethical and Cultural Considerations 
The debate between science-based vis-a.-vis socio-economic considerations in making biosafety 
decisions is undoubtedly a major issue in the Philippines. Accounts of the multi-stakeholder 
consultation process showed the opposing views of the stakeholders on the inclusion of socio-
economic, ethical, and cultural considerations in biosafety decision-making. According to one 
participant in the process: 
It was acceptable to some who felt that it was very important to assess the socio-
economic dimensions of the technology whilst, it was unacceptable to others who felt 
that socia-economic, ethical, and cultural considerations have no relevance to biosafety 
principles. 
Indeed, there are many diverging views when it comes to the questions of science-based or socio-
economic considerations in the Philippines. This study found in the report of Halos et al. (2004: 104) 
that "some scientist argued that biosafety is primarily a scientific procedure; that it specifically 
addresses health and environment safety, and the only objective way this can be evaluated is through a 
proper, science-based risk assessment and risk management process." An international scientist based 
in the Philippines asserted further that it would be a big mistake to consider socio-economic criteria in 
biosafety decision-making: 
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The contentious issue in the discussion of the biosafety framework is to include socio-
economic criteria to allow or disallow certain products or experiments or activities to 
proceed I think that's a big mistake because if it's biosafety then you work within the 
biosafety parameters. Whether it is economic, or whether it has to be released is another 
problem; but to judge it that way will complicate the whole thing because the socio-
economic assessment is not that precise- there are relative scales and relative degrees of 
appreciation. 
There are those however, who totally disagree to it being strictly science-based. One environmental 
scientist even put forward the idea of having a 'science-based but culture-sensitive' approach to 
biosafety decision making: 
For me, I can subscribe to science-based but culture-sensitive. Has there ever been an 
absolutely pure science, I mean science tells you that we can have all the nuclear energy 
we want, we should have nuclear energy because it's much better according to the 
scientist, but the risks that measure the political acceptability of this, is not there. Now I 
subscribe to science-based, but I do not subscribe to limited science, as if biology and 
microbiology are the only sciences around ... But for those microbiologists, they keep on 
saying and insisting that biosafety should be considered only as a scientific enterprise 
meaning what they are doing, within the confines of what they can understand, 
microbiology. Economics, ethics which they don't understand, and therefore they are 
not concerned with, are no longer part of science which is their science that they're 
talking about. To me that's an arrogant position, that I cannot also subscribe to. 
For other stakeholders ethical and social considerations should be considered vital components when 
assessing risk and making biosafety related decisions. They were saying that biosafety could be 
harmful to social dynamics and social stability and therefore can cause societal harm. There are 
others who also believe that matters related to biosafety should be taken into the context of 
biodiversity of which 'bio-culture' is an extension of the latter. They emphasised that cultural 
minorities and their ways of life are defined by their biodiversity; 
The aspect of biosafety in this country I tell you is sensitive to socio-economy and ethics. 
Why? Because if you look at the question of controlling the probability of harm, harm is 
not only physiological ... a biotechnology can also be harmful to the economic system of 
a countly and to me that's part of the regime of biosafety. It could also be harmful to 
social dynamics and social stability, such as why should you inject pork genes for 
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example into halal chicken and then sell it as halal chicken to Muslim countries. We 
cannot do that, that will dismantle the public approach with society. That's also a harm, 
to me that's also a legitimate issue on biosafety. 
We should know that an extension of biodiversity in the Philippines includes bioculture -
biological and the cultural because many of our cultural minorities for example, their 
ways of life are defined by their biodiversity. 
Given the diversity of views on which path to follow, a question that can be asked is: How can one 
defme and delineate the parameters, standards, and mechanisms for socio-economic and cultural 
assessments that should be followed, provided for instance that they are appropriate or acceptable? 
Excerpts of the NBF deliberations obtained by the researcher showed that it became clearer to most 
participants that socio-economic, ethical and cultural assessments are separate and distinct from risk 
assessment and that biosafety determination was strictly science-based. By and large, however, the 
use of socio-economic considerations in decision making was accepted with the proviso that there 
should be a careful balance in looking at the various considerations, parameters, and mechanisms for 
decision making. In one of the Nee meetings, it was agreed and finalised that risk assessment (or 
biosafety assessment as they equate it with) is strictly science-based. However, socio-economic, 
ethical, cultural, and other assessments in biosafety decision making should be considered prior to 
commercialisation, and only after biosafety assessment/determination has been made37 • Such decision 
of the Nee was then reflected in Section 5.4 of the Draft EO which states: 
Consistent with Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol, concerned government 
departments and agencies may take into account socioeconomic considerations arising 
from the impact of regulated articles on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity, especially with regard to the value of biological diversity to 
indigenous and local communities. 
The NCBP shall issue gUidelines relating to the conduct of social, economic, ethical, 
cultural and other assessments, as appropriate, particularly prior to decisions to 
commercialize products of modern biotechnology. These assessments shall be 
conducted separately from risk assessment and in a transparent, participatory wld 
rigorous manner. (Draft Executive Order 2004) 
37 Minutes ofthe National Coordinating Committee meeting. 
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6.2.6 Transparency and Participation 
McLean et al. (2002) highlighted that "the twin issue of public infonnation and participation relate to 
the degree of transparency in a regulatory system and to the extent to which the public can provide 
input to the fonnulation either of a regulatory policy, or specific regulatory decisions." In the 
Philippines, observation in the field by the researcher revealed concerns over the need to further 
educate the people and keep the populace aware of the relevant issues, in view of the current 
developments in modem biotechnology. But who will take charge of educating the public and 
keeping the people infonned? The current dilemma over deciding is which group, institution or 
organisation is sufficiently non-biased, and will provide balanced infonnation to the public. One 
interviewee commented further that there is no mechanism that ensures the correctness, truthfulness 
and accuracy of the information as well as accountability. This view concurs with the report of Dayrit 
& Gatlabayan (2005). One top government scientist also expressed this concern and underscored the 
role that scientists play in communicating and explaining issues at the grassroots level: 
I think we have to educate our people, what I'm afraid of is that when we try to move 
forward people will just say "We just don't want it, it's out of our culture so it's no good 
for us ", something like that. That's what I'm afraid of I think we really have to educate 
our people and see how we respect certain traditions and certain practices. Perhaps we 
should give a role to our scientists who can communicate, and who can bring issues 
down to the ground, and who can explain what the issues are. 
On the other hand, this study found that public participation occurs not just during the decision-
making process for specific GMO applications but also during policy fonnulation. One of the 
members of the NCC recounted that they insisted and supported the process because they wanted to 
make transparency and public participation an anchor of the biosafety regime in the Philippines, 
which is a component of the proposed NBF: 
Because we are a country where first of all capabilities are very low, we cannot afford 
to have those capabilities deposited in just one sector of society such as a government. 
So in that case we must make transparency and participation an anchor of our biosafety 
regime, and that's part of the NBF ... so our NBF is anchored on our social capital and 
not on our technical or economic capital. 
One important inclusion in the proposed NBF is the mandate given to the National Commission on 
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) to take the lead in ensuring that the rights of indigenous people and 
communities are recognised and protected in all biosafety decisions which affect them. In particular, 
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the NCIP is mandated to ensure that free and prior informed consent by indigenous peoples and 
communities has been given to the introduction and/or use of regulated articles within the ancestral 
lands and domain of indigenous peoples and communities . 
. Conceivably, the Philippines is taking the right steps towards engaging all sectors of the public in 
dealing with the sensitive issues that pertain to biosafety regulation. The next challenge will be how to 
implement it on the ground. 
6.2.7 Access and Ownership 
Another outstanding issue that was raised during the conduct of this case study was the issue of access 
and ownership. One environmental lawyer and a former top government official expressed the view 
that the real issue is not biosafety but access to and ownership of biological technologies. They were 
asking the question whether the Filipino people and/or the scientists themselves would be able to 
access the growing biotechnology; or whether the technology would remain under the control of the 
multi-nationals. As the environmental lawyer pointed out: 
People are always talking about the biosafety regulation etc., they're too focused on 
biosafety regulations however, in the first place is there is something that we will 
regulate. The thing is most of the technologies on biotech are with the multi-nationals. 
What we are trying to say and what we want to see happening actually is that the public 
research institutions should acquire the capacity so that they can develop products that 
"we need, which may not necessarily be on the priority list of the multi-nationals. So the 
real issue here about biotech is really access and ownership. It's not really biosafety, 
for us developing countries the real issue is access and ownership. Will our scientists, 
will our people be able to access the technology. 
A related issue that was put forward by a former top official of the government was the subversion of 
the economic interests of the small farmers by the multi-national seed corporations: 
In fact in a sense the reason why people are worried about GMOs is because it is a 
subversion of our economic interests when the seeds of the farmers will become 
controlled by multi-transnational seed corporations, by a few. T71at's one of the reasons 
why it is unacceptable. They could not see it; Monsanto could not see it because 
American farmers can always buy the seeds. But here it's important because our 
farmel:'i looking at the future - can no longer source out genetic back-up for our 
agriculture from the wild assuming the worst scenario that the wild is already 
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compromised; or because the growing stocks are all based on genetically modified 
stocks, otherwise they cannot even produce anything that can be marketed or can't 
compete in the market. Isn't that erosion of national security? 
The displacement of farmers who rely on subsistence agriculture is another issue that was invoked by a 
community leader in the Philippines. The community leader emphasized that the issue is being 
complicated by big companies or multi-national companies buying up farmers' land which has led to 
displacement of many small farmers: 
1 think the concern is about this whole issue of big companies coming in and buying lots 
of lands displacing farmers, now the interesting thing with farmers is that small farmers 
have adopted GM technology. It's giving them an advantage in their crops, you know, 
they get rid of the bugs and the weevils and all sort of thinking but unfortunately 1 think 
the problem is that it becomes mixed up with this issue of big companies or multi-
national companies buying up land It actually really doesn't matter if they're buying it 
up for conventional agriculture or GM agriculture; it is still displacing a lot of little 
farmers. The issue is not too much GM; it's the issue of what to do with the farming and 
the poor in the Philippines, those people who rely on subsistence agriculture. 
This issue of access and ownership is highly contentious. Clearly this issue merits further in-depth 
study and research. 
6.2.8 Challenges 
One of the challenges that was cited during the conduct of this study relates to putting biodiversity on 
top of the priority list. One official stated that the challenge is to put in place a robust biosafety 
regime and effective implementation of the regime for the protection of the country's biological 
resources: 
The challenge is to make our decision makers realise that we have more to lose 
as far as our biodiversity is concerned because we are a priority biodiversity 
country; we're top mega diverse. Even if we could tap the potential of our 
biological resources for commercial pUlposes, for income generation, for 
scientific and research pUlposes 'we have to put in place a robust biosafety 
regime and effective implementation of the regime... 171at's the challenge. Look 
at other countries their biodiversity is not that high, they have less to lose, yet 
they are stricter in biosafety. 
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Another challenge according to a former Undersecretary of one of the Philippine Government 
Departments is for the issue of biosafety to be understood by the people so that they can have a good 
way of making decisions: 
The first challenge is that people need to have an understanding of the issues so that 
society with its diverse interests and differences would have a good way of making a 
decision. It has to be understood that there are different levels of issues: the issue at 
the farm level, the issue at the industry level, the issue at the national level, economy 
level, up to global level. So it has to be understood as a multi-level, multi-sectoral bunch 
of issues; it's a basket of issues. If they can understand an issue the way you and I would 
probably understand it, then at least we have achieved something there. The other 
challenge would be setting up the process so that no one sector or interest group will 
dominate the decision,' it becomes a national decision rather than an expedient decision. 
Furthermore, one social scientist put forward the challenge of implementation and the capacity to 
implement: 
The next challenge and the hardest part would be the implementation and the capacity 
to implement. The trouble is people always criticise the regulations but they should 
realise that the problem as always here in the Philippines is the implementation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
BIOSECURITY AND BIOSAFETY ISSUES AND CONCERNS IN 
NEW ZEALAND 
This chapter presents and discusses the crosscutting issues, concerns and challenges to biosecurity and 
biosafety in New Zealand. This chapter has two sections. The first focuses on the biosecurity issues 
and concerns and the second delves into the biosafety issues and concerns. 
7.1 Biosecurity Issues and Concerns 
7.1.1 Understanding the Term Biosecurity 
There is no doubt that New Zealand is one of those few countries that certainly understand the whole 
concept of biosecurity. In the previous chapters it was shown how New Zealand's definition of 
biosecurity evolved from and transcended a more economic or primary production focus to a holistic 
focus of including human health and the environment. Based on a recent realignment of priorities, 
New Zealand is geared towards protecting not only its terrestrial ecosystems but likewise its marine 
ecosystems. In this study, New Zealand's scope of biosecurity was compared with the FAOs (2003) 
scope of biosecurity. Such comparison showed that New Zealand' biosecurity can be considered 
similar to or parallel to what the F AO encompass i. e. "biosecurity covers the introduction of plant 
pests, animal pests and diseases, and zoonoses, the introduction and release of GMOs and their 
products, and the introduction and management of invasive alien species and genotypes" albeit, New 
Zealand does not specify the other aspects that it pragmatically covers. In its definition, New Zealand 
did not explicitly specify the full scope of what it wants to exclude, protect and effectively manage, 
however, it does cover in a implicit manner a wide ranging aspect. Based on the cabinet papers, official 
pUblications, reports, biosecurity magazines, government press releases, and conference proceedings, 
among others that the researcher collated for the purpose of this study, it showed that the specific scope 
of biosecurity in New Zealand includes plant pests, animal pests, microorganisms, new organisms, 
GMOs, zoonotic diseases (such as BSE, SARS and Avian Influenza), plant diseases, lAS, emerging 
diseases such as FMD and Avian Influenza, food-borne diseases, infectious diseases and other 
biological threats. 
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that biosecurity in New Zealand would include various measures 
such as: sanitary and phytosanitary measures, inspection, exclusion, incursion response, detection and 
surveillance, pest management (i.e. through national and regional pest management strategies), disease 
control and eradication. These measures are executed to prevent, control or eliminate those various 
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threats mentioned above from entering, spreading and damaging the New Zealand environment as well 
as its people. 
The comparison between the New Zealand scope of biosecurity and that of the F AO revealed that New 
Zealand's scope of biosecurity, and the measures that it sets in place in managing the risks associated 
with it, indicate that New Zealand's biosecurity is at the forefront internationally. Interestingly, 
according to one senior MAF official and a leader on an international panel, the current international 
perception of biosecurity is quite different from the way New Zealand understands it: 
A lot of overseas countries just don't know what biosecurity means. They ask, do you 
stop terrorism? They think you police, so the brand Biosecurity New Zealand which is 
very new does not actually work so well. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is a 
much better brand as people know what that means. But, no, biosecurity is not well 
understood. Really when you're international you don't use the word biosecurity you 
use the word phytosanitary or sanitary, speaking about the sps. 
A member of the Bioethics Council commented that "there is nowhere in the world that biosecurity has 
been taken to any depth and substance except in New Zealand and Australia." The reason for this 
according to another interviewee is because New Zealand benefits from its geographic isolation as an 
island nation and so it has managed to stay free of the significant pests and diseases that countries in 
continental land masses have to deal with. A MAF official opined that most New Zealanders are also 
becoming aware that a major biosecurity incursion like the foot-and-mouth disease has the potential to 
disrupt their economic, social and environmental well-being. A paper38 prepared by the Reserve Bank 
and Treasury estimated that over two years, an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) would wipe 
a catastrophic $10 billion off the country's GDP and result in the loss of 20,000 jobs, whilst the 
economy would take years to recover. The MAF at the time of the writing of this thesis conducted 
"Exercise Taurus", a simulation exercise looking at field operations response and the management at 
the National Response Centre in the event of an FMD outbreak (Thomas 2005). Records gathered by 
the researcher also showed that there are, of course other high profile pests such as the painted apple 
moth, Asian gypsy moth, possum, pine pitch canker, southern saltmarsh mosquito, Undaria and 
Argentine ant among several others that are being identified as biosecurity risks and are being 
subsequently addressed. 
38 The Macroeconomic Impacts of a Foot-and-Mouth Disease Outbreak: an Information Paper for the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, prepared by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and The Treasury, 
http://www.rbnz.govt.nzlresearch/0130346.html 
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In view of the perceived biosecurity risks to New Zealand, the government has increased baseline 
biosecurity funding39 by over 50% since 1999. The baseline budget for 2005 amounted to NZ $165 
million (circa US $116 million) with an increase in the 2004 budget of NZ $46.5 million. This 
included NZ $20 million specifically for marine biosecurity capability enhancement4o • At the time of 
writing, another high profile initiative was formally launched i.e. the plans for the creation of the 
National Centre of Biosecurity and Infectious Disease which is designed to provide a centralised 
national coordination point and enhance national capabilities and services for investigating and 
responding to: 
(1) existing, new, and emerging animal diseases such as FMD and Avian Influenza; 
(2) existing, new and emergmg diseases that transfer from animals to humans (that is 
zoonoses) such as BSE, SARS and Avian Influenza; and 
(3) other major public health concerns such as food-borne disease outbreaks4\ 
One international scientist interviewed by the researcher explained that New Zealand's 100 percent 
screening of all passengers and crew at international airports was a procedure not present in other 
countries that the scientist had visited. Furthermore, biosecurity breaches at New Zealand airports, i.e. 
not declaring unwanted item(s) would incur an automatic instant fine ofNZ $20042 . This has become a 
point of comparison for those travelling in other countries; they concede that New Zealand takes 
biosecurity more seriously than other countries even in the US and Europe: 
I haven't encountered biosecurity of any substance anywhere except in New Zealand 
and Australia and the Pacific. Even America doesn't care, you can go in and out of 
America and they don't inspect you; they want to knock you back if you're a terrorist 
but they're not that worried if you bring something that will kill off their crop. In the 
European Union it's the same thing, I have never ever been inspected, even my luggage, 
between countries. Even when I entered the EU which I normally do through Rome they 
have never checked me. So you know New Zealand and our part of the Pacific countries, 
Papua New Guinea, Tonga, places like that, all have biosecurity. 
39 Baseline funding is the funding given yearly but does not include funding for one-off incursions. 
40 Press Release by Han. Jim Sutton. International marine bioinvasions conference, Wellington. 
~QY.,J~!"!'!"yc~LY.h!MLXJS~~~::ill!~~~ill.'.!!2l!1!.-'='=~~. Date retrieved: 14 September 2005. 
Press Release by Han. Jim Sutton. Launch of plans for new Wallaceville centre. 
~QY.,J~!"!'!"yc~LY.h!!Y ... Xl~;.'Y""~~::ill!~~~.".Jl!!2l!1!.-'='=~~' Date retrieved: 14 September 2005. 
Press Release by Han. Jim Sutton. Government boost biosecurity again . 
.\D:\~~lD.Y'~mmL~1YJ:~!ill!!m1illillm29.£J!I1l~lI2:'bl.m. Date retrieved: 14 September 2005. 
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The above simply indicated the level of seriousness that New Zealand places on protecting the country 
from biosecurity threats. The level of funding that the New Zealand government has poured into 
biosecurity activities reflects the level of commitment that the country has to biosecurity. 
7.1.2 Biosecurity System 
The archives collated by the researcher showed that New Zealand's biosecurity system evolved from a 
sectoral approach (i.e. animals, forest, plants, policy and international) to a whole-of-system (i.e. across 
sectors and agencies), and point of intervention approach (i.e. the pre-clearance and post-clearance). 
Such focus has shifted in view of the Biosecurity Strategy's overall expectation that "the biosecurity 
system should be fully integrated, and operating efficiently and transparently in an environment of 
continuous improvement." As a result, MAF held the overall responsibility for biosecurity; in part the 
underlying reason was to reconcile the issue ofprioritisation38• 
This case study embarked on learning the perceptions of some key people on what they thought of the 
whole-of-system approach vis-a-vis the sectoral approach after an almost a year of implementation of 
the new biosecurity system. Most of the officials interviewed agreed that the new system is the best 
way forward. They argued that in the whole-of-system approach there are better synergies and better 
efficiencies across sectors. They also felt that looking at points of intervention is better because it 
gives everyone the opportunity to look across the system and make better and calculated decisions 
about where priorities sit in terms of both excluding pests in the country in the pre-clearance criteria; 
and deciding how to manage those pests that have got through the border security. One MAF senior 
official emphasized that it gives them the opportunity to review the systems in place, begin 
improvements in some areas, fill gaps and ensure that a full range of values is taken into account: 
It is obviously the best way to go and we should have always been doing it, coordinating 
between sectors. There's no argument that you could have just coordinated sectors 
better, but in reality it's better, you get better synergies you get better efficiencies if you 
coordinate across and side-to-side. But it has also given us a good opportunity to 
review our systems, where to begin improvements in some areas, fill gaps to make sure 
there are no holes in the system so it is much better the way we are now, the way we're 
growing now. 
In terms of operational level, one senior policy analyst pointed out that it is better to make informed 
decisions when people from the plants group understand the issues the animal group has and vice 
versa, hence, better decisions and prioritisation can be made. 
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When the government adopted the Strategy last year, the first things that resulted from it were the 
structural changes and some shifts in accountability. The accountability is now being left with MAF 
for the biosecurity system as a whole which means it is not just the central government, but includes 
regional government and industry as well. MAF now has to look at the overall coordination and 
consistency across the system and deliver a range of outcomes which include the economy, trade, 
environment, health, cultural and Maori objectives. In view of what MAF and other agencies have 
accomplished so far, in line with their new role, one official remarked: 
I think that the department and agencies have actually made a lot of progress in the 
course of less than a year of trying to take that view. We got secondments from the 
Department of Conservation and MinistlY of Health in the Biosecurity Strategy Unit,' 
there are secondments from the Department of Conservation in Biosecurity New 
Zealand; and that is one way of getting this thing integrated. I think that, yeah, there has 
been really quite a lot of progress in the short time. 
On the other hand, there were officials who commented that they have not seen any evidence yet in 
terms of new focus on pest management. In the new system, MAF is supposed to provide the over-all 
leadership in pest management; nonetheless, they admitted that it is certainly just in its early stage on 
that front. Obviously, in terms of how successful the new system will be, time will certainly tell. On 
the other hand, one former official commented that whilst New Zealand has moved to the points of 
intervention approach, other countries and equivalent organisations are still structured on a sectoral 
basis with the distinction between plants, animals and forestry. The official is concerned about how 
New Zealand would relate to its equivalent organisations in other countries who themselves might be 
confused with the new arrangements: 
When I see equivalent organisations in other countries all still structured 011 a sectoral 
basis, in particular with the distinction between animals and plants and forestry; and 
likewise I also see the international standard setting bodies essentially running on a 
sectoral basis you have OlE for animal health, animal disease standard setting role 
and advisOly role,' you similarly have the Interim Commission for Phytosanitary 
Measures (ICP M) which is the equivalent one on the plants and forestry side; and so I 
have concerns based on the international theme and how well New Zealand can 
therefore relate to its equivalent in other countries ... every thing is still simply based on 
sectors and as such I'm not yet convinced that MAF will be somewhat apt-think with 
other operation. 
81 
It would be considerably interesting to follow through the development in the whole-of-system 
approach that New Zealand has recently adopted. The merits and demerits of such a system will 
certainly be unfolding in the coming years. 
7.1.3 Risk Analysis and Integrated Risk Management Framework 
Based on the recent Memorandum of Understanding (2005) on biosecurity activities between MAF, 
DOC, MFish and MOH, it was emphasized that biosecurity decisions will be informed by science, 
evidence and best knowledge available, using appropriate precautions. It stated further that the 
biosecurity system should be based on assessing, prioritising and managing risks. This implies a 
science-based risk assessment. But this study learnt from one former official of MAF that risk 
assessment (the way MAF employs it), should be viewed into its completeness which is the risk 
analysis. Furthermore, risk analysis would then serve as one of the bases for risk management. 
According to a senior adviser from MAF, if when they carry out risk analysis they follow a science-
based process that will take into account all potential impacts, even social impacts but from a scientific 
viewpoint; then risk management will follow. The official referred to risk management as the decision 
making process that takes into consideration the product of risk analysis and weighs it together with 
other values such social, political and the range of values important to New Zealand. As the senior 
adviser explained: 
So what we are flying to do here is separate very carefully, separate risk analysis-
science from politics because if politics contaminate the risk analysis-science process 
then you'll start getting the wrong answers. Now with risk analysis you can get an 
answer and then politics make different decisions but at least you know your trails, you 
know where you've sacrificed, you find default for political answer. If politics affect 
risk analysis you contaminate the decision, the answers if you like, you can contaminate 
the outcome of risk analysis you don't know what you don't know, you don't know 
what you're not doing properly and that's quite risky. So it's better to have risk 
analysis-science to avoid political interference which is the way biosecul'ity has been 
written basically, then have you risk management political decision making process 
separate. 
Most of the recommendations in the Biosecurity Strategy aim to create a single, holistic and integrated 
biosecurity system which is where the new concept of Integrated Risk Management Framework IRMF) 
is anchored. This study found that biosecurity IRMF will be used to guide decision-making for all 
activities where MAF is accountable for service delivery. In addition, the Chief Executive Forum has 
noted its intention to use the IRMF to inform decision-making on resource allocation in managing 
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biosecurity risks across the biosecurity system, and to SUppOlt the system's oversight role (MOU 2005). 
One official ofMAF provided an elaboration of this relatively new concept: 
The Integrated Risk Management Framework (IRMF) is basically a decision making 
tool. Integrated risk management framework is about decision making so if you like, 
you deal with your risk analysis when you have a whole set of potential options for 
decision making,' how you make that decision you apply the IRMF around that decision, 
so you'd scry which option is the best option which is the most cost effective, which 
encompasses New Zealand's values, that's your IRMF about decision making. so the 
feed-in to the IRMF the risk management framework you have to have information, you 
have to have good information and risk analysis is one area that generates that good 
information, you have to have the resource of other information, other values cost 
benefit, all sorts of stuff have to be generated as well (jor informed decision making) for 
informed decisions, exactly. 
The way New Zealand manages risks will be vital in tenus of delivering the outcomes it sets 
out to achieve. Employing the principle of comprehensive risk management and the adoption 
of the IRMF are considered vital in meeting those outcomes. The researcher did not 
investigate further the way IRMF is being used by other agencies and sectors involved in 
biosecurity in New Zealand, but it would be worthwhile to look closely at its mechanisms and 
how this framework impacts on the decision-making process for biosecurity matters in New 
Zealand. 
7.1.4 Pest Management 
The issue of pest management in New Zealand is one of the issues that surfaced during the conduct of 
this case study. The issue of rationalisation of Regional Pest Management Strategies (RPMS) was put 
forward by one environmental scientist and a senior lecturer. They proposed that there should be a set 
of recommended best practice protocols in pest management that can be used in controlling pests by 
the different regional councils. They stressed that rather than re-inventing the wheel, these sets of best 
practice protocol can be followed and adopted in particular regions. Such an idea can be best 
understood in the example provided by the environmental scientist below: 
Whilst I think the regional pest management strategies are a strength in the different 
regions considering priorities, what I think need*; to be set in place is: if Northland is 
going to have "cordoned areas" in one of the pampass grasses the plant they want to 
control, and so Is Walkato, that you don't see two completely different sets of approach. 
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Another issue that this study gathered was the issue of "super regional approach" that was put forward 
in view of pest management. Such an approach was proposed by a biosecurity specialist and described 
as a North Island and South Island pest management strategy that strategically controls a particular 
pest43 which could be a problem either in the North Island or in the South Island. 
7.1.5 Amending the Biosecurity Act 
In view of implementing fully the new biosecurity system, the issue of potentially amending the 
Biosecurity Act was raised. One senior MAF policy adviser interviewed for this research pointed out 
that the Biosecurity Act is quite a well designed piece of legislation and that it does not require 
amendment at this stage. Other officials interviewed agreed that the Biosecurity Act is a stable and 
empowering piece of legislation and that no rework is needed. They added that the Biosecurity Act 
actually does not specifically mandate what to do but rather provides the framework and powers to do 
what needs to be done. One official further stressed that it is possible to change the whole system and 
the Biosecurity Act would still be relevant; and stated categorically that was what happened in view of 
the new biosecurity system in New Zealand. A former MAF top official and a senior policy adviser to 
MAF supported this view and expounded their insights below: 
I think in domain the essentials of being able to operate the biosecurity system have 
been established in the Act and the necessary powers are there. 
It (the Biosecurity Act) actually establishes some processes for considering the set-up 
and processes; for how you would consider the importing of products and managing the 
risk of importing products into the country. It sets-up some systems and provides some 
powers so that we can respond to the new pests that arrive into the country; it also 
establishes some systems for deciding how to manage pests, those ones that are in the 
counhy, whether it should be done regionally or nationally, or by individual land 
owners ... it's a process based system; it's got the ability to recover cost and to set up 
funding arrangements ... So I don 'f think it will need a major rework, it might just need 
some slight refocusing of the legislation. 
On the contrary, one government strategist opined that the Biosecurity Act needs changes or 
amendments (if the government is willing) in view of the biosecurity restructuring, the Biosecurity 
Strategy and the interface betvveen the Biosecurity Act and the HNSO Act. It was stressed by the 
43 One example that was cited was the case of the Varroa Bee Mite. 
84 
official that what the Biosecurity Act does is to provide a range of tools, but does not actually say who 
should be using those tools and for what purposes. 
7.1.6 Biosecurity as Strategically Important as National Security 
The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment in its review of the biosecurity system reported 
that "biosecurity is not recognised as being as strategically important to New Zealand as national 
security" (PCE 2000: 9). In this case study, it was attempted to bring back the issue and some people 
were asked their views on and insights into this particular concern. One official commented that 
people just need to look at the recent experience with Operation Waiheke44 to see how important 
biosecurity is in New Zealand. Another official did not give a direct answer but commented that 
biosecurity has obviously gained prominence in New Zealand and that its prominence is significantly 
increasing. One senior advisor to the government further emphasized that biosecurity has become a 
bigger issue in New Zealand and has become a bigger word, so to speak: 
What's becoming more understood now is that biosecurity impacts on many, many more 
things than was originally envisaged; originally it's basically a productive sector issue, 
now it's being recognised as environmental, social, health, across the spectrum with 
impacts on lots and lots of things ... so it's recognised as being something that impacts 
right through New Zealand and that reflects the broader mandate of Biosecurity New 
Zealand. We're here to protect not just parts of New Zealand but the whole thing. So I 
guess what's been changing is that biosecurity really is now considered to be the whole 
biosecurity if you like; the whole thing is now being envisaged, rather than in the past 
it's smaller biosecurity, it becomes a much bigger word now. 
7.1. 7 Biosecurity Encompassing Biosajety 
The idea of biosecurity encompassing biosafety45 is being promoted in a recent F AO Committee on 
Agriculture (COAG) meeting (F AO 2003a). In tenns of the international scene, one government 
scientist who also represents New Zealand in international panels in agriculture commented that 
biosecurity and biosafety overlap to some degree. The scientist emphasized that there is a need for 
some form of international coordination on that front. However, the scientist stressed that it should not 
create duplication and another level of bureaucracy: 
44 Operation Waiheke was the action taken by the government led by MAF Biosecurity New Zealand in coordination with the 
Police and New Zealand Food Safety Authority, related to the claimed deliberate release of FMD virus on Waiheke Island 
sometime in May 2005; it turned out to be a hoax. 
45 Biosafety is referred in this case study as the regulation of the introduction and release of GMOs into the environment; or 
as SCBD (2000) defines it as the need to protect human health, and the environment from the possible adverse effects of the 
products of modern biotechnology. 
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But what you don't want is duplication, you don't want a whole separate set of bodies; it 
becomes like bureaucracies at the FAO level. So you really want it to be limited, try to 
look under one or two frameworks rather than numerous frameworks. 
ill New Zealand, a senior official of MAF noted that the encompassing nature of biosecurity over 
biosafety is happening to some degree, in view of the current biosecurity system in place. The official 
stressed that MAF and ERMA may have different foci in dealing with new organisms but they all fall 
within the broader biosecurity context: 
Well in New Zealand it does. From New Zealand's perspective Biosecurity New 
Zealand which now looks after the whole-of-system biosecurity also does a lot of 
biosafety stuff in coordination with ERMA of course. MAF and ERMA have different 
foci in dealing with new organisms but it is all biosecurity; it's all part of the same 
game. 
Moreover, according to a senior policy analyst and a MAF official there is a need to differentiate 
between the policy and risk assessments and the tools for delivering biosecurity and biosafety. For 
them the tools delivering biosecurity and biosafety are basically the same, i.e. the border control, the 
inspection, the audit, among others; hence in that sense there is some form of encompassing 
mechanism for biosecurity over biosafety. 
7.1.8 Challenges 
One of the challenges that was raised during the conduct of this case study in view of biosecurity was 
on addressing the continuing incremental loss of biodiversity. One senior lecturer of one of New 
Zealand's top university institutions commented that New Zealand is still facing a major problem in the 
conservation of its flora and fauna. According to the lecturer, whilst the biosecurity focus has shifted 
from a more production oriented one to consideration of biodiversity values, still there are losses on a 
daily basis of New Zealand's valued species. There were comments that support this concern. One 
interviewee commented that people do not perceive it as a multi-billion dollar industry and it does not 
have quite the same amount of focus yet compared to the economic values. They believed that the 
single largest problem sti11lies in the conservation state. Another related problem that was put forward 
was the possum problem and its role in spreading Bovine Tb. However, related to possum control, one 
of the challenges identified was the international perception of how New Zealand controls it; the use of 
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'1080 as poison to control possum for instance has been the subject of debate46 • In relation to the 
possum control problem, one environmental scientist further opined: 
It's not only a biosecurity threat per se, but it is a threat to our economy, our national 
security if you like, and to broader environmental security. 
Another challenge that was brought up was the increasing urbanisation and the changing immigration 
pattern in New Zealand. One people's organisation representative commented that the immigration 
pattern from Asia, the Pacific and even from Europe is an emerging concern since most of the people 
that come from these countries do not understand the level ofbiosecurity that New Zealand has. As the 
representative put it: 
I think part of the question is around the change in the immigration patterns to New 
Zealand and 1 think the immigration patterns now from Asia and from the Pacific and 
even from Europe where they don't have anywhere near the strong biosecurity 
regulations that we have, they simply don't understand They're coming from cultures 
that don't understand this level of biosecurity at the border, and so as a result you get 
people bringing all sort of things in their bags, in their belongings you know; and we do 
our best to catch them but the fact that we've had a number of unwanted things brought 
into New Zealand is probably evidence that it's going to be something like we'll be 
running constantly to a standstill in terms of keeping up with it. 
The above challenge linked up with another challenge that was identified by a former MAF official: 
1 think the biggest challenges may well relate to effective communication and engaging 
the relevant sectors. 
7.2 Biosafety Issues and Concerns 
7.2.1 Biosafety Systems In-place 
This study found that prior to 1996, there was no law in New Zealand specifically dealing with GMOs 
and its potential release to the environment. There was confusion too on whether microorganisms were 
covered under any legislation (Moeed pers. comm.). There was legislation in place but it did not have 
coverage for assessing environmental effects. Archived records revealed that in 1998, the Minister for 
46 ERMA repolted in its Statement of Intent 2004/05 that hazardous substance decision-making in 2005 will be dominated by 
the anticipated application for the reassessment of the veltebrate poison 1080. 
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the Environment had set up a body called the Interim Assessment Group (lAG), which reviewed 
proposals to field test or release GMOs. However, the lAG had no statutory basis. Its review was 
mandatory for government-funded research and voluntary for privately-funded research (Pollak 2003). 
This study also noted that in view of the current biosafety system and the recent amendments made to 
the HNSO Act, many believe that the system is working well primarily in terms of regulating GMOs. 
The case-by-case regulating mechanism that was set in place is a welcome mechanism for some 
people. One government official remarked: 
We have quite a good regulatory system for genetic modification. The Environmental 
Risk Management Authority (ERMA) is good. The legislation actually sets in place a 
body that regulates or controls on a case by case basis as do ERMA and Assisted 
Reproduction Legislation, and the reason for that is simply that you can't actually 
legislate from much of this technology in detail because you have no idea how it will 
actually develop, and changing legislation takes a long time whereas changing 
regulations or changing how a regulatory body acts is much quicker, so that's been the 
response: to develop sort of a legislation that sets the body in place to do it rather than 
trying to legislate in detail. 
Furthermore, this study found that the improvement to the way the biosafety system operates in New 
Zealand was influenced by the current changes in the legislation. The amended legislation (HNSO 
Amendment Act 2003) gave effect to the findings of the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 
and enabled ERMA to strengthen its decision-making framework for GMOs; streamlined the approval 
process for low-risk GMO laboratory work; established a Maori Advisory Group under the Authority 
of ERMA; and improved the enforcement47 mechanisms for new organisms. 
7.2.2 Socio-economic, Ethical alld Cultural Considerations 
Science-based versus socio-economic, ethical and cultural considerations in risk assessment and 
biosafety decision-making has been a contentious issue even in New Zealand. Economic, cultural and 
ethical considerations which are part of the definition48 of environment in the HNSO Act mean "that 
the variety of environmental effects ERMA must consider is large, going well beyond the range of 
physical and natural phenomena that science is prepared to measure and predict" (Pollak 2003: 52). 
According to one ERMA official, the HNSO Act is a very comprehensive legislation so that, given its 
broad definition of the environment, everything must be evidence-based and the words "in my opinion" 
47 This was also an offshoot of MAP and ERMAs response to the recommendations of the McGregor Report. 
48 The complete definition is given in detail in the succeeding section on transparency and public participation. 
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and "I think" are not acceptable. But how do you put or integrate socio-economic, cultural, and ethical 
considerations into making a decision to accept or deny the introduction and release into the 
environment of a new organism, for instance? The official from ERMA provided a mechanism that 
they employ in the Agency which is more on balancing the risk against the potential benefit: 
It is very broad what we have to do on our risk assessment and it's all based on 
evidence but the evidence might be in my 'iwi' this particular organism is 'taonga' so 
it's special. Ah, if you are going to do something that could harm my 'taonga' that has a 
cultural impact on me as a Maori and we have to take that evidence and look at it 
alongside everything else and put it into the risk assessment. And at the end of a process 
what the Authority has to do is weigh up the benefits of the use of the new organism vs. 
the risk. So the cultural risk affecting the 'taonga' has to be weighed up against the 
potential benefits and it could be that the 'iwi' is being adversely affected so one 
community is adversely affected, the research community might be positively ... so we 
need some balancing and the way we're trying to manage that is by using control or 
conditions to mitigate any of the adverse effects. So we manage the adverse effects to 
bring them down to what we call a negligible level. 
"Vhilst ERMA employs evidence-based decision, this study also learnt of another term. A senior 
lecturer put forward the idea of making a value-based decision. It was emphasized by the lecturer that 
it should be multiple value systems running parallel and the decision must be based across a whole 
range of values: 
I would like to see both or multiple values systems running parallel. So what I'm saying 
is that science can inform us only, science isn't necessarily making a value-based 
decision. So the science provides us with answers to questions about how big a problem 
is it going to be, what types of impacts are they going to be, where is this pest likely to 
establish, what is it, what is its biology, what is its life cycle, science provides us with 
answers on what sort of toxin or what sort of control approach could we take here. 
Science does not answer the question of should we control, which ultimately comes back 
to a value-based decision, will it be cost-benefit economic type decision, or will it be a 
cultural decision, a value-based,' society sees it as a whole set of priorities so we should 
control it. Well I mean science can help inform good management it should not be 
science driving the decision in the first place because a decision is a value-based 
decision and that's going to be across a whole range of values: it's going to be 
economic values, it's going to be social values, and science helps answer whether it's 
technically feasible. 
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Similarly, one former MAF official supported that idea: 
I believe that the approach to risk assessment would in its completeness - risk analysis, 
has to be supported by science but inevitably the values that a country puts on particular 
aspects will differ and so sort of socio-cultural matters have to be taken into 
consideration ... so inevitably there are going to be those judgments that are based on the 
values and cultural basis of the country and I think there needs to be a risk analysis 
framework that takes that into account. 
Nevertheless, the question of how to incorporate social, economic, and cultural values into a risk 
assessment, or in biosafety decision making considering such inherently intangible values, was a 
persistent. A top government official and a member of the Bioethics Council provided two separate 
answers that arguably offer some form of mechanism to going over these intricate issues. The former 
made mention of ERMA's proposed framework49 for cultural, ethical and spiritual issues whilst the 
latter talked about how the Bioethics Council is addressing the issue: 
Actually and basically safety issues for both people and the environment can be decided 
by scientific risk assessment; but cultural, ethical and spiritual issues are not able to be 
set into that type of framework which is why ERMA has now developed a particular 
framework for them. You can't, if you push the cultural, ethical, and spiritual issues into 
the risk framework you really distort them, like for instance, how much of the risk is it to 
your spiritual nature, this kind of thing you know. I think it's quite interesting to see 
that ERMA after about ten years of operation and initially beginning its life as purely a 
science and risk assessment organisation has now moved to a point where it feels it 
needs aframework to deal with these issues. 
I guess our framework is our method, that our terms of reference from the government 
require us to engage with the public on these issues and find out how New Zealanders 
feel about it,' also, to get New Zealanders to talk to one another about it. So not just to 
tell us what they think but to talk to one another about it, so therefore we have these 
dialogue events. Our methodology is really about getting people to talk together, people 
from different viel1'Points to talk together about the issues and then we analyse what we 
hear and then 'we think about it and reflect on it ourselves and come up with 
recommendations or advice to the government. 
49 At the time of writing this thesis, ERMA has set a draft framework for dealing with ethical, cultural and spiritual issues and 
they have put it out for consultations. It was posted on their website: www.erma.govt.nz. 
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7.2.3 Transparency and Public Participation 
Transparency and public participation (as this study gathered) particularly in the field of biosafety and 
genetic modification have been major issues in New Zealand over the years. Chapter 5 of this study 
showed that New Zealand is one of those countries that incorporated the broader objectives and 
consideration of social, economic, and cultural factors in the law - i.e. the HSNO Act. Under the Act, 
"environment" is defined to include: 
"(a) ecosystems and their constituent parts, including people and communities; and 
(b) all natural and physical resources; and 
(c) amenity values; and 
(d) the social, economic, aesthetic, and cultural conditions." 
The Act also requires that all decisions take into account, among other things, the sustainability of flora 
and fauna, the intrinsic value of ecosystems, public health, and economic and related costs and benefits 
from the use of new organisms. Furthennore, decisions must take into account the relationship of 
Maori people and their culture and traditions with respect to their ancestral lands, sacred places ("waahi 
tapu"), valued flora and fauna, and other "taonga" (which translates roughly as "treasures"). Decisions 
must also take into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. In addition, all persons exercising 
powers and duties under the HSNO Act must "recognise and provide for" "the maintenance and 
enhancement of the capacity of people and communities to provide for their own economic, social, and 
cultural wellbeing and for the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations." Whilst the 
philosophy ofthe HNSO Act covers the public process, one top official of ERMA clarified that they do 
not include public consultation in every application. The official also clarified that whilst the HNSO 
Act requires public notification for all field tests of new organisms, it is at the Authority's discretion to 
notify the public on containment applications: 
The philosophy of the HSNO Act is that it includes the public process, now we don't 
include public consultation in evelY application that we have. So for example the 
containment application, especially the low-risk containment application, there's no 
public consultation,' however, there is a Maori member and a lay member of the 
community who sits on the Institutional Biological Safety Committee and they are 
representing the views of their community. Now, the HSNO Act requires that all new 
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organism releases are publicly notified and also all field tests, and the Authority has the 
discretion to publicly notify containment applications. And so we have some test that we 
apply to that discretion around the public interest, how strong would be the public 
interest in that particular type of application. 
One member of the Bioethics Council commented that for New Zealand transparency and public 
participation are really important, but pointed out the problem of limited transparency. The official 
stressed that what the public expects is to have a voice in shaping the way the technology develops: 
1 think for New Zealand they are really important. With regard to transparency, 
transparency always has issues around it, something to do with commercial sensitivity; 
that's often a problem in relation to transparency 'cause you won't get iriformation 
aboutforms of technology because they are commercially sensitive, you know somebody 
is going to undercut the price of something or find out their method or whatever if they 
are made public. So that's always quite a big issue in terms of transparency but 1 think 
it's what the New Zealand public expect and they also expect to have a voice in shaping 
how that technology develops. 
7.2.4 Maori Issues 
This study found that Maori issues are significant issues in New Zealand. The Royal Commission's 
Report (2001) confirmed that many Maori felt their opinions were not taken seriously enough or 
considered early enough in the decision-making process on new organisms. The New Zealand 
government carried out consultation with Maori in view of the Royal Commission's recommendations 
and those recommendations were seriously taken into consideration and formed part of the recent 
amendment of the legislation (HNSO Amendment Act 2003). The researcher gathered and collated 
several proofs of how the issue of Maori has been taken account. 
The 2003 amendment of HSNO established the Nga KaihautU Tikanga Taiao or the Authority's Maori 
Advisory Committee. Nga KaihautU (the members of the Advisory Committee) provides advice and 
assistance to the Authority on. matters relating to policy, process, and applications. Furthermore, the 
amended Act explicitly allows knowledge and experience of the Treaty and Tikanga Maori (Maori 
beliefs) to be considered as qualifications for appointment to the decision~making body of ERMA - the 
Authority. The law requires that the Authority contain a balanced mix of knowledge and experience in 
matters likely to come before it. The Toi Te Taiao or the Bioethics Council, which was formed two 
years ago as a ministerial advisory committee that provides independent advice to the government on 
biotechnology issues involving significant cultural, ethical and spiritual dimensions, also considers 
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Maori concerns. One of theirs tasks is to demonstrate their commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi 
including its responsibility to consult and engage with Maori in a manner that specifically provides for 
their needs5o• A committee member ofthe Bioethics council substantiated this aspect: 
We have some issues around Maori and biotechnology to deal with because there are 
lots of questions for Maori around whether their "Tikanga" which is their sort of 
framework for understanding the world, whether that can be expanded, whether it can 
develop to encompass new developments in biotechnology or whether in fact this is kind 
of a set group of principles that can change and would possibly lead them to oppose 
various forms. So is their body of lot knowledge - their Tikanga, is that able to grow 
and expand with biotechnology, or is it immutable, unchangeable. So that's something 
the council has to work through, because eve,y biotechnology issue we come up against, 
this issue with Maori themselves haven't yet work-out, throughout. So hopefully one of 
the things we will be able to do is to help them facilitate doing that in some way, so 
that's one issue. We are also dealing with a Treaty relationship within a country 
between the indigenous people and the Crown, and where there's constant friction 
between Maori and the scientific establishment over how biotechnology should develop, 
so some of those issues need to be worked out. 
7.2.5 Challenges 
One of the challenges that was identified in this study in view of regulating new organisms (which 
include GMO), was on knowing what is actually present in New Zealand. It circles on the question of 
the presence of organisms in New Zealand and thus their coverage or not, by the HSNO Act. 
According to an ERMA official, there has been no full cataloguing yet of every organism that is 
present in New Zealand. The official further opined that what is lacking is the sort of baseline 
information for organisms present in the country before 1998: 
Baseline information, yeah it's a big challenge for us, especially if things get smaller 
and smaller. 
In addition, another challenge that was put forward was the difficulty of having sufficient or adequate 
information on the organism's biology and characteristics to be able to make judgment in terms of 
whether and how it would be established in New Zealand (Moeed pers. comm.). 
50 http://bioethies.org.nz/ abollt-Ilsfterms-of-ref-english. html 
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Another important challenge for ERMA is monitoring and coordinating compliance (Pollak 2003). 
Based on the recent independent review of ERMA, "monitoring and co-ordinating compliance with the 
Act and Authority decisions has been patchy ... The emphasis of Agency effort in new organism work 
is so strongly oriented to processing applications that the recurrence of monitoring mishaps cannot be 
ruled out" (Nakhies et al. 2003: 50). This view was supported by an official interviewed for this study 
suggesting that monitoring and compliance are two areas where ERMA needs to advance and gain 
more strength and experience. 
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CHAPTERS 
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS OF BIOSECURITY AND BIOSAFETY SYSTEMS 
AND ISSUES IN THE PHILIPPINES AND NEW ZEALAND 
This Chapter presents a cross-case analysis of the biosecurity and biosafety systems and issues in the 
Philippines. The issues and concerns covered in this analysis are only those main issues where 
substantial comparing and contrasting can be made. The other issues not covered in this cross-case 
analysis are included in the last Chapter - Chapter 9 where synthesized concepts and lessons from the 
field are outlined. 
8.1 Biosecurity System 
8.1.1 Understanding the Term Biosecurity 
Evidence from the field revealed that there are distinct differences in terms of the way the Philippines 
understand biosecurity compared with New Zealand. In the Philippines, it is still unfamiliar 
terminology and is sometimes confused and used interchangeably with the term biosafety. There is no 
direct definition of the term biosecurity in the Philippines, though some people associate it with 
preserving biodiversity, or under the term environmental security. Biosecurity as a matter of 
terminology may be relatively unfamiliar to the country but when broken into its associated risks, a 
better understanding of it emerges. There is a growing awareness of and concern about the current 
threats brought by high profile cases of SARS, Avian Influenza, BSE and FMD. This level of 
understanding ofthe term biosecurity in the Philippines connects with the claim made by FAO (2004) 
that biosecurity issues remain inadequately understood or addressed in Asia. 
In New Zealand on the other hand, the term biosecurity is understood to mean exclusion, eradication, 
and management of risks associated with pests and diseases. It is also understood in terms of activities 
associated with it such as inspection detection and interception at the border; surveillance and incursion 
responses; and national and regional pest management. The scope of biosecurity in New Zealand and 
the range of values it wants to protect are parallel to the F AOs (2003) coverage of biosecurity. 
8.1.2 Enabling Policies and Legislation 
In terms of policy, there is a big difference between the two countries. In the Philippines, there is no 
biosecurity in place but technically it could be anchored loosely to the general policy provided under 
the Philippine Agenda 21. The problem however, is that the Philippine Agenda 21 in itself remains 
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under fire because it has fallen short of the great expectations of the Filipino people (PCSD 2004). The 
review and assessment conducted by PCSD revealed the limited scope of the Philippine Agenda 21 and 
its generally perceived low impact. New Zealand on the other hand, used the Biosecurity Strategy as a 
comprehensive mechanism and platform to direct policy direction across the biosecurity system. It sets 
the policy in terms of recommended steps and medium to long term expectations. The policy for 
biosecurity in New Zealand is straightforward and has a whole-of-system focus. 
Both the Philippines and New Zealand have primary legislation in place when it comes to addressing 
biosecurity concerns. The difference however, is the directness of the legislation in terms of 
addressing biosecurity concerns in each country. The Philippines has a fairly elaborate legislation 
(mainly primary legislation) that contains specific provisions of relevance to biosecurity regulation. 
The issues encompassed in biosecurity are traditionally and separately dealt with in the Philippines in 
terms of food safety law, plant and animal quarantine law, wildlife law, fisheries codes and pesticides 
regulations among others; and are administered and implemented in two major government 
departments - the DA and DENR, and their respective attached agencies and bureaus. These laws to 
some extent provide mechanisms to regulate pests and diseases from entering or spreading into the 
country. However, whilst these laws address the problem of pests and diseases there are questions in 
terms of implementation and enforcement mechanism of the laws. In a sense, the legislation in place is 
a minimum requirement for trading countries like the Philippines. The degree of its implementation 
and enforcement are arguably in question. 
In New Zealand, the Biosecurity Act is a stable and empowering piece of legislation. The legislation 
itself sets the framework, systems and processes and provides a process-based system that has the 
ability to recover cost and set up necessary funding arrangements. The New Zealand biosecurity law 
provides for comprehensive management of pests and eradication of pests which are significantly 
lacking in the Philippines legislation. The enabling provision for enforcement and liability and redress 
are also the strength of the New Zealand law on biosecurity. The interface of the Biosecurity Act with 
the lINSO Act however, as found in this study, needs resolution on particular arrangements concerning 
unintentional introduction of new organisms. This supports the comments made by Walker (2005). 
8.1.3 Governance and Regulatory Frameworks 
The biosecurity governance and regulatory framework in the Philippines and New Zealand are two 
interesting cases. In the Philippines, the biosecurity governance and regulatory frameworks are 
scattered among different sectors involving agriculture, forestry, fisheries, health, and trade and 
industry. They are also generally limited to food safety, and plant and animal quarantine regulations 
and activities. Interestingly though, New Zealand for many years followed a sectoral approach to 
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biosecurity i.e. plants, forestry, animals, policy and international, which, although not exactly the same 
system, is the present position of the Philippines. The level of coordination, prioritising and the 
strategic and operational focuses were considerably different when New Zealand was still applying the 
sectoral approach. There is a clear indication that the Philippines needs a coordinated national 
framework to regulate and manage biosecurity matters. 
In the case of New Zealand, since the biosecurity system recently evolved from a sectoral approach to a 
whole-of-system approach to biosecurity, it will be interesting to see how the new system will deliver 
in the future. Certainly, MAF will be the focus of the wayan integrated, across-system and side-to-
side approach to biosecurity develops and responds. This current biosecurity governance and 
regulatory framework in New Zealand is an ideal situation; however, biosecurity decisions made by 
one Agency may have implications for other agencies accountabilities and operations. The notions that 
the whole-of-system approach will provide better synergies and better efficiencies across sectors are 
yet to be proven in the not so distant future. 
8.1.4 Issues in Pest Management 
There is a significant contrast in the way pest management is being handled in the Philippines and New 
Zealand. Pest management in the Philippines is predominantly farmer-led pest management through 
Farmer Field School. The country does not have a national or regional pest management strategy; 
instead what it employs is the creation of ad hoc committees or task forces to address the problem with 
a particular pest. There is an absence of authentic experience or programs to eradicate pests in the 
country. Furthennore, the focus of pest management in the Philippines is more on agricultural crops 
and reducing the use of pesticides. The current dilemma is how to address other pests such as animal 
pests, forest pests and invasive pests (which could be plants, insects, fish or other organisms). 
In New Zealand, managing pests is quite different. There are national and regional pest management 
strategies in place guided by primary legislation. There are multiple actors or stakeholders involved in 
implementing the pest management strategies and activities in New Zealand which include the national 
government, regional councils, the Animal Health Board, farmers, industry sectors and Crown 
institutions. Whilst the Philippines has no authentic eradication measures in place, New Zealand on the 
other hand, has numerous pest eradication initiatives and activities. Notably, New Zealand was 
successful in terms of totally eradicating high profile pests in a particular locality or in its wider 
environment. The current issue on pest management in the country however, is the need to rationalise 
its national and regional strategies and activities. 
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8.2 Biosafety System 
8.2.1 Enabling Policy and Legislation 
The foundation of any biosafety regulatory system is the enabling legislation (acts, laws, decrees, and 
government orders) governing biosafety (Mc Lean et al 2002). Both the Philippines and New Zealand 
have policies, legal instruments, and regulations in place to regulate biosafety matters primarily GMOs. 
In the Philippines, the legislation in place is secondary legislation in the form of Presidential Executive 
Order (EO 430) and a Department Administrative Order (DA AO 8). This approach to legislation has 
been adopted on account of the novelty of and rapid developments in modern biotechnology and the 
need for a quick and flexible response at the time. Legislation in the form of EO and AO is easier to 
approve and amend than laws. New Zealand on the other hand, has primary biosafety legislation in the 
form of a statutory law the HSNO Act; but also has a stringent regulation in place administered by 
ERMA. 
There is. congruence in the way the scope of biosafety legislation for both countries developed over 
time; the underlying focuses however, are slightly different. The scope of the Philippines biosafety 
regulation has developed over time in a phased manner; it started from laboratories and contained 
experiments, then extended to covering field trials; then more recently covered release into the 
environment for propagation and commercialisation. When EO 430 was issued it was aimed at 
creating a body and a national policy on biosafety that would regulate all biological activities that may 
be potentially hazardous to plants, animals and humans, however the underlying focus then was 
towards regulating importation, transfer and use of GMOs and PRES. On the other hand, the HSNO 
Act was created in view of the need for a criteria-based legislation that would apply to all new 
organisms that are coming into the country, whether they are microorganisms, plants, animals or 
GMOs. 
8.2.2 Govemance and Regulatory Frameworks 
Both the EO 430 of the Philippines and the HSNO Act of New Zealand created an Agency or a body to 
implement the legislation and regulations that were set in place. The Executive Order 430 created the 
NBCP whilst the HNSO Act established ERMA; there are differences though on how the two 
institutions are empowered, set up, function and operate. Whilst the NCBP has given broad 
responsibilities, its powers actually derived or came from the individual mandates of a member-
institutions and the residual power of the President in safeguarding the general welfare (Halos et al. 
2004). The NCBP is not a stand alone agency rather it is attached to the DOST. Even though the 
NCBP is the highest regulatory body in the Philippines with respect to the introduction, use and 
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transfer of GMOs and PRES, its decisions are considered recommendatory. The NCBP's approval or 
disapproval of a biotechnology application for instance, is restricted to research and development (i.e. 
laboratory and field tests), technical aspects and scientific advice. Hence, the regulatory functions 
actually rely in effect on member regulatory agencies or Departments i.e. the DA, DENR and DOH. 
These set-ups were likewise cited during the development ofthe NBF presented by Halos et al. (2004). 
It is interesting to note however, that in spite of the lack of funding support and a very small 
Secretariat, the NCBP was able to deliver its basic mandates. This is one thing to look at from the 
perspective of a developing country such as the Philippines. The experience gained by the NCBP in 
terms of delivering results amidst insufficient funding reflects an effective operational biosafety 
management. 
Conversely, ERMA is a prime body that is responsible for making decisions about importing, 
developing or manufacturing hazardous substances and new organisms; it is an independent regulatory 
authority. ERMA has two roles under the HSNO Act, they are the decision makers and they also 
monitor compliance and enforcement in view of the Act. One unique feature of ERMA as a stand 
alone agency is the partition of its functions into three inter-related elements i.e. the Authority which 
makes the decision, the Agency that provides executive support to the Authority and the Nga Kaihauru 
Tikanga Taiao which act as the Authority's Maori Advisory Committee. The power of ERMA to make 
decisions and set the necessary conditions should a particular application be allowed for release made it 
different from the way the NCBP operates. 
8.2.3 Tire issue offunding 
The influence that a primary legislation can have and the difference it can make compared with a 
secondary legislation can be best explained by funding. Funding for the NCBP was supposed to be 
initially allocated from the DOST for its early operation and eventually be included in the General 
Appropriations Bill submitted to Congress each year. However, the funds were not consistently 
allocated, and the DOST has to find an alternative source of funds, i.e. utilising some of its Grants in 
Aid program intended for other R&D projects to support at least the Secretariat's operation. In 
contrast there is a different scenario in the case of ERMA; as a crown entity it gets direct funding 
consistently from the government to support the effective implementation ofthe HSNO Act. 
8.2,4 Socio-ecollomic considerations ill decision-making 
The debate between science-based vis-a.-vis socio-economic considerations in doing risk assessment 
and making biosafety decisions is undoubtedly a major issue in both the Philippines and New Zealand. 
In the Philippines, the prevailing position is that socio-economic and cultural considerations are vital 
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components of biosafety decision-making and may be taken into account. Whilst socio-economic 
factors are considered in decision making, it was noted in the proposed NBF that its assessment should 
be conducted separately from risk assessment-science. This is where the Philippines and New Zealand 
have a commonality. In New Zealand, the debate is simplified between evidence-based and value-
based decisions. However, the action taken in New Zealand is parallel to the way the Philippines 
sought to address it, i. e. to create a separate framework that will deal with the issues of social, cultural 
and ethical factors and leave risk assessment on a separate scientific risk assessment framework. The 
situation in the Philippines and New Zealand in a way supports the idea of integrating socio-economic 
considerations into biosafety decisions (Fransen et al. 2005). 
8.2.5 Transparency and Public Participation 
"Public participation and transparency in decision-making process are increasingly recognised as 
essential elements of good governance and sustainable development" (Fransen et at. 2005: 30). This 
statement arguably, is happening to a larger extent in the case of the Philippines and New Zealand; 
both are democratic societies and acknowledge the importance of transparency and public participation 
as vital components of a biosecurity or biosafety regimes. In the Philippines, the NCBP which is the 
highest regulatory body when it comes to biosafety has one social scientist and two community 
representatives out of its 10 governing members; most of whom have been appointed by the President 
of the Philippines since the creation of the NCBP in 1990. Moreover, there is community 
representation in the respective IBCs created by different institutions and organisations (under the 
NCBP guidelines and DA AO 8), that also make decisions before endorsing a project proposal and 
sending it to the NCBP or BPI for final assessment and approval. This in part reflects the way the 
community is valued as an integral component ofbiosafety decision making in the country. 
In the case of New Zealand, in making decisions on approval for hazardous substances and new 
organisms, the Authority is mandated (under the HNSO Act) to take into account specific matters 
including the socio-economic, social and cultural well-being of all people and communities. In 
pa11icular, the Authority also has to take into consideration Maori perspectives in decision-making. 
There is no direct community representative within the eight-members of the Authority, who are 
basically the people making decisions about whether or not hazardous substances or new organisms 
can be imported, developed or manufactured in New Zealand. However, the creation of the Authority's 
Maori Advisory Committee is a step towards recognizing Maori views and perspectives on matters 
relating to policy process and applications (ERMA 2004). The Authority also established an Ethics 
Advisory Panel that assists in its consideration of ethical and spiritual matters in decision making. In 
the IBSCs however, there is a Maori member and lay member of the community who sit in the 
Committee and represent the views of their community when making decisions on low-risk 
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containment application. The set up of public participation and representation in regulatory 
governance in the Philippines and New Zealand is obviously different in approach, but has the parallel 
goals of engaging the public and the community in the decision-making platform. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that public participation occurred not just during the decision-
making process but also during policy formulation. The development of the NBF and the public 
process that it went through which involved a series of multi-stakeholder, consultative workshops at 
the regional and national levels, were an example of how the Philippines engaged the public in the 
policy making process; they anchored the formulation of the NBF to the principle of transparency, 
participatory consultation and consensus building. The Philippines has a strong tradition of activism 
and grassroots movement (Fransen et al. 2005) and a dynamic social sector. Hence, it can be construed 
that the strength of the biosafety in the Philippines is the social process itself; it is being used as a 
counter balance to the complex scientific and legal issues inherent in biosafety governance. Public 
participation in the Philippines has brought other forms of specialised knowledge and experience 
(including indigenous knowledge and perceptions), besides scientific and technical perspectives, "that 
are also considered as relevant to policy formulation" (Glover & Keeley 2004: 47). In New Zealand, 
the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification's public consultation process which is considered as 
one of the most comprehensive public engagements ever conducted is a parallel illustration of the way 
the public can participate in shaping policy outcomes. Furthermore, it demonstrated "the usefulness of 
having several mutually enforcing streams of public consultation, and of making efforts to overcome 
cultural, temporal and geographic barriers to foster wide participation" (Pollak 2003). 
8.2.6 Shared norms in Biosafety 
There were some specific shared norms identified in biosafety in the Philippines and New Zealand in 
this study. First, both the Philippines and New Zealand adopt the case-by-case approach to approving 
or disapproving a particular GMO application intended for release into the environment. Second, the 
two countries shared a common practice of having a community representative in their respective IBCs 
so that the community has a voice during the evaluation of low-risk GMO applications. 
8.3 Biosecurity Encompassing Biosafety in the Local Context 
There is an interesting contrast between the Philippines and New Zealand's experiences in view of the 
idea of biosecurity encompassing biosafety. In the Philippines, the term biosecurity is a relatively new 
term for many. The system in the Philippines that can be attributed to biosecurity is the more 
traditional regulatory system focused on food safety, plant quarantine, animal quarantine, IPM, and 
through NIP AS, which are administered in different government departments and bureau or line 
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agencies. There is arguably a limited coordination and integration of these sectors in terms of 
addressing holistically the issues of biosecurity. The encompassing concept of biosecurity over 
biosafety (in view of the introduction and release of GMOs into the environment) is not happening in 
the Philippines; instead to some extent it is happening the other way around. The confusion on where 
to address the growing problem with lAS in the absence of a clear national policy to address it led to 
the inclusion of lAS under the proposed NBF. Currently and even before the creation of the proposed 
NBF, the Philippines is addressing the risks of introduction of lAS within the framework of biosafety 
under the guidelines set by NCBP on GMOs and PHES, whilst the protection and monitoring side of it 
is under the DENR-PA WB. The guidelines on GMOs and PHES reflected the recognition of the need 
to address concerns in these areas, however covering the issues ofIAS (which pose a huge threat to the 
country's biodiversity) within the context of a biosafety framework showed that there is a clear absence 
of a biosecurity mechanism to address the issue within its context. On the other hand, in New Zealand, 
the encompassing nature of biosecurity over biosafety seems to be happening to some degree. The 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry which now looks after the whole-of-system approach to 
biosecurity performs tasks which are considered biosafety matters, i. e. being in-charge of the 
enforcement aspects of GMOs approved in containment or field release. Arguably however, there is 
still an artificial division within New Zealand behveen biosecurity and biosafety in terms of MAF 
doing the enforcement and ER.l\1A doing the risk assessment of new organisms of which GMOs by 
definition (under the HSNO Act) are part. The MAF and ER.l\1A may have different foci on dealing 
with new organisms but basically concerns involving new organisms fall within the biosecurity context 
and priority of New Zealand. In the case of New Zealand the tools for delivering biosecurity and 
biosafety are basically the same; it is just a matter of differentiating between the policy and risks 
assessments and the tools for delivering it. Biosecurity in New Zealand also evolved from a 
traditionally sectoral approach to biosecurity centred mainly on its primary production, to an expansion 
of including biodiversity; and the terrestrial and marine ecosystems; it transcended a more economic 
focus to a holistic and encompassing focus on economy, public health and the environment. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONIIMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
9.1 Synthesized Concepts: Lessons from the Field 
The evidence from the case studies generates synthesized concepts that can be considered and applied 
to future actions with the view to developing or improving the biosecurity and biosafety systems and 
frameworks not only in the countries of study but also in other advanced or developing countries. 
Potentially, it is also intended to inform policy making. The synthesized concepts presented in this 
study are lessons learned from the whole experience of undergoing this study and can be construed as a 
form of summary and general recommendations. As a way of presentation, the synthesized concepts 
are outlined in bullet points presented as an action agenda. 
9.1.1 Biosecurity 
• Realising the need for a co-ordinated, enhanced and comprehensive approach to biosecurity. 
Policies, regulations, strategies, and risk management frameworks should be comprehensively 
coordinated among agencies and the stakeholders involved. 
• Formulating appropriate policy and strategy. A sound policy or biosecurity strategy serves as a 
platform for enabling biosecurity legislation; sets direction, goals and desired outcomes. 
I/) Enhancing capacity and capability in biosecurity risk assessment and management. Strengthening 
human resource and developing expertise in assessing biosecurity risks; and improving or installing 
biosecurity facilities and infrastructure primarily to be able to trade equally in the international 
arena. 
I/) Strengthening the monitoring of compliance and stern enforcement mechanisms. Monitoring of 
compliance and enforcement of the law at the pre-border, border and post-border are necessary 
elements of a successful biosecurity implementation. 
I/) Rationalising pest management strategies. Setting best practises, standards and protocols provide 
for efficient and effective pest management. 
103 
• Building and maintaining a good international reputation in biosecurity. Fostering a good 
international reputation builds trust and confidence, and enhances trade relations. 
9.1.2 Biosafety 
It Formulating and enacting primmy legislation on biosafety. A more permanent legislation is in 
itself an enabling mechanism for resource commitment, sustainable funding, and robust regulation. 
II Integrating socio-economic considerations in biosafety decision making. Delineating and 
incorporating socio-economic, cultural, ethical, and spiritual considerations as part of decision-
making, potentially under a separate framework from scientific risk assessment. 
1\1 Building capacity and capability in biosafety. The capacities of various sectors, policy makers, 
regulatory agencies, local government units, the research community and the general public 
involved in performing various tasks must be strengthened. 
.. Making transparency and public participation an anchor of the biosafety regime. There is a need 
for: (1) a coordinated and integrated system for promoting and facilitating public awareness of and 
education about biosafety; (2) a system that ensures correctness of the information and 
accountability; (3) scientists who can communicate the issues to all levels (primarily at the 
grassroots level). 
1\1 Addressing the issue of access and ownership. Ensuring that farmers have access to technology and 
are not displaced in their lands is of paramount concern and should be taken seriously. 
.. Increasing understanding of biosafety as a multi-level and multi-sectoral issue. Informed political 
leadership, top level government decision makers and policy makers as well as NGOs, POs, 
industry and other stakeholders would mean better policy and decision making. 
9.2 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study has shown the complexity of systems, policies, legislation, regulations and 
cross-cutting issues that surround biosecurity and biosafety in the Philippines and New Zealand. The 
case studies highlight the challenges, issues and concerns that affect the biosecurity and biosafety 
systems from an advanced and a developing country perspective. ill view of biosecurity, it clearly 
showed that the Philippines needs to shape a biosecurity policy or strategy that will serve as a blueprint 
in forming a stable biosecurity system in the country. This study has also found that there is limited 
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aspect of biosecurity being practised in the Philippines and responsibilities are scattered among 
different sectors. It is shown from this study that New Zealand has taken biosecurity management to 
the next level, i.e. from sectoral to a whole-of-system approach. The comparison between the two 
countries cemented the wide gap in terms of implementing a coordinated, enhanced and comprehensive 
biosecurity system; and the urgent need for a country like the Philippines to adopt or put up a similar 
system. 
In view of biosafety, this study has shown the significance of having a primary legislation over 
secondary legislation in regulating biosafety. This means that a primary legislation facilitates enabling 
mechanism for resource commitment and robust regulation. The case studies highlighted the shared 
norms between the Philippines and New Zealand in terms of socio-economic, cultural and ethical 
considerations in biosafety decision-making; and in public participation. This suggests that advanced 
and developing countries are now realising the importance of these factors to the biosafety regulatory 
regime. 
In terms of biosecurity encompassing biosafety jn the local context, clearly such a concept is not (yet) 
present in the Philippines, whilst, to some extent it is happening in New Zealand. Therefore, unless 
steps are taken to make national policies better infolmed, enhance understanding of the nature and 
relevance of biosecurity, and set strategic and operational priorities, then there will be a continuing 
overlap between biosecurity and biosafety and the encompassing concept of biosecurity over biosafety 
will take a while to materialise in the local context. 
9.3 Implications of the StudylRecommendations for Future Research 
The results and findings of this study have implications for consideration in terms of practice and 
future research. This study has direct implications for countries like the Philippines and New Zealand 
that are setting biosecurity systems, policies and framework. Future research on the synthesized 
concepts provided above will pave the way for better understanding of the complex system of 
biosecurity and biosafety, and would provide a pragmatic resolution to outstanding biosecurity and 
biosafety issues and concems. 
9.4 Limitations of the Study 
This study has identified certain limitations that can offer important insights for future research on the 
topic. Foremost, this study delved into a considerably broad and novel topic of biosecurity and 
biosafety and, as such it was like scratching the surface of these huge areas of research. Apparently, 
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the information and material related to biosecurity and biosafety systems and their interrelationship are 
scarce especially in the Philippines. 
Second, this study used in-depth "elite" interviews as the primary data for analysing the phenomena but 
elite interviewing has its inherent limitations. Interviewing as many interviewees as possible across a 
range of disciplines status and levels in society would have better informed the cross-case analysis. 
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APPENDIX A 
MALACANANG 
MANILA 
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 
ESTABLISHING THE NATIONAL BIOSAFETY FRAMEWORK, PRESCRIBING 
GUIDELINES FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, STRENGTHENING THE NATIONAL 
COMMITTEE ON BIOSAFETY OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND FOR OTHER 
PURPOSES 
WHEREAS, there is rapid expansion of the use of modern biotechnology not only for scientific 
research but also for products for commercial releases and purposes; 
WHEREAS, there is a growing concern over modern biotechnology's potential impacts on the 
environment, particUlarly on biological diversity, on human health, and on social and cultural well-
being; 
WHEREAS, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the United Nations Convention on Biological 
Diversity which the Philippines signed on 24 May 2000 entered into force on 11 September 2003; 
WHEREAS, there is a need to establish and implement a National Biosafety Framework that would 
respond to the challenges presented by modern biotechnology; 
WHEREAS, the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) has played, since 1987, a 
pioneering and important role in developing and establishing the current biosafety system, and that it 
needs to be strengthened so that it can better respond to these challenges. 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Philippines, by 
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order: 
SECTION 1. Adoption and Operationalization of the National Biosafety Framework. The 
National Biosafety Framework (NBF) for the Philippines, attached hereto as Annex A, is hereby 
adopted. 
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SECTION 2. Scope and Objectives. The NBF shall have the following scope and objectives: 
2.1 Scope. The NBF shall apply to the development, adoption and implementation of all biosafety 
policies, measures and guidelines and in making biosafety decisions concerning the research, 
development, handling and use, transboundary movement, release into the environment and 
management of regulated articles. 
The NCBP and concerned departments and agencies may apply, when allowed by law, the principles, 
mechanisms and processes developed and implemented under the NBF to similar problems such as 
addressing the issue of exotic species and invasive alien species. Where appropriate, they may adopt 
the administrative and decision-making systems established in this Order. 
2.2 Objectives. The NBF shall have the following objectives: 
2.2.1 Establish a science-based determination of biosafety to ensure the safe and responsible use of 
modern biotechnology so that the Philippines and its citizens can benefit from its application while 
avoiding or minimizing the risks associated with it; 
2.2.2 Establish a decision~making system on the application of products of modern biotechnology that 
is efficient, predictable, effective, balanced, culturally appropriate, ethical, transparent and 
participatory; and, 
2.2.3 Serve as guidelines for implementing international obligations on biosafety. 
Section 3. Administrative Framework and Decision-Making processes. In making biosafety 
decisions, the administrative system and decision~making processes established in the NBF shall be 
complied with. 
Section 4. Strengthening the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP). The 
NCBP is hereby strengthened. Its mandate, functions, composition and organization are set forth in the 
NBF 
Section 5. General Mandate on Departments, Offices and Agencies. All departments and agencies 
shall exercise jurisdiction and all other powers that they have been conferred with under existing laws. 
They shall be guided by the NBF and coordinate with each other in exercising such powers. 
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Section 6. Funding. The DOST, DENR, DA, and DOH shall allocate funds from their present budgets 
to implement the NBF, including to support the operations of the NCBP and its Secretariat for 2004 
and 2005. Starting 2006 and thereafter, the funding requirements shall be included in the General 
Appropriations Bill submitted to Congress. 
These concerned departments, on an annual or other periodic basis, shall enter into agreement on the 
sharing of financial and technical resource to support the NCBP and its Secretariat. 
Section 7. Transition. The NCBP and its present members shall continue to exercise their present 
functions under EO 430 until such time that it has completely reorganized under the NBF, which 
reorganization shall be completed within one year of its effectivity. 
All members of the NCBP to be appointed by the President, as required by the NBF, shall assume their 
positions within the same period oftime. 
Section 8. Repealing and Amending Clause. All orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof which 
are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Order are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. 
SECTION 9. Effectivity. This Order shall take effect immediately. DONE, in the City of Manila, this 
__ day of in the year of our Lord two thousand and four. 
GLORIA MACAP AGAL-ARROYO 
By the President: 
Executive Secretary 
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NATIONAL BIOSAFETY FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE PHILIPPINES 
SECTION 1. CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES 
In implementing the National Biosafety Framework (NBF), the following state policies mandated by 
the 1987 Constitution shall guide the concerned government department and agencies: 
1.1 Right to Health. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill 
health consciousness among them (Article II, Section 15); 
1.2 Right to a Healthy Environment. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a 
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature (Article II, Section 
16); 
1.3 Priority to Science. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, 
and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human 
liberation and development (Article II, Section 17); 
1.4 Role of the Private Sector. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, 
encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments (Article II, Section 20); 
1. 5 Rural Development. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform 
(Article II, Section 21) and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and 
research, and adequate financial, production, marketing, and other support services (Article XIII, 
Section 5); 
1,6 Right of Indigenous Peoples and Communities. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of 
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development (Article II, 
Section 22). The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies 
and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to 
ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being (Article XIII, Section 5); 
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1.7 Right to Information. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and 
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Article II, 
Section 28); 
1.8 Local Autonomy. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy (Article 10, 
Section 2); 
1.9 Right to Participation. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable 
participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The 
State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms (Article XIII, 
Section 16); 
1.10 Science and Technology. Science and technology are essential for national development and 
progress. The State shall give priority to research and development, invention, innovation, and their 
utilization; and to science and technology education, training, and services. It shall support indigenous, 
appropriate, and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, and their application to the 
country's productive systems and national life. The State shall regulate the transfer and promote the 
adaptation of technology from all sources for the national benefit. It shall encourage the widest 
participation of private groups, local governments, and community-based organizations in the 
generation and utilization of science and technology (Article XIV, Sections 10 and 12); and, 
1.11 Consumer Protection. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractice and substandard 
and hazardous products (Article. XVI, Section. 9). 
SECTION 2. PRINCIPLES 
The following principles, based on national and international law, shall apply in a mutually supportive 
manner to the implementation of the NBF: 
2.1 Policy on A;fodern Biotechnology. The NBF shall be implemented in the context of the overall 
policy of the Philippines on modem biotechnology, to wit: The State shall promote the safe and 
responsible use of modern biotechnology and its products as one of the several means to achieve and 
sustain food security, equitable access to health services, sustainable and safe environment and industry 
development; 
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2.2 Policy on Sustainable Development. The overall policy of the Philippines on sustainable 
development, as laid down in Philippine Agenda 21, shall equally guide the implementation of the 
NBF; 
2.3 A Balanced Approach. A balanced approach, which recognizes both the potential benefits and risks, 
shall guide the implementation of the NBF. This shall be based on recognition that modern 
biotechnology has significant potential for human well-being if developed and used with adequate 
safety measures for the environment and human health. Such approach recognizes both the potential 
benefits and risks of modern biotechnology to human health, agricultural productivity, food security, 
the livelihoods of the poor, biological diversity and the environment; 
204 A S~ientific Approach. The implementation of the NBF shall be based on the best available science 
and knowledge. Such science and knowledge must be of the highest quality, multi-disciplinary, peer-
reviewed, and consistent with international standards as they evolve; 
2.5 Socio-economic, Cultural, and Ethical Considerations. The socio-economic, ethical and cultural 
benefits and risks, of modern biotechnology to the Philippines and its citizens, and in particular on 
small farmers, indigenous peoples, women, small and medium enterprises and the domestic scientific 
community, shall be taken into account in implementing the NBF; 
2.6 Using Precaution. In accordance with Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 and the relevant 
provisions of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, in particular Articles 1, 10 (par. 6) and 11 (par. 8), 
the precautionary approach shall guide biosafety decisions. The principles and elements of this 
approach shall be implemented through the decision-making system in the NBF; 
2.7 Transparency and Public Participation. Decision taken under the J\TBF shall be arrived at in a 
transparent and participatory manner. Biosafety issues are best handled with the participation of all 
relevant stakeholders and organizations. They shall have appropriate access to information and the 
opportunity to participate in biosafety decision-making processes; 
2.8 Consensus Building. In making biosafety decisions, all concerned government departments and 
agencies shall exert all efforts to find consensus among all relevant stakeholders using well-accepted 
methods such as negotiation, mediation, and other appropriate dispute resolution processes. Such 
consensus, to be achieved in a transparent and participatory manner, shall be based on the best 
available science and knowledge and shall not compromise public safety and welfare; 
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2.9 Principle of Subsidiarity. As provided by law and where competence exists, all levels of 
government, including local government units, shall participate in implementing the NBF; 
2.10 Availability of Remedies. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including 
redress and remedy, shall be available in accordance with Philippine law; 
2.11 International Obligations and Cooperation. In accordance with international law, the NBF shall 
be implemented in a manner consistent with and mutually supportive to the international obligations of 
the Philippines, in particular its obligations under international trade and environmental law. 
Multilateral, regional and bilateral cooperation in implementing the NBF, in particular its sections on 
capacity building and financial resources, shall be encouraged; 
2.12 Efficient Administration and Timely Decision Making. The NBF decision making process must be 
conducted in an efficient, coordinated, effective, predictable, cost-effective and timely manner. Undue 
delay shall be avoided without compromising transparency, public participation, public safety, and 
public welfare; and, 
2.13 Public interest and welfare. In cases of conflict in applying these principles, the principle of 
protecting public interest and welfare shall always prevail. No section or provision in this Framework 
shall be construed as to limit the legal authority and mandate of heads of departments and agencies to 
consider the national interest and public welfare in making biosafety decisions. 
SECTION 3. SCOPE, OBJECTIVES AND DEFINITIONS 
3.1 Scope. The NBF shall apply to the development, adoption and implementation of all biosafety 
policies, measures and guidelines and in making decisions concerning the research, development, 
handling and use, transboundary movement, release into the environment and management of regulated 
articles. The NCBP and concerned departments and agencies may apply, when allowed by law, the 
principles, mechanisms and processes developed and implemented under the NBF to similar problems 
such as addressing the issue of exotic species and invasive alien species. Where appropriate, they may 
adopt the administrative and decisiofl-making systems established in this Framework. 
3.2 Objectives . The NBF shall have the following objectives: 3.2.1 Establish a science-based 
determination of biosafety to ensure the safe and responsible use of modem biotechnology so that the 
Philippines and its citizens can benefit from its application while avoiding or minimizing the risks 
associated with it; 
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3.2.2 Establish a decision-making system on the application of products of modem biotechnology that 
is efficient, predictable, effective, balanced, culturally-appropriate, ethical, transparent and 
participatory; and, 
3.2.3 Serve as guidelines for implementing international obligations on biosafety. 
3.3 Definitions. For purposes of this framework, the following terms shall mean: 
3.3.1 "Biosafety" is a condition in which the probability from harm, injury and damage resulting from 
the intentional and unintentional introduction andlor use of a regulated article is within acceptable and 
manageable levels; 
3.3.2 "Biosafety Clearing house" is an information exchange mechanism established by the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety to assist parties in the implementation of its provisions and to facilitate sharing 
and exchange of scientific, technical, environmental and legal information on, and experience with, 
regulated articles; 
3.3.3 "Biosafety decisions" apply to the development, adoption and implementation of all biosafety 
policies, measures and guidelines and in making decisions concerning the research, development, 
handling and use, trans boundary movement, release into the environment and management of regulated 
articles; 3.3.4 "Contained use" means any operation, undertaken within a facility, installation or other 
physical structure, which involves genetically modified organisms that are controlled by specific 
measures that effectively limit their contact with, and their impact on, the external environment; 
3.3.5 "Genetically modified organism" also refers to "living modified organism" under the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety and refers to any living organism that possesses a novel combination of genetic 
material obtained through the use of modem biotechnology; 
3.3.6 "Handling and Use" means the process by which regulated articles are moved, carried, 
transported, delivered, stored or worked with; 
3.3 .7 "Hazard" refers to traits inherent to or activities of a regulated article that may cause harm to 
human or animal health or to the environment; 
3.3.8 "Management" means measures adopted after the release of regulated articles to ensure their safe 
use and, in cases of commercial release, shall also include product monitoring and product 
identification; 
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3.3.9 "Modern biotechnology" means the application of: a) in vitro nucleic acid techniques, including 
recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles; or 
b) fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family, that overcome natural physiological reproductive or 
recombination barriers and that are not techniques used in traditional breeding or selection; 
3.3.1 0 "Product identification" refers to information on the presence of a regulated article in a 
particular product, as implemented by concerned departments and agencies through import and export 
documents, unique identification system, or similar applicable approaches such as product labeling; 
3.3 .11 "Product Monitoring" refers to any post-commercialization measure that provides data on the 
fate and effects of the regulated article, in order to confirm compliance with regulatory requirements, 
collect information necessary for controlling and managing potentially adverse public health or 
environmental situations, assess environmental quality and detect unexpected or potentially damaging 
effects on human and animal health and the environment. Product monitoring helps reduce uncertainty 
remaining from risk assessment, confirm conc1~sions with additional data and provide informational 
feedback on system status or conditions; 
3.3 .12 "Regulated article" refers to a genetically modified organism and its products; 
3.3.13 "Risk" refers to the combination of the likelihood that an adverse consequence of a 
biohazardous activity or trait will occur and the magnitude of such a consequence; 
3.3.14 "Risk assessment" refers to the procedure that identifies, evaluates and predicts the occurrence 
of possible hazards to human and animal health and the environment and designs mitigating measures 
to avert or minimize these hazards; 
3.3 .15 "Risk management" refers to appropriate mechanisms, measures and strategies to regulate, 
manage and control risks identified in the risk assessment including those conditions imposed by 
concerned departments or agencies; 
3.3 .16 "Transboundaty movement" means the movement of a regulated article from another country to 
the Philippines; and, 
3.3.17 "Transformation event" means one instance of entry, stable integration and expression of an 
introduced gene into a cell which then develops into a functional organism expressing the introduced 
gene. 
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SECTION 4. ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
The administrative mechanism for biosafety decisions shall be as follows: (a) National scientific and 
technical biosafety standards and standards on methods and procedures for ensuring biosafety in the 
country, shall be set by the NCBP consistent with existing laws; 
(b) Basic policies on addressing public interests on biosafety shall be developed by the NCBP, 
provided the same are consistent with law and/or if such policies are found insufficiently addressed in 
existing mandates and regulations of pertinent agencies; 
(c) Member-agencies of the NCBP shall continue to perform their regulatory functions in accordance 
with their legal mandates, provided that their policies and programs relating to biosafety shall be 
discussed in the NCBP for purposes of harmonization with other agencies' functions; 
(d) Other concerned agencies shall coordinate with NCBP on matters that may affect biosafety 
decisions as provided in Sections 4.7 to 4.14; 
(e) Administrative functions required under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety shall be performed by 
agencies as provided in Section 4.14 and 4.15; and, 
(f) The role of stakeholders and the general public shall be recognized and taken into account as 
provided in Sections 6 and 7. 
4.1 Mandate of tlte National Committee 0 n Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP). The NCBP shall be 
the lead body to coordinate and harmonize interagency and multi-sector efforts to develop biosafety 
policies in the country (where such are not already stipulated by law) and set scientific, technical and 
procedural standards on actions by agencies and other sectors to promote biosafety in the Philippines; 
oversee the implementation of the NBF; act as a clearing house for biosafety matters; and coordinate 
and harmonize the effOlts of all concerned agencies and departments in this regard. 
4.2 Composition of the NCBP. The NCBP shall be composed of the following: 
4.2.1. The Secretaries of the Departments of Science and Technology, Agriculture, Health, 
Environment and Natural Resources, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Industry, and Interior and Local 
Governments or their designated representatives. The DOST Secretary shall be the permanent Chair; 
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4.2.2 A representative of civil society to be recommended by the Civil Society Counterpart of the 
Philippine Council on Sustainable Development (PCSD) to the NCBP and appointed by the President, 
serving for a term ofthree (3) years, renewable for another term; 
4.2.3 A community representative from the farmers, fisherfolk and indigenous sector appointed by the 
President from a list submitted by nationally recognized sectoral organizations, serving for a term of 
three (3) years, renewable for another term; 
4.2.4 A representative from industry appointed by the President from a list submitted by the Secretary 
of Trade and Industry, serving for a term ofthree (3) years, renewable for another term; and, 
4.2.5 A biological scientist, physical scientist, environmental scientist, health scientist, and social 
scientist to be endorsed by the DOST Secretary upon the recommendation of recognized professional 
and collegial bodies such as the National Academy of Science and Technology (NAST) and the 
Philippine Social Science Council (PSSC), and appointed by the President, serving for a ternl of three 
(3) years, renewable for another teTIn. 
4.3 NCBP Executive Committee and Technical Working Groups. The NCBP may create an 
Executive Committee and Technical Working Groups as it deems necessary and appropriate. 
4.4 Meetings of the NCBP . The NCBP shall meet regularly as it deems fit and shall formulate its 
standards for making decisions. 
4.5 NCBP Secretariat. The NCBP shall create a Secretariat that shall be based in the DOST. All other 
concerned agencies shall participate in the functions of the Secretariat. 
4.6 Powers and Functions of the NCBP. As the lead body in implementing the NBF, the NCBP shall 
have the following powers and functions: 
4.6.1 Biosafety Policy Functions 
4.6.1.1 Assist concerned departments and agencies m formulating, reviewing, or amending their 
respective policies, measures and guidelines on biosafety; 
4.6.1.2 Hold public deliberations on proposed national policies, guidelines, and other biosafety issues; 
4.6.1.3 Provide assistance in the fOTInulation, amendment of pertinent laws, rules and regulations; 
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4.6.1.4 ill coordination with concerned departments and agencies and consistent with the requirements 
of transparency and public participation as provided in Sections 6 and 7 of the NBF, shall take the lead 
in periodically reviewing the NBF; 
4.6.1.5 Issue detailed guidelines on the conduct of socio-economic impact evaluation ofbiosafety 
decisions; and, 
4.6.1.6 Propose to Congress necessary and appropriate legislation. 
4.6.2 Accountability Functions 
4.6.2.1 Monitor the implementation of the NBF by concerned departments and agencies; 
4.6.2.2 Ensure coordination among competent national authorities that have shared mandates; 
4.6.2.3 Ensure that NCBP guidelines, and the principles and processes established in this Framework 
are complied with by concerned departments and agencies; and, 
4.6.2.4 Review procedures for accountability in biosafety decision-making by competent national 
authorities, with particular emphasis on ensuring independence and impartiality in such decisions. 
4.6.3 Scientific Functions 
4.6.3.1 Facilitate the study and evaluation of biosafety research and control and minimize the 
concomitant risks and hazards associated with the deliberate release of regulated articles in the 
environment; 
4.6.3.2 Identify and evaluate potential hazards involved in modem biotechnological experiments or the 
introduction of regulated articles and recommend measures to minimize risks; 
4.6.3.3 Recommend the development and promotion of research programs to establish risk assessment 
protocols and assessment of long-term environmental effects of regulated articles; 
4.6.3.4 Develop working arrangements with the government quarantine services and institutions in the 
evaluation, monitoring, and review of projects vis-a.-vis adherence to national policies and guidelines 
on biosafety; 
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4.6.3.5 Review and develop guidelines in the risk assessment of regulated articles for contained use; 
4.6.3.6 Assist other agencies in developing risk assessment guidelines and procedures of regulated 
articles for field trials and commercial release; 
4.6.3.7 Review the appointment of the members of the Institutional Biosafety Committees created by 
institutions engaged in activities involving regulated articles, upon recommendation by their respective 
heads of institutions; 
4.6.3.8 Publish the results of internal deliberations and agency reviews of the NCBP; 
4.6.3.9 Hold discussions on the comparative ecological, economic and social impacts of alternative 
approaches to attain the purposes/objectives of the proposed genetic modification products and/or 
services; and, 
4.6.3.10Perform such functions as may be requested by concerned departments and agencies. 
4.6.4 Capacity Building Functions 
4.6.4.1 Assist in the development of technical expertise, facilities, and other resources for quarantine 
services and risk assessments; and, 
4.6.4.2 Take the lead m developing and implementing a national capacity-building program for 
biosafety. 
4.7 Mandate of the Department of Science and Technology. The Department of Science and 
Technology (DOST), as the premiere science and technology body in the country, shall take the lead in 
ensuring that the best available science is utilized and applied in adopting biosafety policies, measures 
and guidelines, and in making biosafety decisions. The DOST shall ensure that such policies, measures, 
guidelines and decisions are made on the basis of scientific information that is of the highest quality, 
multi-disciplinary, peer-reviewed, and consistent with international standards as they evolve. In 
coordination with other concerned departments and agencies, and consistent with the requirements of 
transparency and public participation as provided in Sections 6 and 7 of the NBF, it shall exercise such 
jurisdiction and other powers that it has been conferred with under existing laws. 
4.8 Ma11date of the Department of Agriculture. As the principal agency of the Philippine government 
responsible for the promotion of agricultural development growth, rural development so as to ensure 
123 
food security and contribute to poverty alleviation, the Department of Agriculture shall take the lead in 
addressing biosafety issues related to the country's agricultural productivity and food security. In 
coordination with other concerned departments and agencies, and consistent with the requirements of 
transparency and public participation as provided in Sections 6 and 7 of the NBF, it shall exercise such 
jurisdiction and other powers that it has been conferred with under existing laws. 
4.9 Mandate of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. As the primary government 
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's 
environment and natural resources, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) 
shall ensure that environmental assessments are done and impacts identified in biosafety decisions. It 
shall also take the lead in evaluating and monitoring regulated articles intended for bioremediation, the 
improvement of forest genetic resources, and wildlife genetic resources. 
4.10 Mandate of the Department of Health. The Department of Health (DOH), as the principal 
authority on health, shall formulate guidelines in assessing the health impacts posed by modem 
biotechnology and its applications. The DOfT shall also require, review and evaluate results of 
environmental health impact assessments related to modern biotechnology and its applications. In 
coordination with other concerned departments and agencies, it shall exercise such jurisdiction and 
other powers that it has been conferred with under existing laws. 
4.11 Mandate of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. The National Commission on 
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall take the lead in ensuring that the rights of indigenous peoples and 
communities are recognized and protected in all biosafety decisions made which affect them. In 
coordination with other concerned departments and agencies, and consistent with the requirements of 
transparency and public participation as provided in Sections 6 and 7 of the NBF, the NCIP shall 
exercise such jurisdiction and other powers that it has been conferred with under existing laws. In 
particular, the NCIP shall ensure that free and prior informed consent by indigenous peoples and 
communities has been given to the introduction and/or use of regulated articles within the ancestral 
lands and domains of indigenous peoples and communities. 
4.12 Local Government Units. The autonomy of local government units (LGUs) is recognized under 
existing laws and regulations. In this regard, the DILG, in coordination with appropriate agencies, shall 
encourage and support the active participation of LGUs in capacity building, decision making, program 
planning, and implementation related to biosafety. 
4.13 Malldate of Other Departments al1d Agel1cies . In coordination with other concerned departments 
and agencies, and consistent with the requirements of transparency and public participation as provided 
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in Sections 6 and 7 of the NBF, all other departments and agencies shall exercise such jurisdiction and 
other powers that it has been conferred with under existing laws. In particular, the following 
departments and agencies shall participate in biosafety decision making, where appropriate: the 
Department of Foreign Affairs in promoting and protecting Philippine interests on biosafety in 
bilateral, regional and multilateral forums; the Department of Trade and Industry in relation to 
biosafety decisions which have an impact on trade, intellectual property rights, investments and 
consumer welfare and protection. 
4.14 Focal Point and Competent National Authorities. 
4.14.1 For purposes of Article 19 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the national focal point 
responsible for liaison with the Secretariat shall be the Department of Foreign Affairs. The competent 
national authorities, responsible for performing the administrative functions required by the Protocol, 
shall be, depending on the particular genetically modified organisms in question, the following: 
4.14.1.1 The Department of Agriculture, for biosafety decisions, when covered by the Protocol, 
concerning plants and plant products derived from modern biotechnology, fisheries and other aquatic 
resources, domesticated animals and biological products used for animal husbandry or veterinary 
purposes and biological agents used for biocontrol; 
4.14.1.2 The Department of Science and Technology, for biosafety decisions concerning research and 
development, when covered by the Protocol; 
4.14.1.3 The Department of Health, for biosafety decisions concerning pharmaceuticals for humans 
that are not explicitly excluded under Article 5 of the Protocol, i.e. pharmaceuticals which are not 
addressed by other relevant international agreements or organizations; and, 
4.14.1.4 The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, for biosafety decisions covered by 
the Protocol that concern regulated organisms intended for bioremediation, the improvement of forest 
genetic resources, and wildlife genetic resources, and applications of modern biotechnology with 
potential impact on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. 
4.14.2 The national focal point and the competent authorities listed above shall, as appropriate, 
coordinate with the NCBP in accordance with its mandate under Section 4.1. For genetically modified 
organisms not falling under the jurisdiction of the competent authorities enumerated above, the NCBP 
shall designate the appropriate agency that shall act as such authority. 
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4.15 Biosafety Clearing House. Concerned government departments and agencies shall utilize the 
Biosafety Clearing House (BCH) of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in developing and adopting 
biosafety policies, guidelines, and measures and in making biosafety decisions. The NCBP Secretariat 
shall serve as the focal point for the BCH in coordination with the DENR-P A WB serving as the focal 
point for the Clearing House Mechanism (CHM) of the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
4.16 Role of Stakeholders and t he Public. The role of relevant stakeholders and the public in 
biosafety decisions is provided for in Sections 6 and 7 of this Framework. 
SECTION 5. DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
Biosafety decisions shall be made in accordance with existing laws and the following guidelines: 
5.1 Standard of Precaution. In accordance with Article 10 (par. 6) and Article 11 (par. 8) of the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, lack of scientific certainty or consensus due to insufficient relevant 
scientific information and knowledge regardi!1g the extent of the potential adverse effects of a 
genetically modified organism on the environment, particularly on the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity, and on human health, shall not prevent concerned government departments and 
agencies from taking the appropriate decision to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects. In 
such cases, concerned government department and agencies shall take the necessary action to protect 
public interest and v:elfare. 
5.2 Risk Assessment. Risk assessment (RA) shall be mandatory and central in making biosafety 
decisions. It shall identifY and evaluate the risks to human health and the environment, and if 
applicable, to animal health. 
5.2.1 Principles of Risk Assessment. The following principles shall be followed when performing a 
RA to determine whether a regulated article poses significant risks to human health and the 
environment: 
5.2.1.1 The RA shall be carried outin a scientifically sound and transparent manner based on available 
scientific and technical information. The expert advice of and guidelines developed by, relevant 
international organizations, including intergovernmental bodies, and regulatory authorities of countries 
with significant experience in the regulatory supervision of the regulated article shall be taken into 
account in the conduct of risk assessment; 
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5.2.1.2 Lack of scientific knowledge or scientific consensus shall not be interpreted as indicating a 
particular level of risk, an absence of risk, or an acceptable risk; 
5.2.1.3 The identified characteristics of a regulated article and its use which have the potential to pose 
significant risks to human health and the environment shall be compared to those presented by the 
nonmodified organism from which it is derived and its use under the same conditions; 
5.2.1.4 The RA shall be carried out case~by~case and on the basis of transformation event. The required 
information may vary in nature and level of detail from case to case depending on the regulated article 
concerned, its intended use and the receiving environment; and, 
5.2.1.5 If new information on the regulated article and its effects on human health and the environment 
becomes available, and such information is relevant and significant, the RA shall be readdressed to 
determine whether the risk has changed or whether there is a need to amend the risk management 
strategies accordingly. 
5.2.2 Risk Assessment Guidelines. The conduct ofRA by concerned departments and agencies shall be 
in accordance with the policies and standards on RA issued by the NCBP. Annex III of the Cartagena 
Protocol shall also guide RA. As appropriate, such department and agencies may issue their own 
respective administrative issuances establishing the appropriate RA under their particular jurisdictions. 
5.3 Role of Environmental Impact Assessment. The application of the EIA System to biosafety 
decisions shall be determined by concerned departments and agencies subject to the requirements of 
law and the standards set by the NCBP. Where applicable and under the coordination of the NCBP, 
concerned departments and agencies shall issue joint guidelines on the matter. 
5.4 Socio-economic, Ethical, Cultural and Other Considerations. Consistent with Article 26 of the 
Cartagena Protocol, concerned government departments and agencies may take into account socio-
economic considerations arising from the impact of regulated articles on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity, especially with regard to the value of biological diversity to 
indigenous and local communities. 
The NCBP shall issue guidelines relating to the conduct of social, economic, ethical, cultural and other 
assessments, as appropriate , particularly prior to decisions to commercialize products of modern 
biotechnology. These assessments shall be conducted separately from risk assessment and in a 
transparent, participatory and rigorous manner. 
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5.5 Decisions under tile Cartagena Protocol. For decisions required under the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, the competent national authorities identified may choose to adopt the procedures of the 
Advance Informed Agreement as provided in Articles 7,8,9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Protocol or issue 
their own respective rules and regulations provided that such rules and regulations are consistent with 
the ProtocoL In all cases, decisions under this Framework shall fall within those timeframes required 
under the Cartagena ProtocoL As provided however in the Protocol, failure to comply with such 
timeframes shall not imply consent to an intentional transboundary movement of genetically modified 
organisms covered under the ProtocoL 
5.6 Monitoring and Enforcement. All concerned departments and agencies shall monitor compliance 
to the conditions attached to approvals and authorizations, especially on risk management, in a manner 
that is transparent, and in coordination with other agencies, including LGUs, and other stakeholders. It 
shall also include monitoring for impacts, whether anticipated or not, of the introduced product on 
environment and health. 
SECTION 6. ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
The right of the public and the relevant stakeholders to information related to biosafety decisions is 
recognized and shall always be respected in accordance with the following guidelines. 
6.1 Illformation OIl Applicatiolls . Concerned departments and agencies shall, subject to reasonable 
limitations to protect confidential information as provided below, disclose all information on such 
applications in a prompt and timely manner. Such departments and agencies may require applicants to 
provide the information directly to concerned stakeholders. 
6.2 Confidential Illformation. In all applications for approvals, whether domestic or foreign, 
concerned departments and agencies shall ensure that it has procedures and regulations to determine 
and protect confidential information; Provided, however, that the concerned agencies may refuse 
declaring the confidentiality of such information if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the 
prejudice that the disclosure would cause to any entity. 
6.3 Informatioll 011 Biosafety Decisions. The public and stakeholders shall have access to all biosafety 
decisions and the information on which they are based, subject to limitations set in Section 6.2 of this 
Framework. Such decisions shall summarize the application, the results of the risk assessment, and 
other relevant assessments done, the public participation process followed, and the basis for approval 
or denial of the application. 
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6.4 Information on Risk Management, Product Monitoring, and Product Identification. All relevant 
stakeholders shall have access to information related to risk management and product monitoring. 
Information on product identification shall be provided to the general public. 
SECTION 7. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION The concerned government departments and agencies, in 
developing and adopting biosafety policies, guidelines and measures and in making biosafety 
decisions, shall promote, facilitate, and conduct public awareness, education, and meaningful 
participation. They shall incorporate into their respective administrative issuances and processes best 
practices and mechanisms on public participation in accordance with the following guidelines: 
7.1 Scope of Public Participation. Public participation shall apply to all stages of the biosafety 
decision-making process from the time the application is received. For applications on biotechnology 
activities related to research and development, limited primarily for contained use, notice of such 
application through the NCBP shall be sufficient unless public interest and welfare requires otherwise. 
7.2 Minimum Requirements of Public ParticipfJtion. In conducting public participation processes, the 
following minimum requirements shall be followed: 
7.2.1 Notice to all concerned stakeholders, in a language understood by them and through media to 
which they have access. Such notice must be adequate, timely, and effective and posted prominently in 
public places in the areas affected, and in the case of field trials and commercial releases, in both 
national and local print and broadcast media. In all cases, such notices must be posted electronically in 
the internet; 
7.2.2 Adequate and reasonable time frames for public participation procedures. Such procedures 
should allow relevant stakeholders to understand and analyze the benefits and risks, consult with 
independent experts, and make timely interventions. Concerned departments and agencies shall include 
in their appropriate rules and regulations specific time frames for their respective public participation 
processes, including setting a minimum time frame as may be appropriate; 
7.2.3 Public consultations, as a way to secure wide input into the decisions that are to be made. These 
could include formal hearings in certain cases, or solicitation of public comments, particularly where 
there is public controversy about the proposed activities. Public consultations shall encourage 
exchanges of information between applicants and the public before the application is acted upon. 
Dialogue and consensus-building among all stakeholders shall be encouraged. Concerned departments 
and agencies shall specifY in their appropriate rules and regulations the stages when public 
consultations are appropriate, the specific time frames for such consultations, and the circumstanccs 
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when fonnal hearings will be required, including guidelines to ensure orderly proceedings. The 
networks of agricultural and fisheries councils, indigenous peoples and community-based organizations 
in affected areas shall be utilized; 
7.2.4 Written submissions. Procedures for public participation shall include mechanisms that allow 
public participation in writing or through public hearings, and which allow the submission of any 
positions, comments, infonnation, analyses or opinions. Concerned departments and agencies shall 
include in their appropriate rules and regulations the stages when and the process to be followed for 
submitting written comments; and, 
7.2.5 Consideration of public concerns in the decision -making phase following consultation and 
submission of written comments. Public concerns as reflected through the procedures for public 
participation shall be considered in making the decision. The public must be infonned of the final 
decision promptly, have access to the decision, and shall be provided with the reasons and 
considerations resulting in the decision, upon request. 
SECTION 8. CAPACITY BUILDING AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
Implementing the NBF requires the design, adoption and implementation of a capacity-building 
program supported by adequate financial resources. The following considerations shall be taken into 
account in developing such a program: 
8.1 Need for Capacity Building. To ensure the proper implementation of the NBF, the capacities of 
various sectors: policy-makers, regulatory agencies, local government units, research community and 
the general public involved in performing various tasks must be strengthened; 
(a) Policy makers must be made aware of issues and provided with sufficient and most current 
information on biosafety for the enactment of appropriate policies, regulations and programs; 
(b) Expertise and appropriate facilities in regulatory agencies must be developed for the safety 
assessment of regulated articles, harmonization of regulatory policies and procedures and monitoring 
compliance and outcomes to biosafety regulations; 
(c) The research community must be supported to enable them to address the safety issues of regulated 
articles; and, 
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(d) The general public must be made aware of issues, provided with the correct information and 
enabled to participate in the biosafety decision-making process. The capacity of environmental and 
developmental non-government organizations, people's organizations, professional organizations, 
including industry and other concerned entities to assist in this capacity-building program shall be 
enhanced. Agencies involved in implementing the NBF should undertake programs to achieve the 
above objectives. 
8.2 Areas for Capacity Building. Capacity building in all areas relevant to biosafety and biosafety-
decision making is necessary, and particularly in the following: in conducting risk assessment; in 
undertaking social, economic, cultural, ethical and other assessments; and, in implementing transparent 
and effective public participation procedures. 
8.3 Designing and Implementing a Capacity -Building Program. In coordination with other 
concerned government department and agencies, and with the participation of all relevant stakeholders, 
the NCBP shall take the lead in developing and implementing multi-agency and multi-sector capacity-
building programs that are needed for the effective implementation of the NBF. The basis of such 
programs shall be a capability needs assessment undertaken by each concerned department and agency 
and by the relevant stakeholders. 
8.4 Financial Resources. The DOST, DENR, DA, and DOH shall allocate from their present budgets 
such amount as may be necessary to implement the NBF, including to support the operations of the 
NCBP and its Secretariat. Thereafter, the funding requirements shall be included in the General 
Appropriations Bill submitted to Congress. These concerned departments, on an annual or other 
periodic basis, shall enter into agreement on the sharing of financial and technical resource to support 
the NCBP and its Secretariat. 
SECTION 9. REMEDIES 
In cases of violations of laws, rnles, and regulations related to biosafety, the following remedies shall 
apply: 
9.1 Administrative Remedies. The concerned departments and agencies shall ensure, in accordance 
with law, that the right of appeal and other administrative remedies are available to applicants and 
relevant stakeholders in biosafety decisions. 
9.2 Criminal Liability. Natural or juridical persons committing offenses in violation of existing laws 
shall be prosecuted and penalized in accordance with such laws. 
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9.3 Civil Liability . Philippine laws on liability and compensation for damages resulting injuries 
committed on persons shall apply in accordance with such laws. Concerned departments or agencies 
shall study the feasibility of requiring such instruments as indemnification bonds. 
9.4 International Law. International legal norms on liability and compensation, including those 
developed and adopted under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, shall likewise apply. 
9.5 Review of Remedies. Recognizing the current gaps in the law on remedies related to biosafety, the 
NCBP shall, as a matter of priority, review the existing laws and recommend to Congress the 
appropriate legislation. 
SECTION 10. REVIEW 
The NBF shall be reviewed periodically to identify gaps and lessons learned from its implementation 
and to incorporate new information that may lead to its improvement. Such review shall be conducted 
in five year intervals unless circumstances, such as emergencies or new developments in the science 
and technology, require an earlier review. 
10.1 Review Process. The review shall be initiated by the NCBP and shall involve concerned 
departments and agencies. Public consultations, in accordance with Section 6, shall be undertaken 
whenever substantive changes are proposed to the Framework. 
10.2 Process of Delisting . Delisting of regulated articles shall rest on the regulatory agencies, subject 
to guidelines set under the NCBP process. The NCBP shall initiate a study on the feasibility of a 
delisting procedure for regulated articles. 
10.3 Legislation . Lessons learned from implementing the Framework shall be documented and, at an 
appropriate time, conveyed to Congress for purposes of developing, drafting and adopting legislation 
on biosafety. 
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APPENDIXB 
GENERAL INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTIONS 
1. What can you say about the biosecurity/biosafety system in the country? 
2. What framework for addressing biosecurity/biosafety issues and concems does the country follow? 
3. Do you agree that biosecurity should encompass biosafety? To what extent do you think should 
biosecurity encompass biosafety? 
4. What is your comment to the international/regional harmonisation of biosecurity efforts? 
5. Do you agree that there is need for a coordinated and/or unified approach to handling the issues of 
biosecurity and biosafety? How do you think the PhilippineslNew Zealand should address the 
issue ofbiosecurity in relation to biosafety? 
6. What is you comment in terms of capacity and capability of the country in implementing 
biosecurity/biosafety measures? 
7. To what extent do you think the PhilippineslNew Zealand accommodates transparency and public 
participation in the policy and decision making process in terms of biosecurity? In terms of 
biosafety? 
8. How do you think cultural, ethical and spiritual values could be incorporated m the risks 
assessment mechanism? 
9. What is your comment on the use of the Precautionary Principle in dealing with the issues on 
biosecurity/biosafety? 
10. In terms ofrisk assessment, where do you stand: strictly science-based vs. consideration of socio-
economic issues/concerns? 
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APPENDIXC 
LIST OF MAJOR DOCUMENTS EXAMINED 
In the Philippines: 
1. Developing the National Biosafety Framework (NBF) for the Philippines, 2004. 
2. Proceedings: National Workshop in Developing the NBF for the Philippines, 2-3 March 2004. 
3. Proceedings: Mindanao Regional Workshop in Developing the NBF for the Philippines, 5-6 
January 2004. 
4. Proceedings: Luzon Regional Workshop in Developing the NBF for the Philippines, 8-9 January 
2004. 
5. Proceedings: Visayas Regional Workshop in Developing the NBF for the Philippines, 12-13 
January 2004. 
6. Proceedings: Experts' Group Workshop in Developing the NBF for the Philippines, 08 October 
2003. 
7. Minutes of Meetings: National Coordinating Committee (NCC) Meetings 1 to 11, period 2003-
2004. 
In New Zealand: 
8. The Biosecurity Strategy for New Zealand, August 2003. 
9. Cabinet Papers: Biosecurity Strategy for New Zealand Overview and Cross cutting Issues, 2003. 
10. Memorandum of Understanding on Biosecurity Activities between MAF and DOC, MFish and 
MOH, June 2005. 
11. ERMA Statement of Intent (SOl) 2004/2005 
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12. MAF SOl 2004/2005 
13. MAF Annual Report 2003/2004 
14. Proceedings 2nd New Zealand Biosecurity Summit, November 2004. 
General: 
15. UNEP-GEF Project on Development of National Biosafety Frameworks, PHASE 3 Toolkit 
Module Part (i) Developing the Regulatory Regime, 2004. 
16. Development of a Regional Risk Management Framework for APEC Economies for Use in the 
Control and Prevention ofIntroduced Marine Pests, 2001. 
17. Towards a Food Secure Asia and Pacific: Regional Strategic Framework for Asia and the Pacific, 
Second Edition, 2004. 
18. Setting a Research Agenda on Agricultural Biotechnology and Biosafety in Asia, 2005. 
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APPENDIXD 
LIST OF OFFICES VISITED 
In the Philippines: 
1. Department of Science and Technology, Taguig, Metro Manila 
2. Department of Agriculture, Diliman, Quezon City 
3. Bureau of Agricultural Research (BAR), Visayas Ave., Quezon City 
4. Department of Environment and Natural Resources - Protected Area and Wildlife Bureau, Quezon 
City 
5. University of the Philippines - Los Banos, Laguna 
6. International Rice Research Institute, Los Banos, Laguna 
In New Zealand: 
7. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, The Terrace, Wellington 
8. Biosecurity Strategy Unit, The Terrace, Wellington 
9. Environmental Risk Management Authority, Customhouse Quay, Wellington 
10. Environment Canterbury, Christchurch. 
11. University of Canterbury, Christchurch 
12. Lincoln University, Lincoln. 
136 
